Scotland the brave? US strategic policy in Scotland 1953-1974 by Mackay, David Gerard
Scotland the Brave? US Strategic Policy in Scotland 1953-1974 
 
i 
D G MACKAY 
 
 
 
SCOTLAND THE BRAVE?  
US STRATEGIC POLICY IN SCOTLAND 1953-1974 
 
 
 
 
 
To April and Lorraine 
 
 
 Scotland the Brave? US Strategic Policy in Scotland 1953-1974 
 
ii 
ABSTRACT 
 
During the Cold War, American strategic policy was exercised and implemented on a 
worldwide basis; decisions taken by Presidents and their advisers were eventually 
implemented at some other location. Scotland was one of these other locations and 
this research project will examine the implementation of the US strategic doctrine and 
its eventual delivery in Scotland. The research covers the following four questions.   
 
Why were the Americans present in Scotland during this period in such strength? 
What were they doing there? 
How did this change over time? 
How does this study of policy implementation help us to understand the American 
motives? 
 
The research is split into six separate chapters. The first chapter sets the scene and 
poses the research questions noted above. The purpose of the remaining chapters is to 
examine activities that had a physical presence in Scotland and interrogate the 
research sources to find answers to the contextual questions. 
 
Chapter Two examines how the US established and maintained an intelligence 
gathering system at Edzell and Thurso, apparently regardless of any larger strategic 
imperatives. Chapter Three deals with the creation of the US Polaris submarine base 
at Holy Loch, the most high profile base in the UK. Chapter Four, anti-submarine 
warfare (ASW) strategy addresses the strategic importance of the Scottish base at 
Thurso for this purpose. Chapter Five concentrates on the communications, navigation 
and logistics tasks carried out by the US forces in the UK, and especially in Scotland. 
The final chapter draws the systematic study together along with the conclusions 
reached in each chapter to the research questions. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
 
During the Cold War, American strategic policy was exercised and implemented on a 
worldwide  basis;  decisions  which  were  taken  by  Presidents  and  their  advisers  were 
subsequently  implemented  at  some  other  location.  Scotland  was  one  of  these  other 
locations and this research project will examine the implementation of the US strategic 
doctrine and its eventual delivery in Scotland. 
 
Scotland can claim to have been in the front line of the Cold War due to its strategic 
location and the presence of the US nuclear ballistic missile submarine fleet in the Holy 
Loch, the signals intelligence stations at Edzell, Thurso, Kirknewton and Mormond Hill, 
and the strategic reinforcement airfields at Prestwick and Machrihanish. The research will 
examine these activities in the context of changing American strategic defence policy 
during the mid-Cold War period, i.e. from 1953 to 1974, covering the presidencies of 
Eisenhower,  Kennedy,  Johnson  and  Nixon.  These  dates  have  been  chosen  as  they 
encompass the establishment of the first US strategic base in Scotland at Kirknewton in 
1953 and the end of the landmark strategic policy of the Nixon presidency in 1974 when 
he had ended the Vietnam War, changed US-Chinese relations and built détente with the 
USSR. 
 
Scotland has been chosen as the focus of the research as it contained all of the major 
components of US policy – intelligence gathering, strategic retaliation, anti-submarine 
warfare and command and control facilities. These features were also present at other 
bases in the UK, but only Scotland had the major intelligence gathering and strategic 
retaliation  bases.  This  factor  makes  it  worthy  of  research.  This  limited  focus  will 
necessarily exclude other important activities that were carried out at these UK locations. Scotland the Brave? US Strategic Policy in Scotland 1953-1974 
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 However, the topic of US strategic presence in Scotland during this period has not been 
covered in any detail and therefore the research will cover new ground. 
 
The research questions in this paper are as follows:   
·  Why were the Americans present in Scotland during this period in such strength? 
·  What were they doing there? 
·  How did this change over time? 
·  How does this study of policy implementation help us to understand the American 
motives? 
The sources used are from the US National Archives College Park, the UK Public Record 
Office, the National Archives of Scotland, the Foreign Relations of the United States and 
a  variety  of  online  primary  sources  from  US  and  UK  government  declassified  sites. 
Almost all of the relevant information has been provided solely from US and UK primary 
sources, as there is a limited amount of translated Soviet/Warsaw Pact primary source 
material available. There is a wide-ranging collection of material, with some excellent 
detailed  coverage,  but  also  some  areas  have  little  primary  source  material  currently 
accessible.  As  a  consequence  of  these  limitations,  the  research  does  not  address  in 
detailed fashion the full history of US actions during the period. However, there is an 
adequate supply of information available to construct a reasonable picture of the events of 
the time. 
 
Review of the Literature 
 
The  Cold  War  dominated  international  relations  activity  of  its  time.  There  has  been 
plenty of reporting on policy matters, but practical implementation measures have been 
somewhat  neglected,  especially  in  the  case  of  US  strategic  activities  in  Scotland. 
Presidential actions have been well observed, but there has been less coverage for the 
‘lower, practical’ activities. The project will attempt to link the high level decisions with 
the lower level activities, and relate them to actions in Scotland.  
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Three main schools of thought exist about American bases in the UK. The first of these 
emphasises American unilateralism and technically-driven defence matters. The second 
concerns itself with US multilateralism, with references to relations with NATO and the 
importance of the political relationship. The final school takes the US/UK relationship as 
its focus and examines this from a political viewpoint.  
 
This research focuses on the American development of strategic policy and examines its 
implementation in its Scottish bases; this aspect has a limited supply of detailed literature. 
School One is dominant in this field as it considers all American actions as unilateral, and 
School Three, the UK/US political relationship, also has support. Related events will be 
examined through the US strategic doctrine, the Anglo-American Relationship and the 
use of American bases in Scotland. There is a variety of literature and original sources on 
these matters, but there is a shortage of original Soviet information in sharp contrast to 
the non-Soviet reports on the same matters. 
 
American Strategic Doctrine 
 
The principal change to America’s strategic doctrine in this period was the move from 
military involvement in strategy to complete civilian control and the subsequent effort to 
reduce dependence on the use of nuclear weapons. The research project deals principally 
with American strategic policy, which moved from Massive Retaliation in the 1950s to 
Flexible Response in the 1960s. It has considerable interest for historians and has resulted 
in a consistent tension in their views. Denis Healy, former UK Secretary of Defence is of 
the opinion that ‘Soviet intransigence’ shaped US policy and was accelerated by 
American and UK officials who had worked together during the war.
1 
 
Michael Korda notes that Eisenhower did not believe that there was a ‘single, simple 
answer to defending the United States’, and although Gaddis does not rate Eisenhower as 
a great president, he acknowledges that his ‘strategy was coherent’ and in overall terms 
                                                 
1 Healey, Denis, The Time of my Life, (London: Politicos, 2006), p.102 
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was ‘more considerate than detrimental to the national interest.’ This, Gaddis reckons, 
was a better legacy than what had preceded it, as well as what followed it.
2 In simple 
terms, Eisenhower was faced with an American doctrine of all-out nuclear response to 
any Soviet aggression and he worked to alter this situation. 
 
Lawrence Freedman believes that the use of nuclear weapons by NATO was established 
by the New Look policy of the mid-1950s and in January 1954, Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles stated advanced the concept of Massive Retaliation; the US would 
‘retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing’. However, Massive 
Retaliation had its critics from its start in 1953, principally General Ridgeway, General 
Taylor, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze.
 3  In 1958 Dulles wrote 
to Macmillan ‘our entire military establishment assumes more and more that the use of 
nuclear weapons will become normal in the event of hostilities.’
4 Despite this belligerent 
attitude, Eisenhower still did not commit himself to the use of nuclear weapons in any of 
the crises of his presidency. Dockrill holds that Eisenhower’s New Look strategic policy 
was heavily reliant on collective security as its mainspring, with the USA providing the 
nuclear capability and the other NATO allies providing the regional conventional 
defences 
 
American strategic policy was predicated on two factors; first, the relentless advance of 
the ‘military-industrial’ complex as publicly identified by Eisenhower in 1961 and 
development of nuclear weaponry, and second, the imperative that the US must remain 
the sole nuclear power in the NATO alliance. 
5  All commentators agree on these points.  
                                                 
2 Michael Korda, Ike: The American Hero, (New York: Harper, 2007), p.701. John Lewis Gaddis, 
Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold 
War, Revised and Expanded Edition, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.196 
 
3 Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, (London: Macmillan, 1999), pp.38-41. 
 
4 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Third Edition, (New York and Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.85. R. Harkavy (1982) Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases, 
(Oxford: Pergammon,1982), p.216. 
 
5 George W Baer, One Hundred years of Sea Power: the US Navy 1809-1990, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1996). pp.340-2. 
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Eisenhower was determined to avoid wars after his experiences in  World  War 2 and 
Korea. He fully backed the development of nuclear weaponry as a prominent feature of 
US strategic doctrine, mainly centred on the Strategic Air Command (SAC) However, 
this  strategic  outlook  could  only  result  in  huge  civilian  casualties  and  needed  to  be 
changed.  
 
George W Baer and Donald Cameron Watt point out that prior to 1947, each individual 
service ran as an autonomous organisation, with its dedicated Cabinet Secretary; after 
this, the Secretary of Defense was the controller and only Cabinet member. 
6 This 
resulted in a growth of civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1,865 to 
21,457 in 1962. Each service, however, attempted to continue its own research 
programme, and constant rows erupted between chiefs of staff over the rights of their 
own services to have the main part in the delivery of American strategic policy.
7 
However, with the arrival of the Polaris submarine fleet, control of strategy was in the 
hands of the US Government. 
 
George W Baer points out that after WW2 both the US Army and the US Air Force laid 
claim to the strategic role; both could deliver the atomic/nuclear weapons in the US 
arsenal and this left the US Navy on the outside, being robbed of its long reach strategic 
philosophy of Mahan. However, the Navy managed to secure a strategic role with 
nuclear-armed seaplanes. This was, however, a contradiction of the belief that a short all-
out nuclear war could be avoided by having a longer, conventional-based conflict. This 
was the basis for the ‘fire-break’ strategic doctrine.
8 It also formed the crux of the inter-
services arguments over strategic direction. 
 
                                                 
6 Baer, p.370-2. D C Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain’s Place 1900-1975, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), p.8. 
 
7 Watt, p.8. 
 
8 Baer, pp.1-5. 
 Scotland the Brave? US Strategic Policy in Scotland 1953-1974 
  8   
There was a huge increase in missile production in the late 1950s; the purpose of US 
nuclear forces was to be able to survive a Soviet first strike and therefore the importance 
of submarine-based missiles became obvious.
 9 The USSR, he notes, had a similar view, 
notes Freedman, and General Pokrovsky was able to proclaim, truthfully, that ‘the future 
belongs to long-range ballistic rockets.’ 
 
Dockrill maintains, because of the simple fact of the Soviet nuclear capability, relatively 
unsophisticated that it may have been, which could still reach the continental USA, 
Eisenhower was forced to concede that ‘for the first time in its history the United States is 
now fearful.’ By 1960, note both Stromseth and Dalder, the Soviet Union’s increased 
capability of striking the United States meant that the policy of massive retaliation lacked 
credibility.
10 All the SAC sites were vulnerable to Soviet first-strike attack. On the other 
hand, Polaris submarines were almost impossible to find and attack and introduced the 
concept of ‘finite deterrence’. This concept was adopted by Eisenhower’s administration 
as it limited force levels and was obviously an alternative to massive retaliation. Kennedy 
accelerated the Polaris programme.
11 
 
The SAC planners refused to target any smaller targets, notes Beatrice Heuser, and their 
1962 SIOP still provided for an immediate simultaneous release of all nuclear weapons at 
the outbreak of war. By this time, Kennedy and McNamara were in the process of 
regaining control of military actions from military officers; their only strategic option 
available during the Cuban missile crisis was to have initiated an immediate nuclear 
holocaust.
 12  The question for Kennedy and his successors was how to deal with this 
                                                 
9 Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), pp.46, 103, 143, 248. 
 
10 J Stromseth, The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO’s debate over Strategy in the 1960s, (New York: 
St Martin’s Press, 1988),p.29. Ivo Dalder, The Nature and practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy 
and Theater Nuclear Forces since 1967, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991),p.1. 
 
11 Baer, pp.350-76. 
 
12 Heuser, NATO, Britain, France, pp.38-41. 
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blunt reality and develop a second strike capability.
 The SSBN fleet fitted this 
requirement perfectly. 
13   
 
On taking office, Daalder notes that Kennedy identified three priorities – to strengthen 
the nuclear deterrent, to create more flexible non-nuclear options and to establish central 
control over nuclear weapons. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson produced a report 
which was the core of Kennedy’s strategic thinking.
 14 Kennedy, Johnson and McNamara 
were against the proliferation of nuclear weapons to anyone; their aim was a single 
NATO nuclear force, the USA and a return to the doctrine of ‘Symmetrical Response’ of 
Truman’s time. But, as noted by Heuser, this was never welcomed by the European allies 
because of their deep-rooted suspicions of desertion by the USA in the event of a nuclear 
conflict. 
15 
 
McNamara’s principal role, as claimed by Freedman, was to ensure that the USA built up 
a guaranteed second-strike capability as ‘the president’s hand should not be forced by 
lack of alternatives.’ McNamara’s strategy had a ‘plentiful supply’ of the necessary 
weapons ‘in each major category…to ride out a Soviet attack and still be available for 
retaliation.’
 16 One of these was the newly developed SSBN fleet and this was a major 
policy change from Massive Retaliation. Freedman points out that there were many 
senior officers within the US Navy who did not support the SSBN project in its early 
days, because of a fear that ‘it was diverting funds away from the large surface ships they 
preferred.’
 Military opposition continued from the sceptical SACEURs, Generals 
Greunther and Norstad, the latter being eventually sacked by McNamara for his 
opposition.
  
 
                                                 
13 Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1996), p.284. Freedman, Nuclear Strategy, pp.158, 319-20.. 
 
14 Dalder, p.30. 
 
15 Heuser, Russia, the Soviet Union, pp.43-6. 
 
16 Freedman, Nuclear Strategy, pp.107, 220-6.  
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Kennedy inherited the SIOP with all of its absurdities; in retrospect it gives the 
impression of a ‘Dr Strangelove’ scenario; this prompted Kennedy and McNamara to 
institute serious strategic changes. By this time, Burke had ensured that the Polaris fleet 
would not come under the command of SAC. The Defense Reorganisation Act of 1958 
gave operational command and control to the Secretary of Defense, instead of the 
military chiefs. This gave McNamara great strength in his programme of change and the 
Berlin Crisis of 1961, notes Baer, exposed Kennedy’s lack of conventional options and 
brought great focus on the flexible response concept.
17 
 
Duffield shows that America faced two strategic problems, the threat of a direct attack 
against the USA by the Soviet Union and the Soviet threat to Europe. These problems 
were never resolved to the complete satisfaction of the USA or the European allies.
18 
There was constant tension over NATO’s ability to implement measures, as these 
depended on the numbers of conventional forces available, with the Europeans 
demanding an earlier release of nuclear weapons than desired by the USA. The Soviet 
General Staff believed that ‘military operations would begin in ‘the heart of the warring 
countries’, by nuclear means, 
19 but McNamara devised a counter strategy that responded 
to real events, giving the USA a retaliatory capability.  
 
NATO’s underpinning bargain was that the US would assist with Europe’s post-war 
defence and reconstruction, according to Stanley Sloan, 
20  but the US Congress 
constantly demanded less American involvement in the defence of Western Europe; there 
                                                 
17 Baer, pp.365-7, 379. 
 
18 John S Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture, (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 11-12. 
 
19 Speech to the Supreme Soviet, Pravda 16 January 1960, in Thomas M Nichols, The Sacred Cause: Civil-
Military Conflict Over Soviet National Security 1917-1992, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1993), pp.63, 69, 94-5, & 101. Freedman, Nuclear Strategy, pp.220-6. 
 
20 Stanley R Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: the Transatlantic Bargain 
Reconsidered, (Lanham: Boulder, New York. 2003), pp.1 & 41. 
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was never any lessening of the American presence and strategic capabilities in Scotland.
21 
However, Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programme was starved of finance and 
ultimately did not make the advances it otherwise could have done.
 
 
According to Freedman, the Flexible Response agreement of 1967 did not result in the 
increases in European conventional forces implied, because the defence expenditures 
declined.
 22 The year 1969, was a ‘major turning point…in the Cold War’ according to 
John Lewis Gaddis, as the USSR had now achieved nuclear parity.
23 There were also 
armed confrontations between Soviet and Chinese forces, and the USA was beginning to 
withdraw from Vietnam. America’s overstretched policy had to change and this change 
was viewed as a retreat by the Soviets. 
 
Nixon and Kissinger radically changed US strategic policy after this time; Robert Dallek 
points out their positive achievements as they ended the Vietnam War after long talks, 
overturned international relations regarding the treatment of China and strengthened the 
détente already under way between the USA and the USSR.
24 
 
The US/UK Special relationship 
 
There is plenty of literature available on the US/UK special relationship dealing with 
Eisenhower, Macmillan, Kennedy and Johnson, but not very much for the Nixon/Heath 
era. This is probably explicable by the change in America’s worldwide superpower status 
during the 1970s as opposed to the still strong wartime bonds in the 1950s and 1960s. 
                                                 
21 Richard K Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crisis, (New York: Columbia University Press 
Morningside Edition, 1991), p. 91: Stephen E Ambrose, Eisenhower Soldier and President, (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1990), p. 44. 
 
22 Freedman, Nuclear Strategy, p.271.  
 
23 John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
1978), p.256: David Miller, The Cold War: Military History, (London: John Murray, 1998), p.422: 
Jonathan Samuel Lockwood and Kathleen O’Brien Lockwood, The Russian Views of US Strategy: Its Past, 
Its Future, (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishing, 1993), p.136. 
 
24 Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, (London: Penguin Books, 2008), p. x. 
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The ‘special relationship’ between the USA and the UK, as noted by Rasmussen and 
McCormick, was a broad and complex network of links; trade, investment, 
communications, military; there were three layers – personal ties between leaders, mass 
sentiment and elite cooperation. 
25 The commonly expressed views are that American 
actions were fully supported by the UK, and that the USA acted in its own interests at all 
times. The only historical debate appears to be the extent to which the UK benefited and 
this will be examined by the research sources in later chapters. 
 
Robin Harris points out that from 1944 onwards, Harold Macmillan kept up the constant 
illusion that the British were actually the Greeks (smooth and sophisticated) and the 
Americans were the Romans (strong); by such string pulling he believed that he could 
guide the ‘Atlantic community’.
26 American policy towards Britain believed that, under 
their guidance, the UK could reassemble a friendly coalition. Harris believes that this was 
not accomplished, but acknowledges the definite advantages of the 1947 US/UK 
intelligence gathering agreement. 
 
John Baylis believes that the ‘special’ relationship was identified as a positive and 
essential matter by the JCS in November 1951, pointing out that the UK could host the 
US strategic bomber force. This was essential as the US strategic missile force had 
limited range and required operational bases close to the USSR; it also covered the 
strategic imperative of establishing targets for the Soviets away from mainland USA.
27 
 
                                                 
25 Jorgen Rasmussen and James M McCormick, British, Misperceptions of the Anglo-American 
Relationship, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 108, No. 3, (Autumn 1993), pp.515-541.  
<http://www.jstor.org/view/00323195/di980441/98p0471a/1?frame=noframe&userID=817710123@gla.ac.
uk/01cc993399b9010caac63987&dpi=3&config=jstor> [accessed 15 May 2006].  
 
26 Robin Harris The State of the Special Relationship, Policy Review, <http://policyreview.org/jun02 
/harris_print.html> [accessed 14 June 2006]. 
 
27 John Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1984: The Special Relationship, Second Edition; 
(London: Macmillan, 1984), pp.40-1 & 78. 
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Eisenhower acknowledged the importance of the UK’s support and strategic position in 
providing forward bases for the development of any flexible response concept.
28 Britain 
was an ‘indispensable partner’ that needed American backing in political, military and 
economic  matters.  However,  Britain’s  tendency  to  ignore  American  opinion  was  not 
ignored. Frank C. Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense, produced a report in November 
1957 which recommended that the possible closure of some UK bases would not be well 
received  and  urged  caution  on  such  actions;  the  realities  of  the  US/UK  partnership 
required constant fine tuning, despite American dominance. This approach suggests that 
the US recognised that the UK needed some tangible benefits from the relationship and 
this was something which Eisenhower tried to accomplish, even after his great rage after 
the Suez crisis in 1956. 
 
Moreover, this British conception of a special relationship (it was always much more a 
British idea than an American claims David Reynolds) served to differentiate the 
“English-speaking peoples” from continental Europe – ravaged by war and wracked by 
political turmoil.
29 The United States had much more to offer in power, wealth and 
ideology and Britain’s absence from the European Economic Community until the 1970s 
reflected this pervasive sense that the Atlantic was narrower than the Channel. 
 
The Soviet technological advances of the time ensured that the UK was essential to the 
home  defence  of  the  USA  and  Kennedy  strongly  promoted  the  ‘special  relationship’ 
when Harold Macmillan visited Washington in April 1962.
30 Nevertheless, John Baylis 
also  notes  that  the  US  regarded  itself  as  immeasurably  the  senior  partner,  ‘the  only 
nuclear power’ as stated by McGeorge Bundy, the National Security Advisor, and wanted 
the UK to concentrate on conventional forces within the NATO alliance.  
                                                 
28 Appendix to Frank C. Nash's White House report on U.S. Overseas Military Bases, Country Studies: 
Great Britain. Miscellaneous, 1 November 1957. Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. 
Document Number: CK3100288057. [accessed 25 June 2006]. 
 
29 David Reynolds, Rich Relations: the American Occupation of Britain. (London: Phoenix Press, 2000), 
p.439. 
 
30 John Baylis, Anglo-American Relations since 1939: The Enduring Alliance, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1997), pp.97-121.  
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David Reynolds holds the opinion that during the entire Macmillan premiership the 
Anglo-American relationship worked well, particularly to create the success of the 
Marshall Plan and NATO. Britain was a major ally that could share America’s burden in 
Europe, and elsewhere; Britain also housed the SAC B-47s, and in Cold War terms, the 
‘convergence of interests’ were more in Europe than elsewhere. However, he states that 
there was a ‘pronounced decline’ in the UK relationship and value to US after 1963, 
partly due to personalities, but above all, to the reality that British power had reduced 
during this period and fundamental economic weakness had caught up. According to 
Robert Dallek, the UK did not have any real influence in the SALT negotiations, despite 
warning the US to ban MIRVs ‘to prevent a new phase in arms competition’; the UK was 
right, but was ignored, thus illustrating its marginal influence in the relationship. Britain 
was beginning to recede from its importance as a world power because it had withdrawn 
from East of Suez. 
31 
 
A ruthless exposure of the relationship was vigorously elucidated by D C Watt, in 
‘Succeeding John Bull…’, examines the blunt facts of the ‘replacement’ of Britain’s 
influence in the world by that of the United States during the twentieth century, 
confirming the growth of America’s worldwide influence.
32 He does not think that the US 
managed this as well as they ought to have done and in particular, the admirals of the US 
Navy have been held to have overtly influenced the designs of the president and his 
associates, an echo of the strategic policy situation. However, he also believes that 
Britain’s decline was accelerated by the Americans who did nothing to prevent it and 
dismisses Macmillan’s ‘Atlantic community’ as nonsense, with marginal benefit to the 
UK. 
                                                 
31 David Reynolds, A 'Special Relationship'? America, Britain and the International Order Since the 
Second World War, International Affairs Vol 62, Number 1, (London. Royal Institute of International 
Affairs 1985), pp.1-20. Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power, (London: Penguin Books, 
2008), p.141. 
 
32 Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's place, 1900-1975: a study of the Anglo-American 
relationship and world politics in the context of British and American foreign-policy-making in the 
twentieth century, (Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1984); 
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He points out that Macmillan skilfully handled his American counterparts and achieved 
three notable ‘coups’; the amendment of the McMahon Act in 1958, the promise of the 
Skybolt missile in 1960 and finally, the replacement of the cancelled  Skybolt by the 
Polaris missiles: these were undoubted benefits for Britain. 
33  Macmillan and Eisenhower 
had agreed that Thor ICBMs would be stationed in the UK in 1957; these missiles would 
be carried by the RAF Vulcan fleet, but they were on the verge of obsolescence. By 1960, 
the  UK  had  abandoned  its  development  of  the  Blue  Streak  missile  and  Skybolt  was 
proposed as part of the agreement to permit the USA to base its Polaris submarines at 
Holy Loch.
34 
 
But, as shown by Peter Nailor, by 1962 Macmillan regarded Skybolt as a ‘dubiously 
effective, rather expensive airborne missile system.’ The UK had become aware of the 
Skybolt problems and had sensibly prepared a proposal to receive Polaris instead. At 
Nassau little time was spent on SKYBOLT; the American case for cancellation was clear 
enough and the conference took place under tension, particularly regarding lack of 
consultation during the Cuba crisis.
35 The UK desperately needed a quid pro quo and 
Macmillan extracted the Polaris submarine system from a reluctant Kennedy. They had a 
fundamental disagreement over the UK’s true role in the NATO alliance and the 
possession of an independent UK nuclear weapon was contrary to the American hopes of 
a united European force under US command. Macmillan’s efforts at Nassau ended with 
the UK obtaining a far better weapon, i.e. Polaris.  This is probably the only time the UK 
actually gained a benefit which the USA did not want them to have, but the UK media 
was not supportive because of the heavy American influence on weapon system.
36 
                                                 
33 D C Watt, ‘Demythologising the Eisenhower Era’, in The Special Relationship: Anglo-American 
Relations Since 1945, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p.95. Eric J Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British 
Naval Policy Since World War II, (London: Bodley Head, 1987), pp.237-8. 
 
34 Dominic Sandbrook, Never Had It So Good: A History of Britain from Suez to the Beatles, (London: 
Little, Brown, 2005), p.228. 
 
35  Peter Nailor,  The  Nassau Connection:  The  Organisation  and  Management  of  the  British  POLARIS 
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36 Sandbrook, p.230. Scotland the Brave? US Strategic Policy in Scotland 1953-1974 
  16   
 
The Vietnam War and Britain’s lack of involvement dismayed the Secretary of State, 
Dean Rusk, whose opinion was that the US should not have assisted the UK ‘even if 
Sussex were invaded.’ This comment well illustrates the deterioration of the relationship 
amongst  those  at  the  highest  political  level  during  the  Johnson-Wilson  years.  It  also 
demonstrates the ‘master/slave’ relationship expected by the USA, despite there being no 
possible  benefit  to  the  UK  by  such  assistance.  Similar  abuse  of  the  British  media’s 
coverage of Vietnam was expressed by Nixon to Kissinger in 1971.
 37 
 
Edward Heath became prime minister in 1970: he was not interested in courting Richard 
Nixon and his own policies were aimed at gaining Britain’s entry into Europe.
38 Relations 
were so fragile that during the Yom Kippur War in 1973 the US government did not ask 
for permission to use British bases for aircraft carrying armaments to Israel, as they knew 
it would have been refused.
 Watt regards the Nixon election as a disaster for Anglo-
American relations, as Nixon paid ‘lip-service’ to the ‘special relationship’.
 39  
 
However, in the words of Admiral Sir James Eberle, the ‘full account’ of the relationship 
cannot be written for many years because of the ‘high security value’ of most of the 
defence and intelligence activities.
40 The research project will examine these as closely as 
is possible. Firstly it will search the relevant national archives for information relating to 
these two sensitive topics, defence and intelligence, which were the bedrock of the Cold 
War. Other primary sources, such as the online declassified document libraries, will be 
examined to discover the little incidents and developments which produced gradual 
changes in operational matters, particularly in the implementation activities necessary to 
carry out US strategic policy in Scotland. Finally, personal memoirs will be used to 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
37 Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations, p.155. Watt, Succeeding John Bull, p.138. Dallek, p.261. 
 
38 Watt, Succeeding John Bull, pp.155-6. 
 
39 Watt, Succeeding John Bull, pp.150-3. 
 
40 Admiral Sir James Eberle, ‘The Military Relationship’, in The ‘Special Relationship’; Anglo-American 
Relations Since 1945, ed by WM Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, (Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1986), p.151. 
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discover interesting and informative facts about day-to-day, but significant, attitudes 
regarding various activities. However, it is unlikely that there will be any great 
breakthroughs as the vast majority of such official knowledge is still classified and will 
not be released for many years. Nevertheless, there is every likelihood that there is 
enough information available to the research project to conclude accurately the 
underlying actions of officials and military officers during this period. 
 
The Use of American Bases in Britain 
 
Since World War 2, American bases have been a fact of life in the UK. In overall terms, 
there is a useful body of literature available for the American bases in the UK, but most 
of the useful detail regarding Scotland is missing and can only be provided by reference 
to primary sources. Most of the opinions expressed regarding their purpose are either 
neutral, or that the bases were always part of the overall American/NATO strategic 
requirement, or, that the bases were kept in the UK because of American national security 
requirements. 
 
There is a selection of literature which deals with America’s overseas bases; some of this 
is in compendium form, such as the works by Anni P Baker, Paolo E Coletta, and Jack 
Bauer, Simon Duke and Christopher T Sandars, and covers a worldwide range and a 
period of 100 years.
41 These list various locations, activities and some prominent actions 
associated with them; the information is well researched and reliable, but they do not 
cover the Scottish bases in any detail.  
 
Duncan  Campbell,  author  of  the  influential  work,  The  Unsinkable  Aircraft  Carrier, 
believes that these bases were in the UK principally for US security purposes. He claims 
‘US warmongering as part of a plan ‘to focus public perceptions on the risks of war’ and 
                                                 
41 Anni P Baker, American Soldiers Oversees: the global military presence, (London: Praeger, 2004). 
Paolo E Coletta, and Jack Bauer, United States Navy and Marine Corps Bases, Overseas, (London: 
Greenwood Press, 1985). Simon Duke, United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989). Christopher T Sandars, America’s Overseas Garrisons: the Leasehold 
Empire, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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highlighted the ‘common distrust of the United States.’
42 He even argues that any attempt 
to  force  US  military  withdrawal  from  the  UK,  would  have  led  the  CIA  to  organise 
military obstructionism to ‘destabilise’ the British Government. It is difficult to see any 
specific instances that were anything other than American unilateral strategic decisions 
that the UK had to accept. 
 
Campbell’s work has received great acclaim and is used as a source for many opinions on 
the presence of US bases in the UK. In general terms however, the book is very detailed 
and lists all known and suspected US bases in the UK. This aspect is accurate, but the 
information is not academically-sourced and most information comes from unattributed 
sources and magazine publications. Therefore, its conclusions, perhaps correct in many 
cases, need to be better examined and sourced before any conclusions can be provided in 
this research project. 
 
Another section of the available literature deals with the political aspects of the US/UK 
relationship regarding the placement of US bases in the UK. The main authors in this 
matter are Simon Duke and David Reynolds; Duke covers the political processes behind 
the establishment of various US facilities in the UK since World War 2, but only really 
covers the Holy Loch in reasonable detail. Reynolds, on the other hand, is able to have a 
broader look at the issue and examines the topic over the period of the twentieth century; 
once again, however, there is little detail on places such as Edzell, Thurso, Kirknewton, 
Machrihanish, Prestwick and any of the other smaller locations.
43 Similar detail is given 
by Christopher T Sandars, with the customary broad brush approach to Scottish bases.
44 
 
                                                 
42 Duncan Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain, (London: 
Paladin, 1986), pp.12, 13, 337. 
43 Simon Duke, U.S. defence bases in the United Kingdom: a matter for joint decision? (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1987). David Reynolds & D Dimbleby, An Ocean Apart: the Relationship between Britain and 
America in the Twentieth Century, (London: BBC/Hodder & Stoughton, 1988). David Reynolds, One 
World Divisible: a global history since 1945, (London: Allen Lane, 2000). David Reynolds, Rich Relations. 
 
44 Sandars. 
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There are also other books regarding the presence of US bases in the UK, and some of 
these are very detailed, but all have the same limitation in that they do not concentrate on 
Scottish matters; this omission ensures that further research is necessary to illuminate the 
topic of the American activities in Scotland during this period. Some publications, such 
as Simon Duke’s two excellent books, contain much information in a compendium style 
and provide basic details of the Scottish facilities. However, with the exception of the 
high profile Holy Loch base, all relevant publications skip over Scotland and its role in 
US strategic policy implementation. 
 
The US was able to set up bases and a full operational infrastructure in the UK on a 
‘gentleman’s agreement’, basically for the specific security of the USA.
45 Simon Duke 
notes that the American bases in the UK initially stemmed from the requirement to base 
the very heavy bomber (VHB) force within range of the Soviet Union, in order that it 
could deliver its nuclear bombs.
  
 
In Scotland the Holy Loch, with the SSBN submarines, was the forward defence of the 
United States. Opinions is divided between those writers who believed that the USA was 
responding to Soviet manoeuvring, and others who believe that it was merely another 
example of the American relentless imperial expansion policy. 
 
There is, however, a reasonable body of literature regarding Holy Loch and this gives 
both detail and political actions; some of this material, such as by Brian Jamison and 
Brian Lavery, contain useful information regarding the establishment of the base.
46 
Others such as Peter Nailor and another book by Brian Lavery deal with the bigger UK 
naval matters on the Clyde.
47   
                                                 
45 Duke, US defence bases, pp.1-4, 19-20. 
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The UK has a unique ‘strategic location’ with regard to US security interests, particularly 
for intelligence and communications; these activities were operated from Scottish bases 
throughout  the  Cold  War.  This  cooperation  became  even  more  important  when 
intelligence gathering facilities were lost in Turkey and Pakistan in the late 1960s. 
48 
 
The matters covered by Edzell and Thurso have better coverage, despite the secrecy 
which surrounds all intelligence gathering subjects, and both James Bamford and Rhodri 
Jeffreys-Jones provide some good detail in their works.
49 In particular, detail is provided 
of the technical equipment used at both bases. Some useful, low-level information has 
been found from a military magazine series, Cryptolog, which deals with the service of 
personnel and their families at Edzell.
50 Military airfields have a small literature and have 
provided facts, but no detailed behind the scenes information regarding the use of 
airfields for US bases.
51 
 
The Americans believed that the other NATO allies needed to take on a greater cost of 
their own defence. This point was emphasised by Senator George Aiken in 1971, who 
pointed out that there were ‘more than enough American troops in Europe to serve our 
objectives.’
52 Dr Henry Kissinger, Nixon’s Secretary of State, states that the purpose of 
having American troops based in Europe was to ‘lend credibility to the nuclear strategy’ 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
48 Duke, US defence bases, p.190: Paolo E Coletta and Jack Bauer, United States Navy and Marine Corps 
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and to ‘keep the nuclear risk to the continental USA at the lowest possible level.’
53 This 
was another echo of a constant European fear and the USA’s fundamental determination. 
 
Scotland’s  US  bases  have  not  been  widely  researched;  the  available  research  mainly 
concentrates  on  the  political  opposition  from  various  sectors  of  Scottish,  and  British 
society to the presence of US nuclear weapons on Scottish soil, such as that produced by 
Brian Jamison. This shortage of information is surprising, as the presence of the United 
States in Scotland during the research period was significant; in fact, the  main news 
feature was when Elvis Presley landed at Prestwick in 1959 on his way to military service 
in Germany.  
 
A small detailed study was produced by Brian Lavery on the details behind the selection 
of Holy Loch; there are first-hand accounts of the operations and lifestyle of US military 
personnel in Scotland during this period. These personal memoirs add detail to the picture 
of the impact of US foreign policy on local life. However, there is no in-depth academic 
analysis of the American bases in Scotland and the ramifications of their operations. 
There are also useful memoirs by Andrene Messersmith and Arthur Clark Bivens which 
provide excellent hands-on material, as well as a local library history of the US presence 
at Dunoon.
54 
 
Another two publications have been found which contribute useful detail; these are a 
published PhD thesis by George Giacinto Giarchi containing much excellent local 
research carried out in 1975, and a long list of military installations recorded by Michael 
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Spaven for CND Scotland.
55 The latter is accurate with its geographical locations, but 
most of the text is too politically extreme for useful application. 
 
Research Design 
 
The aim of this investigation is to examine these changes to American strategic policy 
during  the  period  1953-74,  and  observe  how  it  was  manifested  in  the  US  bases  in 
Scotland. Four main strands of thought have to be examined by the research, namely:  
 
·  Why were the Americans present in Scotland during this period in such strength? 
·  What were they doing there? 
·  How did this change over time? 
·  How does this study of policy implementation help us to understand the American 
motives? 
 
The  review  of  the  literature  suggests  that  American  strategic  policy  was  driven  by 
American  requirements,  with  little  involvement  by  NATO  or  the  US/UK  special 
relationship. The research sections will examine this and comment accordingly. 
 
The research is split into six separate chapters. The first chapter has set the scene and 
posed  the  academic  questions  noted  above.  The  remaining  chapters  will  examine 
activities that had a physical presence in Scotland and interrogate the research sources to 
find answers to the contextual questions. 
 
Chapter Two examines how the US established and maintained an intelligence gathering 
system at Edzell and Thurso, apparently regardless of any larger strategic imperatives. 
Chapter Three deals with the creation of the US Polaris submarine base at Holy Loch, the 
most high profile base in the UK. Chapter Four concentrates on the communications, 
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navigation and logistics tasks carried out by the US forces in the UK, and especially in 
Scotland. Chapter Five, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) strategy addresses the strategic 
importance of the Scottish base at Thurso for this purpose. The final chapter draws the 
systematic study together along with the answers already provided in each chapter to the 
research questions. Scotland the Brave? US Strategic Policy in Scotland 1953-1974 
  24   
CHAPTER TWO 
 
INTELLIGENCE GATHERING 
 
US Requirements 
 
Once  World  War  2  had  ceased,  the  USA  became  the  world’s  policeman,  with  vital 
interests in all corners of the globe. They needed to be able to gather intelligence from all 
of  these  areas  and  this  led  to  the  remorseless,  at  times  chaotic,  growth  of  the  US 
intelligence industry. The interception of enemy communications has always occurred, 
but  the  Cold  War  produced  a  quantum  leap  in  this  activity.  The  rapid  advances  in 
technology enabled greater use of diverse new telecommunications media and produced 
growth in the number of intelligence staff, with more than 95,000 staff working for the 
American government on signals intelligence (SIGINT), by the 1970s. The rapid growth 
in intelligence requirements meant that each of the US Armed Services wanted to expand 
their own operations after the war. This occurred, with predictably chaotic results over 
the next 25 years as each service fought its own turf war. 
 
US intelligence failed to predict Pearl Harbor and emphasis was subsequently placed on 
the importance of SIGINT.
56 A secret US government report concluded that ‘ULTRA 
may well have had a decisive influence on the war against the U-boats and the air war 
over Britain.’
57 General Patton’s rapid advance from the Normandy beachhead in 1944 
was  possible  because  of  the  accurate  intelligence  on  German  forces  provided  by  the 
ULTRA operation.  
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Post-World War 2, the US military, State Department and FBI established the United 
States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) to coordinate intelligence gathering 
policy. The UK was included in the 1947 UK/USA intelligence agreement, an example of 
multilateral and special relationship activity, although driven primarily by US national 
interests.
 58 This formalised the wartime situation and also included Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand, to give the US world-wide coverage. Eventually Turkey, West Germany, 
Norway and Denmark also joined: overall control was entrusted to the National Security 
Council (NSC).  
 
The United States needed many ‘communications facilities’ to support and shape US 
foreign and defence policy. These facilities provided an intelligence-gathering capability 
and command and control network links. The US/UK intelligence gathering cooperation 
is a unique feature of the relationship between the two nations; it has strengthened since 
World War 2.
59 Intelligence gathering was probably even more important than the nuclear 
weapons link, it was indispensable and it was essential to British, and American, national 
security.
60. 
 
The  United  States  did  not  have  adequate  intelligence  on  the  Soviet  Union’s  military 
capabilities; the US based its strategic defence posture on the fact that they had the A-
bomb and the Soviets did not. This complacency disappeared in 1949 when the USSR 
detonated its first A-bomb, years ahead of the American intelligence estimate, and mainly 
through information provided by Soviet spies within the US and UK governments. These 
espionage rings were uncovered as a result of SIGINT analysis that showed the extent of 
Soviet penetration of many civil and military establishments. Project VENONA led to the 
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arrest of Soviet spies, including the Rosenbergs, David and Ruth Greenglass, Klaus Fuchs 
and Harry Gold. 
61 
 
This espionage furore highlighted the need for a better integrated intelligence network, 
with a longer reach across the globe to better identify Soviet activities.
62 Until the U-2 
spy planes began operations in 1956, the only American source of information about the 
Soviet Union was from SIGINT. Such US flights from the UK were fully supported by 
Macmillan in the House of Commons in 1959.
63 
 
The UK’s geographical position was essential for the US intelligence units to test Soviet 
air defences; probe flights would leave from Prestwick and cross into Soviet air space. 
Occasionally  these  flights  would  discover  a  new  signal  from  a  previously  unknown 
source, such as radar.
64 These missions could be designated as unilateral, NATO or even 
US/UK activities. 
 
SIGINT, according to Richard Aldrich, ‘remains the most secretive aspect of Cold War 
espionage  and  was  probably  the  most  important’;  the  British  Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) received a budget larger than that of the Foreign 
Office.
65 Such growth fed interdepartmental warfare between the various agencies. 
The  management  of  intelligence  gathering  was  constantly  problematic  for  the  US 
government and more reorganisation was carried out. In 1950 COMINT was defined as 
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being ‘outside the framework of … general intelligence activities’; this meant that other 
restrictions or directives did not pertain to COMINT activities.
66 Ever since, the NSA and 
other agencies have claimed exemption from legalistic restraint. After the intelligence 
failure in Korea, COMINT became the direct responsibility of the Secretary of Defense 
and there were 13 separate agencies by the 1960s.
 67  
 A trading pattern developed between them for the exchange of intelligence information, 
but American intelligence was inadequate on the international crises of the time, such as 
the Chinese moves in Korea and the testing of the first Soviet atomic bomb.  
When  Kennedy  took  office,  the  NSC  was  a  structured,  military-style  bureaucracy, 
designed to suit Eisenhower’s military experience. It was not Kennedy’s preference and 
he  changed  the  emphasis,  to  small-scale  meetings  with  his  intimates  to  examine  the 
information provided by the NSC and then make decisions. Johnson used it more as a 
confirmation mechanism for decisions that had already been taken by him. The NSC 
became the conduit for the targeting of intelligence requirements for the government, 
instead of the individual approach favoured by the separate services. 
 
SIGINT  has  two  constituent  elements,  Communications  Intelligence  (COMINT)  and 
Electronics Intelligence (ELINT). COMINT was the information obtained by intercepting 
foreign communications transmitted by radio, wire or any other electromagnetic media. 
All other information procured from foreign electromagnetic sources, excluding nuclear 
explosions  and  radioactive  sources,  was  known  as  ELINT;  these  electromagnetic 
signatures were transmitted by radars, fire control systems and various other sources. 
68  
                                                 
66 NSCID 9, “Communications Intelligence,” 10 March 1950, National Security Archives, 
[accessed 3 February 2006] 
 
67 A revised version of NSCID No. 9 was issued on 24 October 1952. 
 
68 National Security Council Intelligence Directive No 6, Signals Intelligence (Effective 17 February 
1972). (Intelligence) Basic Duties and Responsibilities (directive supersedes SIGINT, COMINT and 
ELINT). National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 6. Feb. 17, 1972. 1 p CONFIDENTIAL. 
Issue Date: Feb 17, 1972. Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Document Number: 
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SIGINT  was  the  source  of  95  per  cent  of  all  finished  intelligence  data  for  the  US 
intelligence  community  and  the  UK  Government  had  more  than  11,500  personnel 
deployed on it. 
69 
The Soviets also devoted a ‘significant amount of effort’ to SIGINT activities.
70 Any 
submarine  or  ship  leaving  Russia  must  pass  to  one  side  or  the  other  of  Iceland;  the 
country that controls Iceland controls the North Atlantic.  With Greenland to the west and 
the UK to the east, it forms the GIUK Gap. The Soviets deployed both military and 
civilian aircraft, and a surface fleet of more than 60 Auxiliary Intelligence Gathering 
(AGI) vessels.
71 
US Activities 
 
The USAF established a communications intelligence station at RAF Kirknewton, near 
Edinburgh in 1952; it covered the area from the east of Scotland to southern Scandinavia. 
There is very little source material available for this base. There were NSA operatives on 
site from the early days, and in the other Scottish bases in later  years. Kirknewton’s 
functions  were  eventually  transferred to  the  purpose-built NSA  intelligence  station  at 
Menwith Hill, Yorkshire, in 1966.
  72 There are very few sources on Kirknewton, but 
Campbell  claims  that  it  was  operated  as  a  radio  intercept  centre  with  a  target  of 
‘commercial radio links’ to other cities in Europe. He also states that it ‘supervised the 
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in Journal of Intelligence and National Security, Vol 16, No 1 (2001) p 91. 
 
70 For the SIGINT and related information see: Jeffrey T Richelson, Sword and Shield: The Soviet 
Intelligence and Security Apparatus, (Cambridge, MASS. Ballinger Publishing, 1986), pp.97-107. Also, 
Miller, p.123. 
 
71 Origins of the NSA, JCS Directive 2010, 20 May 1949, National Security Agency, [accessed 21 
December 2005]. 
 
72 Jackson, p.173: History Perspective, Air Intelligence Agency; [accessed 27 August 2006]: USAFSS,  
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Washington/Moscow direct radio link.’ These claims sound credible in the light of other 
evidence.
73 
 
In  1959  the  US  Navy  communications  station  at  Bremerhaven  was  having  technical 
problems and the US Navy looked for an alternative site in the UK. Other SIGINT bases 
had already been commissioned (Keflavik in April 1959). The Edzell site had been used 
as a fighter training airfield in 1918 reopened in 1940 as an RAF maintenance unit. It 
accommodated more than 800 aircraft into the early 1950s, but by 1957 a gliding school 
was established, as there was little traffic on the base.
74  
 
Edzell  was  identified  as  the  most  suitable  site  in  the  UK  in  May  1959  and  a 
Memorandum of Understanding was completed to permit the use of RAF Edzell as a 
naval  communications  centre.  The  US  proposed  that  the  costs  be  part  of  the  1953 
arrangement, being part of ‘the joint Western defense effort.’
75 The base was used solely 
for US Navy operations. 
 
Edzell was part of a ‘package’ of actions between the US and UK, and was part of the US 
Navy  SIGINT  group  that  included  Keflavik  and  Bremerhaven.
76  Its  purpose  was  to 
support the intelligence gathering activities in northern waters, specifically in the zone 
patrolled by fully armed Polaris SSBNs which had now arrived at their Scottish base at 
Holy Loch.  
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75 Foreign Service Despatch, Secret, From American Embassy London to the Department of State 
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On  11  February  1960,  Commander  Pelletier  USN  took  command  and  the  US  Naval 
Security Group Activity (NAVSECGRUACT) Edzell began operations on 1 July 1960.
 77  
From the outset, the activities and purpose of Edzell have contained many ambiguities, 
the  tone  being  set  by  the  original  commander  who  claimed  that  there  ‘would  be  no 
missiles, planes or radars’ at Edzell; although technically accurate, it misled the public as 
to the activities planned for the base, which had an initial strength of 100.  
 
Thurso had been a World War 2 SIGINT station and the new base was established to 
service the USA’s requirement for radio stations in the Northern Seas zone; this was 
specifically, but unstated, to support the Polaris fleet. America did not have any manned 
bases in Norway and therefore the Northern Atlantic was not covered; this meant that 
Thurso was an important facility. It was assumed that Thurso played a part in the ballistic 
missile early warning system (BMEWS), as the site was surveyed in 1958 and the US 
later  pledged  expenditure  to  provide  ‘a  scanning  and  tracking  capability,  a  central-
computer and display facility, and communications.’
78  
 
Thurso’s mission was: ‘to manage, operate and maintain those facilities, equipment and 
devices and systems necessary to provide requisite communications for the command, 
operational control and administration of the Naval establishment.’
79    It was part of the 
US/UK package which located US Polaris submarines in the Clyde and provide other 
facilities.  The  US  achieved  its  own  strategic  needs,  a  straightforward  example  of 
unilateral action.  
 
SIGINT’s growth continued; a Director, Naval Security Group (DirNSG) was appointed 
in 1961 and by 1968 there was a direct line of reporting to the Chief of Naval Operations 
                                                 
77 Cryptolog, p. 2. 
 
78 Telegram from Dean Rusk, Secretary of State to American Embassy London, Top Secret, 9 June 1961, 
Embtel 3479,  Joint State-Defense Message.’ Any public statements on Thurso would place emphasis on 
role in early warning system.’. 711.56341/7-1961. NARA 13 SEP 2006. 
 
79 OP Nav Report, 5750-1 (Command History) Thurso, 26 January 1970, cited in Duke, U.S. defence bases, 
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(CNO); this included Edzell.
80 These changes accentuated the ever-growing importance 
of SIGINT despite the budget cuts that were applied to many US military units after 
1968. 
 
Table 1 describes in detail the number of units and activities that the US deployed in 
Scotland to assist in its intelligence gathering activities.  
 
Table 1 
 
US Intelligence Bases in Scotland 
 
Base  Functions  Units 
USAF 
Kirknewton 
1952-1966 
￿  COMINT  NSA;  
USAFSS;  
6952nd Radio Mobile 
Squadron;  
7535th Air Base 
Squadron;  
37th Radio Squadron 
Mobile. 
     
USN Edzell 
1960-1992 
￿  SIGINT 
￿  NSA Intelligence Collection Site 
￿  Full  support  for  the  main  US  Navy 
communications  system  base  at  USN 
Londonderry 
￿  Part  of  the  HFDF  network;  HFDF 
Facility in support of the Navigational 
Aid  and  Search  and  Rescue  (SAR) 
missions 
NSG;  
NSA:  
GCHQ;  
Co B USMC Support 
Battalion;  
                                                 
80  Al Grobmeier, Naval Security Group History, Cold War, [accessed 26 March 2005]. Also, History of the 
Naval Security Group, Federation of American Scientists, [accessed 22 March 2006]:  Department of the 
Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC 20350-2000, OPNAV INSTRUCTION 
5450.191B, N2, 1 April 1994, From: Chief of Naval Operations, To: All Ships and Stations, Subj: 
MISSION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMANDER, NAVAL SECURITY GROUP COMMAND. 
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￿  Project  White  Cloud  -    satellite 
reconnaissance programme; 
￿  Provided  communications  and  related 
support  to  Navy  and  other  DOD 
elements. 
￿  Project Clear Sky - part of the Atomic 
Energy  Detection  System  to  monitor 
atmospheric nuclear tests. 
￿  Classic  Wizard  Ocean  Surveillance 
Satellite  Control  System  and  the 
Bullseye target location activity; 
￿  Monitoring Soviet submarine forces; 
￿  Part  of  the  Mediterranean/North 
American DF Net; 
￿  Special    Communications 
(SPECCOMMS) service to US fleet; 
￿  Tracked  all  movements  of  Soviet 
warships, including submarines. 
UK Petty Officer 
Academy. 
6321
st Courier Transfer 
Station under direct 
command at USAF 
Prestwick; 
 
     
USN 
Thurso 
1963-1992 
￿  NSA Intelligence Collection Site; 
￿  Direction-finding; 
￿  HF/LF Fleet Broadcast; MEECN; 
￿  Fleet support; 
￿  Intelligence-gathering  as  part  of  the 
HFDF network; 
￿  Downloading  of  satellite 
communications; 
￿  Project Clarinet Betty, the latest version 
of  the  LORAN-C  naval  navigational 
system; 
￿  Provided  command  and  control 
transmission to US Navy vessels in the 
Northeast Atlantic and Norwegian Sea; 
￿  Main  US  Navy  VLF  (submarine 
communications) transmitter in Europe; 
￿  USN Londonderry was closed in 1975 
and its operations relocated to Thurso. 
NSA; 
Royal Navy;  
US Navy;  
GCHQ;  
Detachment Edzell;  
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The  US  Congress  fully  supported  intelligence  gathering  activities 
81  and  in  1960 
President  Eisenhower  appointed  another  commission  to  examine  co-ordination  of  the 
multiple intelligence organisations. This discord later led to McNamara’s remark that 
‘there was no unity in our intelligence service.’
82 In October 1961 he created the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) to integrate the military intelligence effort of all the Services. 
It  was  given  the  mission  to  continually  collect,  process,  evaluate,  analyse,  integrate, 
produce and disseminate military intelligence for the Department of Defense (DOD).
83 
There was no consultation with the UK or NATO on this major change. 
 
By 1962 the SIGINT Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) was 
created; each constituent member of USIB nominated a representative to the committee.
 
84  This was another attempt to ensure that the importance of SIGINT was managed in the 
most effective fashion, but it had to overcome the deep-rooted self-interest shown by the 
various intelligence agencies. Robust efforts were made by interested parties to protect 
their own operations, such as when the USAF Chief of Staff, General LeMay, was urged 
to resist attempts to divest some USAF activities to the CIA in 1963.
85 
 
SIGINT was vital and was the first means to alert the White House to the placing of 
Soviet missiles in Cuba in August 1962; all available intelligence activities moved into 
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83 Organization Relationship of DIA and the JCS/J2, Defense Intelligence Agency, DoD Directive 5105.21, 
Defense Intelligence Agency,  [accessed 21 December 2005] 
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action and the NSA despatched its DER radar picket ships to Cuban waters.
86 SIGINT 
provided the first indication that the Soviet ships had stopped in mid-Atlantic and enabled 
Kennedy to handle the crisis; SIGINT had proved its value yet again.  
 
In April 1962 the Deputy Director for Research and Engineering in the DOD, Mr Rubel, 
visited, accompanied by Sir Solly Zuckerman, the UK Government’s Chief Scientific 
Adviser.
87  This  illustrated  the  close  collaboration  between  the  USA  and  the  UK  in 
intelligence and nuclear strategy. Intelligence gathering was a cooperative effort and not 
one  that  was  driven  solely  in  the  US  interests,  although  they  predominated.  RAF 
Kinnaber,  a  radio  facility,  was  added  to  Edzell  on  11  October  1962  and  was  fully 
operational by 1968. 
 
The information collected at Edzell had to reach Washington DC by secure means as 
swiftly as possible and a Courier Transfer Station was established at USAF Prestwick on 
1 January 1963.  This unit was under the direct command of the Commanding Officer 
Edzell and the final part of the US complement at Edzell arrived on 20 April 1963 when 
cryptographers of Company B Marine Support Battalion USMC began operations. 
88 
 
SIGINT contained the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), an organisation so secret 
that its existence was not formally  acknowledged until 1992, despite later newspaper 
reports.
 89  Its structure was formalised in 1962 and flights were undertaken in the UK by 
aircraft from the ‘1st Weather Reconnaissance Squadron (Provisional)’, passing through 
Prestwick. 
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The NRO was formed to enforce ‘permanent and institutionalized collaboration between 
the CIA and Air Force’ and establish a reconnaissance organisation that could coordinate 
the new satellite and aerial photography requirements. In August 1962, Louis Tordella, 
the  Acting  Director  of  the  NSA,  agreed  that  the  NSA  would  ‘provide  advice  and 
consultation’ to ensure that the requirements of the USIB could be satisfied by the NRO. 
90  But  this  did  not  produce  a  seamless  intelligence  system  and  there  is  no  evidence 
available that the USA consulted the UK on this matter. 
 
These intelligence-gathering locations – or ‘listening posts’ - were easily identified by 
their  gigantic  antenna  systems  that  monitored  high  frequency  (HF)  traffic  from  all 
directions and then linked with other sites to provide direction finding on the source – a 
crucial part of the SIGINT process. The US Navy operated these sites and by 1964 they 
had  facilities  in  England  (Chicksands),  Italy,  Turkey,  the  Philippines,  Japan,  Spain 
(Rota), Bremerhaven, Guam and Edzell. 
 
At Thurso, West Murkle receiving station was completed in 1963 and Forss transmitting 
station  became  fully  operational  in  1965.  It  had  equipment  for  low  frequency  (LF) 
transmission  and  very  low  frequency  (VLF)  for  communications  to  the  US  nuclear 
submarine fleet. 
91  
 
SIGINT’s  value  to  the  USA  was  noted  by  Senator  Milton  Young,  a  member  of  the 
appropriate Senate Committee, in 1966: ‘I think the National Security Agency and the 
intelligence it develops has far more to do with foreign policy than does the intelligence 
developed by the CIA.’
92 This showed that US intelligence gathering policy was focused 
on American interests. 
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The US Navy established a Petty Officer Academy at Edzell in 1966, ‘a sound training 
concept’, to assist with the requirement for highly-trained, naval personnel at Edzell. The 
cryptologists’ career path needed to be strengthened, a point emphasised by the Director 
of Central Intelligence (DCI) and later by President Nixon.
 93 
 
President Nixon ordered a review of the effectiveness of the intelligence-gathering effort 
in 1971 and stressed that ‘the need for timely intelligence becomes greater.’
94 He directed 
that  intelligence  community  reviews  were  to  be  carried  out  at  frequent  intervals  and 
emphasised  that  the  DOD  programmes  needed  to  be  better  integrated  with  the  other 
agencies.  He  made  the  DCI  responsible  for  ‘planning,  reviewing,  co-ordinating,  and 
evaluating all intelligence programs and activities.’ A new NSC Intelligence Committee 
(NSCIC)  was  created,  under  the  chairmanship  of  the  Assistant  to  the  President  for 
National Security Affairs (Dr Kissinger). Nixon also stressed the need for better career 
structures  for  the  cryptanalysists  who  worked  for  the  various  agencies.  This  was  a 
confirmation of the crucial importance of intelligence-gathering to the US government 
and these experts were subsequently deployed to Edzell and Thurso. 
 
Yet again, the high-level management of intelligence gathering was judged to be ‘vague 
and  ill-defined.’  Change  was  required  and  the  DCI  Richard  Helms  suggested, 
unsurprisingly,  that  the  DCI  was  best  placed  to  have  overall  supervision  of  the 
intelligence activity.
95 A high-level report in September 1967 acknowledged the problems 
caused by the multiplicity of competing agencies.
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This  produced  the  requirement for  a  ‘long-range  national  Intelligence  Plan.’  Its  most 
important recommendation, for Edzell and Thurso, was that ‘military tours of duty at the 
NSA should be extended’ and that cryptologist within the Armed Forces should have 
proper  career  paths.  President  Nixon  also  supported  this  point  in  1971.  The  report 
concluded that ‘there must be no slackening in the US cryptologic effort if essential and 
other national needs are to be met.’ There was no mention of working with allies. For 
Edzell  and  Thurso,  their  intelligence  staff  became  more  representative  of  the  overall 
American national intelligence plan structure. In Scotland there were agents from the 
National  Security  Agency  (NSA),  the  United  States  Air  Force  Security  Service 
(USAFSS), the US Navy Security Group (NSG) and the GCHQ operating on American 
sites. 
 
Edzell listened in to the incidents involving the USS Liberty during the 1967 Six Days 
War and the capture of the USS Pueblo by North Korea in 1968.
96 These illustrated the 
involvement of Edzell in the overall intelligence-gathering mission of the US; similar 
radar picket ships (DERs) operated off the Scottish coast and received maintenance in 
Scottish ports.
97 A memo to Secretary Rusk in July 1961 stated that ‘The US Navy has a 
requirement  for  a  fleet  communications  project  at  Thurso,  Scotland  and  facilities  for 
destroyer escort radar (DER) at Rosyth, Scotland and in the Clyde. The DERs would be 
employed  on  radar  and  anti-submarine  work.’  This  was  a  reminder  of  the  front-line 
nature of SIGINT work and there was no linkage to any NATO or UK activities. The 
request was fully acceded to by the UK government. 
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Coverage of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe enabled the US to detect the Soviet 
combat divisions during the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
98 Accurate intelligence 
now  contrasted  sharply  with  the  failures  during  the  Korean  War  and  indicated  that 
intelligence gathering was better directed and analysed. This continued into the 1970s and 
the use of West Berlin as a forward listening post deep inside Soviet territory, enabled US 
intelligence to identify the entire East German Army Order of Battle.
99  
 
Apart  from  Edzell  and  Thurso,  Norway  and  Denmark  also  participated  in  their  own 
fashion. Both were signatories to the UK/USA SIGINT system and were able to monitor 
military communications from the Kola Peninsula; they were also able to cover Soviet 
and  Polish  naval  forces  in  the  Baltic  and  Barents  Sea. 
100  Foreign  troops  were  not 
permitted on Danish soil during peacetime, a similar attitude to that of Norway, and there 
were  also  no  foreign  nuclear  weapons  permitted  in  the  country.  In  reality,  Denmark 
provided  air  bases  for  the  USA  which  could  accommodate  more  than  five  fighter 
squadrons during wartime. 
101 
 
Congress granted $104,000 for an ELINT boat in the Barents Sea to monitor Soviet naval 
activity: the monitoring was done by the Norwegians and was paid for by the CIA. Simon 
West notes that the U-2 spy flights were able to regularly refuel at airfields in Norway.
102  
These aircraft could not have been refuelled at any UK bases without attracting attention 
from various sources; Norway provided totally remote locations, well away from prying 
eyes. Campbell’s ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ was now attracting too much attention. 
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In  1973  the  Senate  Appropriations  Committee  described  Edzell  as  performing  ‘an 
antisubmarine warfare support mission vital to the security of the nation’, as part of the 
‘high-frequency direction-finder network.’
103 More funds were expended on Edzell the 
following year: ‘We are requesting $571,000 for NAVSECGRUACT Edzell, Scotland. 
This station provides communications essential to the defense of the United States.’ No 
mention can be found of any NATO or UK involvement in these matters. 
 
This expenditure may have been part of Project WHITE CLOUD as Edzell was also 
involved in the satellite reconnaissance programme; this had begun in the early 1960s 
with the use of small USAF ‘Ferret’ ELINT satellites to track the movements of foreign 
ships.  These  located  the  position  of  stationary  installations,  but  were  incapable  of 
following  moving  targets  such  as  ships.  The  US  Navy  therefore  developed  its  own 
ELINT satellites and the first WHITE CLOUD was launched in 1971.
104 The existing 
network of UK/USA ground stations was given the task of receiving the down-loaded 
data  from  these  missions.  WHITE  CLOUD  was  the  US  Navy’s  principal  over-the-
horizon reconnaissance, but the USSR was well-informed about its abilities. 
 
In 1974, CNO approved the relocation of all activities at US Londonderry to Thurso. The 
Scottish Office could ‘see nothing but advantage from the proposed development,’ 
105 and 
US Forces Headquarters Europe confirmed that the site was technically suitable: Thurso 
was  given  a  clean  bill  of  health  for  activities  connected  with  Project  CLARINET 
BETTY, the latest version of the LORAN-C naval navigational system and NRS Thurso 
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was then redesignated as the US Naval Communications Station UK (NAVCOMMSTA 
UK).
106 
 
Rumours  and  accusations  regarding  the  use  of  Edzell’s  facilities  by  ‘spying’ 
organisations were rife and in 1976, Tom Litterick MP, claimed in Parliament that ‘the 
American  National  Security  Agency  has  been  using  its  communications  facilities  at 
Edzell… to monitor the communications of British commercial organisations.’
107 The 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Roy Hattersley, pointed out that it was ‘a long 
established practice of the House and Government not to comment on matters such as 
this.’  The  long  history  of  US  unilateral  activity  on  the  site  lends  credence  to  this 
accusation. 
 
Not surprisingly, there is little declassified material available regarding Edzell. However, 
a declassified document concerning the Mission, Functions and Tasks of Edzell, states 
that it was ‘an integral part of a worldwide network developed by the US to serve as a 
part of a program to provide communications for defense of the US and the free world. 
Additional  functions  include  monitoring  transmissions  procedures  and  research  into 
electronic phenomena.’ It is likely that Edzell’s mission was similar to that of Keflavik, 
namely to ‘operate an HFDF Facility in support of the Navigational Aid and Search and 
Rescue (SAR) missions. It also provides communications and related support, including 
communications  relay,  communications  security,  and  communications  manpower 
assistance to Navy and other DOD elements within the area.’
108 There is no mention in 
these documents of any Allied involvement.  
 
                                                 
106 See Loran History, United States Coast Guard, [accessed 10 December 2005].  
 
107 ‘Messages of UK firms “being monitored”, The Times, 29 July 1976, Issue 59768, Page 7, Col A.  
 
108 OPNAV Report 5750-1, Command History for Calendar Year 1974, paragraph 1(3) ‘Mission of the 
Command. Pursuant to NAVSECGRUINST S5210.3...’ US Navy Historical Center,  [accessed 20 October 
2005]. USNAVSECGRUACT Keflavik, Navy CT/SECGRU,  [accessed 21 February 2006). 
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The arrival of USAF Detachment 370 in support of Project CLEAR SKY in May 1970 
was described as a ‘weather research and radio propagation project’; Detachment 370 
was a ground filter unit and part of the Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS) that 
had been created to monitor atmospheric nuclear tests. 
109 
 
By 1979, Edzell was under the operational control of the DIRNSA/ CNCSS (Director 
National  Security  Agency/ Chief  National  Central  Security  Services),  emphasising  its 
continuing high value and it is unlikely that its functions had been otherwise during the 
previous 20 years.
110 The mission was to ‘provide cryptologic support to commanders 
and units of NAVEUR’, with an obligation to provide to CINCUSNAVEUR ‘SIGINT, 
interpretation, advice and assistance.’ Edzell’s mission was explained to the US Congress 
in 1980 as being a radio station that could ‘listen for American or foreign broadcasts’, a 
direct confirmation of Mr Litterick’s accusation in 1976.
 111 
 
The  equipment  used  and  other  information  provides  a  good  estimate  of  its  range  of 
activities. Company B USMC Support Battalion’s known role would support claims that 
they  were  monitoring  Soviet  submarine  forces;  the  CLASSIC  WIZARD  Ocean 
Surveillance Satellite Control System and the BULLSEYE target location activity, both 
used the CDAA Wullenweber equipment and this equipment was installed at Edzell. 
112 
 
                                                 
109 See Cryptolog, p 23. For AEDS see; Memorandum from Col. Frank Griffith, Deputy Chief, Air Force 
Technical Applications Center, to Special Assistant for Atomic Energy and Outer Space, "20-4 System 
Expansion", 4 January 1962, and State Department Circular Telegram 1444 to Various Embassies, "Project 
Clear Sky," 6 February 1964 Source: National Security Archives, [accessed 3 March 2006]. 
 
110 Department of the Navy Naval Security Group Command Headquarters, NSGINST 5450.53A, Ser 
G142/133?/7272, 3 Dec 1979. From: Commander Naval Security Group Command. Subj: Mission and 
Functions of US Naval Security Group Detachment, London England/ US Naval Current Support Group, 
US Naval forces Europe, US Navy Historical Center, [accessed 14 December 2005]. 
 
111 Campbell, p.170: note: NAVSECGRUDET – US Navy Security Detachment. 
 
112 Duke, United States Military Forces Appendix 13A. OPNAV NOTICE 5450, Ser DNS-33/5U838417, 
From Chief of Naval Operations, Unclassified, 27 October 2005, ‘…designed to divest NAVSECGRU of 
Classic Wizard front end mission sites.’ Department of the Navy Issuances, [accessed 17 November 2005]. 
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According to former members of the unit, Edzell had a specific radio intercept role and 
was  part  of  the  Mediterranean/North  American  DF  Net.  Cryptographers  operated 
NAVSECGRU and general service communications circuits and fleet broadcast for North 
Atlantic  and  Mediterranean  commanders.  Others  provided  a  Special  Communications 
(SPECCOMMS) service for ‘afloat units’ in North Atlantic and Mediterranean, and there 
were  other  staff  who  tested,  evaluated  and  operated  new  equipment  as  part  of 
NAVSECGRU’s role. Edzell was regarded as the NSG’s ‘European showcase.’
113 
 
In  the  1960s,  all  HFDF  resources  in  the  UK/USA  Agreement  were  modernised  and 
interlinked  in  ‘Operation  BULLSEYE.
114  This  tracked  the  movements  of  Soviet 
warships,  including  submarines.  During  the  1970s  there  were  21  Bullseye  stations 
operated by the NSG, plus another eight by individual UK/USA nations. The equipment 
used was AN/FRD-10 Wullenweber Circularly Disposed Antenna Arrays/Circular Dipole 
Antenna Arrays (CDAA) and Edzell was fitted with this and the other European station 
was at Rota, Spain.  
  
The Wullenweber site was spectacular and covered 40 acres; it had four concentric circles 
of poles and wires, between two metres and 30 metres in height, covering low band radio 
frequencies used by submarines.
 115 
 
The incoming signal source was ‘fixed’ in conjunction with other Wullenweber stations 
such as Keflavik and Rota. They were part of the US strategic high-frequency direction-
finding net (HFDF), with other stations located in the Pacific region (seven) and the East 
Coast of the USA (five). Edzell was an important player in a major US-only operation. 
 
                                                 
113 Cryptolog, p.15. 
 
114 CFS Masset,  Hyperbolic Radio Navigation Systems, [accessed 3 April 2006]. Aid, p 45: Al Grobmeier, 
‘End of an Era, USN CDAAs’, A Secret Landscape, America’s Cold War Infrastructure, [accessed 22 
February 2006]. 
 
115 For technical description of the Wullenweber system see: Bamford, pp 161-63: Cryptolog, p 8; also 
Wullenweber/CDDA Antenna Homepage. Columbia Amateur Radio Association, [accessed 14 December 
2005]. 
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The CDAA equipment was installed at Edzell in 1962 and Section 2 HFDF, which was 
responsible for DF operations, moved inside the Wullenweber complex. The operators 
worked a ‘2/2/2 and 80’ shift of 2 evening watches, 2 day watches, 2 mid-watches and 
then 80 hours off. 
 
Thurso’s role was to provide command and control transmission to US Navy vessels in 
the  Northeast  Atlantic  and  Norwegian  Sea;  principally  to  deliver  communications 
requirements  to  SSBNs  operating  in  the  northern  waters  and  act  as  support  to  US 
Londonderry which had the lead role in this activity. Thurso was able to ‘…meet the 
essential  high  and  low  frequency  radio  coverage  requirements  in  the  northern  North 
Atlantic,’ and had a subsidiary role to ‘transmit some surveillance intelligence and early-
warning data collected overseas’ to USA.
116 Part of the information would have been 
nuclear launch instructions. Thurso was thus a crucial link in the delivery of US strategic 
policy, especially orders from the national command authority (NCA). 
 
Radio transmissions ranged from Extra Low Frequency (ELF) to Super High Frequency 
(SHF);  the  lower  the  frequency,  the  greater  distance  the  signal  can  travel  and,  very 
importantly for strategic submarine communications, the greater depth beneath the ocean. 
ELF communicated with submarines and could be received at depth of 110 metres by 
using short burst messages; Very Low Frequency (VLF) can penetrate down to 15 metres 
and  Thurso  was  the  main  US  Navy  VLF  transmitter  in  Europe.
117  Like  Edzell,  its 
operational history is still shrouded in classified secrecy. 
 
UK Activity 
 
The locals welcomed the US servicemen and involved them in local matters, such as 
choosing  the  winners  of  a  ‘factory  girls’  competition.
118  It  became  involved  in  the 
                                                 
116 CINCEUR letter to Political-Military Attaché US Embassy London, Confidential, 16 October 1975. 
Subject: US Naval communications Station United Kingdom (Clarinet Betty). NAS. SEP4/2962 
 
117 Duke, United States Military Forces, p.332. 
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demonstrations  held  as  part  of  the  campaign  against  the  existence  of  US  bases  and 
nuclear  weapons  in  Britain.  The  locals  did  not  share  these  concerns  and  protesters 
‘received  a  chilly  reception  at  Edzell…  with  booing  and  hissing  from  some  Edzell 
folk.’
119 This was symptomatic of the overall project and there are no recorded instances 
of any sustained UK or Scottish opposition to the intelligence gathering bases. 
 
The plans for the construction at Thurso followed the usual process of obfuscation and 
minimum information. In July 1961, McNamara approved the requirements and agreed 
that details should not be made public or informed to the UN.
120 ‘The UK has proposed, 
and we agree, that in view of military security requirements it is not intended that the 
agreement regarding these facilities should be registered with the UN or otherwise be 
made public.’ This indicates that both the US and UK governments wanted secrecy on the 
matter. 
 
The public announcement ignored sensitive issues, with the media reporting on 27 July 
1961 that Thurso would be another link in the distant early warning (DEW) line and 
would provide ‘ship-to-shore communications’.
121 The agreement on DER (radar picket 
ships) use of Rosyth and the Clyde were also mentioned at the end of the article. Such 
collaboration over any sensitive announcements shows that the UK government was a 
positive partner in this mission. 
 
In 1964, McNamara decided to ‘close eight United States bases in Western Europe and 
the  Atlantic  areas’;  the  three  UK  bases  were  Brize  Norton,  Upper  Heyford  and 
Kirknewton which would be closed down and its function transferred to Menwith Hill. 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
119 Foreign Service Despatch, Confidential, From American Consulate Edinburgh to Department of State 
Washington, 24 October 1960. Scottish Youth Peace Campaign protest March at US Navy 
Communications Center, Edzell.’ NARA 15 September 2005. 
 
120 Department of State memo from EUR William R Tyler to The Secretary, Secret, 21 July 1961. Subject: 
Circular 175: Request for authorisation to Negotiate and Conclude and agreement Concerning Certain 
Facilities for US Navy in the United Kingdom. (Thurso, Rosyth Clyde – DERs) 711.56341/7-1961. NARA 
13 SEP 2006.  
 
121 ‘US Base for North Scotland; Another Link in DEW Line,’ Glasgow Herald, 27 July 1961. 
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Brize Norton and Upper Heyford were obsolete strategic bomber bases due to the new 
SAC policy of retaining its strategic squadrons in the USA and sending them on three-
month tours to Europe.
122 There was ‘a gradual winding-down of SAC operations in the 
United Kingdom’, and more than 100,000 US personnel were withdrawn from Europe, 
1966-73.
123 The US defined its own interests and then acted accordingly. 
 
The American Embassy in London requested a ‘year’s notice of the closure of the bases 
in  the  United  Kingdom’,  and  this  was  granted.
124  Because  of  Kirknewton’s  demise, 
claims  have  been  made  that  Edzell  was  now  undertaking  its  former  tasks,  with  the 
remainder being provided at Menwith Hill. It has not been possible to substantiate this, 
but other indicators give some support to this view. 
 
Exceptionally tight security was maintained at Thurso and local electricians could only 
supply power to the perimeter fence but not inside the base.
125 Edzell base strength rose 
to more than 700 servicemen and civilians (both US and British), with the rumoured 
involvement of personnel from both the NSA and GCHQ. Both NSA and GCHQ were 
kept  from  public  knowledge  during  the  1960s,  when  authors  agreed,  as  matters  of 
national security, to remove references to either organisation from their books.
126 Even in 
the  1990s,  the  UK  government  denied  the  very  existence  of  the  Secret  Intelligence 
Service (SIS) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), despite clear evidence to the 
contrary.  
 
Navy Secretary John Chafee visited Edzell in 1971 and no fewer than 15 officers of 
admiral rank or equivalent visited in 1974; these included CINCUSNAVEUR, Chief of 
                                                 
122 Jackson, pp17-8, 179-80: Duke, U.S. defence bases, pp.138-40. 
 
123 Duke, United States Military Forces, p.67. 
 
124 Foreign Office Letter from Miss PM Hutchinson to WH Nelson, Air Ministry, Secret, dated 7 April 
1964, Subject: Closing of United States Bases. PRO, FO 371/174305, 4 November 2005. 
 
125 Interview with local electrician 15
th March 2006. 
 
126 West, p.247-8: Dockrill and Hughes, p.5. 
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the Defence Staff and others from many top military organisations.
 127 Thurso was also 
visited by senior officers, including Admiral Thach, CINCUSNAVEUR, who in 1965 
visited both Londonderry and Thurso as part of an inspection programme linked to the 
US Navy strategic communications network in Europe. 
128 Almost without exception, all 
of these VIPs were Americans, another sign of the exclusivity of the US strategic policy 
being operated at these sites. 
 
Thurso had many rumours regarding its activities and evidence of British involvement at 
the base was provided by a 1968 request to the Atomic Energy Authority at Dounreay for 
a lease of the authority’s housing stock for personnel from the Royal Navy, US Navy and 
GCHQ.
129  Further  attempts  to  uncover  evidence  of  the  base’s  activities  have  been 
fruitless, and local interviews merely produce statements that ‘there were various UK 
civil servants working on the base.’
130 
 
Conclusion 
 
All  persons  engaged  in  handling  SIGINT  matters  have  a  ‘lifelong  commitment  to 
secrecy’ about their activities. It has therefore been difficult to obtain any primary source 
information  and  many  ‘statements’  are  unsourced  claims.  Finding  details  about  the 
specific operations carried out at Edzell and Thurso has been difficult owing to the cloak 
of secrecy around all NSG and NSA activities. Notwithstanding, some of these claims 
can be regarded as true, based on a combination of observation and related technical and 
military  knowledge.  A  strict  management  system  applies  to  special  intelligence 
                                                 
127 OPNAV Report 5750-1, Command History for Calendar Year 1974, paragraph 1(3) ‘Mission of the 
Command. Pursuant to NAVSECGRUINST S5210.3.’ US Navy Historical Center, [accessed 27 November 
2005].; note: CINCUSNAVEUR – Commander in Chief US Navy Europe. 
 
128 ‘US Commander’s Visits’, The Times, 16 August 1965, Issue 56401, Page 10, Col G. 
 
129 Letter from Scottish Office to Mr Fotheringham, unclassified, 2 July 1968, Ref: H/NDS/THS, NAS 
DD6/3298, H/NDS/THS Part A. 
 
130 Interview on 15 March 2006 with electrician from Thurso, who carried out contract work on the two 
bases during the period 1965-90. 
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communications records in the US Armed Services.
131 These constraints have therefore 
limited the research project, but not to any damaging extent as activities in general have 
been adequately established and referenced. 
 
What, therefore, was Edzell’s role? There is little doubt that Edzell was a very important 
component in providing SIGINT for the US ‘national interest’. It produced SIGINT and 
strategic operations support for both the US Navy and the NSA. It was a radio intercept 
station,  gathered  SIGINT  and  liaised  closely  with  Keflavik  and  latterly,  Thurso.  It 
supported the US Navy fleet communications network in the Northern Atlantic and the 
Norwegian Sea. It is a listed NSA Intelligence Collection Site and by 1976 received a 
major upgrade to become the European collecting station for the CLASSIC WIZARD 
system after the US Navy Ocean Surveillance Satellite (NOSS) was launched as part of 
Project WHITE CLOUD. 
132   
 
Thurso  offered  ‘significant  advantages  through  collocation  of  high  frequency  radio 
facilities … This realignment of high frequency radio facilities will permit an economic 
transition into the satellite era with no degradation to fleet support.’
133 This confirms that 
Thurso was part of the HFDF network, as well as taking part in the downloading of 
satellite communications. The latter activities could well have been part of the US Navy’s 
WHITE CLOUD programme, as at Edzell. 
 
The US bases at Edzell and Thurso offered advantages in intelligence gathering and fleet 
communications. Both were part of a world-wide network of US military establishment. 
They had added value for the US as they could perform various functions satisfactorily 
from a single site; this is the reason why they attracted much high-level attention. They 
                                                 
131 SECNAVINST 5212.SD, 22 April 1998, Chapter 2, Telecommunications Records, pp III-2-1 to III-2-
24. Navy Directives ,[accessed 3 March 2006]. 
 
132 See Duke, United States Military Force: Spaven, pp 111-15; Campbell, pp 116 & 225-6; CT Sandars, 
p.98. 
  
133 United States Embassy letter Head Defense Department Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Secret, 
dated 17 July 1975. NAS, NAS SEP4/2692. 
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were welcomed by their local communities, although they only used local labour for low-
level tasks, relying totally on American units and contractors to carry out all important 
work. They were successful and were retained while similar facilities in Europe were 
closed. 
 
Sources show that the UK fully supported American requirements and that the US was 
indubitably  the  senior  partner.  Britain’s  ‘unique  strategic  location’  for  US  strategic 
interests was fully exploited for intelligence and communications activities. The three 
Scottish intelligence gathering bases supported US foreign policy, and provided support 
for forward forces, namely the SSBNs and other naval missions. The bases at Edzell, 
Thurso,  and  Kirknewton  were  regarded  as  ‘essential’  and  no  attempt  was  made  to 
‘discard’ them.  
 
All of the US actions and decisions were driven by American requirements, which were 
integrated into the overall defence of Western Europe. The Soviet Navy’s biggest fleet, 
with all its SSBNs, was being assembled in northern waters throughout the 1950s and 
1960s and therefore the US needed to upgrade its presence at Edzell and Thurso to assist 
its ASW strategy. 
 
There are no signs of any damage to Anglo-American relationships by the US operations 
at  Edzell,  Thurso,  or  Kirknewton;  the  evidence  suggests  that  these  operations 
strengthened  the  liaison  at  official  level.  There  were  no  impediments  to  the 
implementation of US strategic policy operations and there are no obvious differences 
with NATO on intelligence gathering; at the same time, there is also little evidence to 
suggest that the US fully involved its allies. The Americans were able to operate their 
Scottish bases for intelligence gathering without being impeded by the UK government. 
 
Despite the high level mismatch over US intelligence gathering, there is no evidence of 
these problems at Scottish bases. Their task was to gather information, analyse it and pass 
it up the chain to the Washington-controlled HQs where the trading activities occurred. It 
has  been  difficult  to  fully  examine  the  complete  range  of  activities  carried  out  at Scotland the Brave? US Strategic Policy in Scotland 1953-1974 
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Kirknewton, Edzell and Thurso because of the paucity of declassified information. A 
sufficient amount is available to form some general conclusions, but there is a lack of any 
central  declassified  source  for  US  Navy  intelligence  gathering  that  would  provide 
sufficient detail. The  ‘closed-shop’  mentality of former intelligence operatives is also 
another stumbling block and there is very little personal memoir material available that 
would assist with the topic. 
 
In summary, the USA had an essential intelligence gathering requirement in the Northern 
Seas region and Scotland was the ideal location. They  made their plans and the UK 
government fully accommodated all of their requests. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
STRATEGIC RETALIATION – THE HOLY LOCH SUBMARINE BASE 
 
US Strategic Policy Requirements 
 
The turning point during the Cold War arrived with the introduction of the US Polaris 
submarine fleet in 1961. This sophisticated new weapon, which could reach targets in the 
USSR, totally changed the Cold War deterrent calculus. For America it gave them the 
guarantee of a second-strike capability, combined with stealth, virtual invulnerability, and 
most importantly, a forward operating base in Scotland, far from the shores of the USA. 
The use of a Scottish base was fully in tune with the American zeitgeist of being as close 
as possible to the enemy while remaining as far as possible from the continental USA. 
Arms-length warfare had now become a reality. 
 
Technological advances reduced the of nuclear weapons, enabling submarines to become 
suitable for the strategic role; nuclear propulsion made a submarine virtually 
undetectable, and a pressurised water nuclear plant meant that it did not need to surface to 
recharge batteries; these characteristics made them the ideal platform for a seaborne 
nuclear deterrent force. Admiral Burke, CNO, moved the Navy to the ‘strategic center’ 
by championing the Polaris fleet. His Naval Warfare Analysis Group reported in 1957 
that the Polaris mission was ‘national deterrence’. This decision did mean that cruise 
missiles were not developed until the 1980s. It also put the Navy ‘into the forefront of the 
central national strategy.’
134  The FBM was described as the ‘optimum launching vehicle’ 
for survivability and ‘its mission should be one of deterrence.’ 
135 In April 1958, Burke  
                                                 
134 Baer, pp.347-77. 
 
135 Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval Warfare Analysis Group Study 
Number 1, Introduction of the Fleet Ballistic Missile into Service, (OP 93), 0011P03 dated 15 January 
1957, Secret, Digital National Security Archives, [accessed 16 February 2006]. Also, Polaris Chronology, 
History of the Fleet Ballistic Missile System Development Program 1955-1967, 00031, 1967/00/00, Digital 
National Security Archives,  [accessed 15 April 2006].pp.13-23. 
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established Submarine Squadron 14 (SubRon 14) to research and implement the 
operational concept.  
 
President  Eisenhower  described  FBM  submarines  as  ‘mobile  missile  bases  …and 
seaborne bomber bases’  and on 7 January 1960 he authorised the NSC to proceed with 
the construction of 14 Polaris submarines, with another five to be planned.
 136 This was an 
increase  on  the  previous  agreed  totals  and  indicative  of  the  prominence  that  Polaris 
SSBNs had now achieved.  
 
Because of arguments between the Air Force and the Navy, the Joint Staff Target 
Planning Staff was created in 1959 to produce the first SIOP for nuclear war; this had an 
‘optimum mix of high priority military, industrial and government control targets.’
 137 It 
was revised in 1961 and its specific objectives were to ‘destroy or neutralize Sino-Soviet 
Bloc strategic nuclear delivery capability’ and to ‘attack the major urban-industrial 
centers of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.’ 
 
In 1961 the SAC allotted 232 targets to Polaris SSBNs; 169 of these were in Russia and 
62 were in China. As SubRon 14 was stationed in the North Atlantic area of operations, 
only Russian targets would have been within range, probably Moscow, other Russian 
cities and naval facilities at the Kola Peninsula. The Soviet SSBNs had been based within 
the Kola Peninsula since 1958; this targeting was confirmed to the US Congress in 1979 
                                                 
136Memorandum of Conversation [Dwight D. Eisenhower, Pres.; Thomas S. Gates, Jr., Secretary of 
Defense; Livingston T. Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Gen. Andrew J. 
Goodpaster, Staff Secretary to the Pres.; other State and Defense officials]. Oct. 3, 1960. 6 p. SECRET. 
Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Document Number: CK3100396714, [accessed 
23 March 2006]. Memorandum. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. SECRET. Issue Date: Sep 22, 1960. Date 
Declassified: May 26, 1982. Unsanitized. Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. 
Document Number: CK3100452975, [accessed 10 May 2006]. 
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Samuel  Huntington (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing, 1982), pp.59-61: Miller, pp.133-5: Hanhimaki and 
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by the CNO.
138 The Polaris submarines ‘maintained a battery of missiles ready for firing 
throughout their patrols’; also, the US Navy was very confident that these patrols had 
never been detected by Soviet ASW activities.
139 
 
Khrushchev  was  determined  to  correct  the  strategic  imbalance  by  creating  a  Soviet 
nuclear missile force of warships and rocket launcher battalions. He formed the Strategic 
Missile  Forces  (RSVN), but in 1960 it only had four R-7 launchers  and a couple of 
hundred  very  short-range  missiles  that  could  only  reach  Poland;  the  Soviet  air  force 
gradually reduced its strategic tasks.
140 When Khrushchev was removed in October 1964, 
Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, commander of the Navy, ordered an increased build-up of the 
new nuclear ballistic missile vessels.
141 
 
Defense Secretary  McNamara  fully supported the FBM programme  and proposed six 
Polaris submarines in his first Defense Budget in September 1961. He described them as 
providing  a  second  strike  capability  against  Soviet  long-range  nuclear  forces,  with  a 
secondary mission against Soviet cities: he stated that ‘the main objective of our nuclear 
forces is to deter nuclear attacks on the US’, and that ‘the president’s hands must not be 
tied  on  strategic  matters  through  a  lack  of  resources.’
142  An  NSC  memorandum  of 
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October  1961  set  out  McNamara’s  concept  of  nuclear  strategy,  namely  to  ensure  a 
survivable second-strike capability.
143  
 
McNamara’s selected strategic doctrine, says Gaddis, was designed for the ‘destruction of 
the enemy’s military forces, not of his civilian population’; but he eventually shaped it to 
target civilian populations to ensure mutual assured destruction, the cornerstone of the 
strategic policy.
144 
 
By December 1961, both Rusk and McNamara started to discuss Flexible Response. At 
the  NATO  Athens  Meeting  a  few  months  later,  McNamara  revealed  his  concept  of 
limited war; this laid down guidelines for nuclear use and acknowledged that warfare 
against  the  Soviets  might  only  involve  limited  activity.
  145  Previously,  the  Soviets 
believed that war would start with a surprise attack by NATO using nuclear weapons; 
once flexible response was adopted, the Soviet General Staff realised that war would be 
conventionally-based, with the threat of an eventual nuclear exchange.
 146 
 
The  Cuban  Missile  Crisis  in  October  1962  presented  SubRon14  with  its  operational 
examination and it performed effectively. By 22 October, all SSBNs had moved out to 
their operational station and the US had the maximum number of strategic submarines at 
sea.
147 Messages were passed regarding Proteus moving out of Holy Loch to naval Z-
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berths in West Highland sea lochs.
148 The families and locals around Holy Loch were 
under great stress, as they believed they were ‘very close to destruction’ at this time.
149 
The Cuban crisis was epochal for both sides and confirmed to Kennedy, as noted by 
Stromseth,  that  massive  retaliation  was  not  feasible;  the  Soviet  lesson  was  that  the 
Americans would not risk nuclear strikes on the USA.  
 
In March 1963 it was announced that three boats from SubRon 14 would patrol the 
Mediterranean; this first NATO SSBN force had been agreed at Athens in May 1962. In 
February 1964, a second FBM base was established at Rota, Spain.
150  This was an 
‘acceptable alternative’ to Franco’s Spain becoming a member of NATO, something 
which the Europeans would not allow. The naval base at Rota, meant that the FBM fleet 
for the Mediterranean did not have to make a 14-day round trip to the USA at the end of 
each patrol, thus saving millions of dollars and maintaining its strategic effectiveness.  
 
It is interesting to note that the UK had opposed American plan to set up naval HQ in 
Lisbon until the mid-1960s as London regarded that sea zone as part of the Royal Navy’s 
area  of  control.  The  CNO  deployed  SubRon  16  to  Rota  on  28  January  1964  and  in 
December the anchorage at Guam became operational; within a year the final base, at 
Charleston SC, opened. America’s SSBN system was now fully operational and had been 
deployed in the customary, businesslike unilateral fashion. Rota operated as a front-line 
SSBN base for 15 years before the US withdrew SubRon 16 from Spain in July 1979. 
This  ensured  that the  Holy  Loch  base  assumed  greater  importance  in the  overall US 
second strike strategy. 
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On 28 September 1964, the SSBN USS Daniel Webster was the first Polaris submarine to 
go on patrol armed with the Polaris A-3 missile; the fleet of 19 boats now carried a total 
of  288  surface-launched  ballistic  missiles  (SLBMs).
  151  By  November  1964,  the  US 
possessed 796 inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on Alert Status, with another 
82 in Emergency Combat Capability Status, many on board SSBNs from Holy Loch. The 
Polaris A-3 had been fully developed, each with three re-entry vehicles (MIRVs); these 
were  small  nuclear  weapons  that  would  separate  from  the  main  missile  and  attack 
separate targets. 
152 In 1971, President Nixon modified the FBM commitment to NATO 
to take account of the equipping of the SSBN fleet with Poseidon MIRV missiles; this 
order made no mention of any change to the mission of the Atlantic SSBNs.
 153 
 
In reality, the USA had unilaterally constructed a nuclear strike force of immense power 
to combat what was in effect a very small Soviet threat. This stemmed from the relentless 
advance of the ‘military-industrial system’ as predicted by Eisenhower, as well as the 
institutionalised  over-estimation  of  Soviet  strength  by  the  poor  coordination  of  US 
intelligence gathering as previously noted. 
 
By the mid 1970s, Rota had become a strategic air base as the US had lost its airfields in 
Morocco in 1963, becoming one of the largest airbases outside the USA; it also handled 
more than 600 ships annually. However, after the US accidentally dropping H-bombs in 
Spanish  waters,  Rota’s  nuclear  status  was  reduced,  whereby  it  could  ‘no  longer  be 
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associated  with  the  Polaris  programme.’
154  Holy  Loch  was  untouched  by  any  such 
changes. Rota eventually closed as home port to SubRon 16 in July 1979, while Holy 
Loch was maintained for another 13 years. The UK government never pressurised the 
Americans to remove the SSBNs, regardless of party policy statements; they also never 
had the trauma of the Palomares incident. Had they ever done so, the US would have 
withdrawn  support  for  the  UK  Polaris/Poseidon  fleet,  a  possibility  that  was  always 
present. Once more the US controlled their major ally in a crucial strategic matter. 
 
Nixon  and  Kissinger  changed  American  strategic  posture  because  of  overstretch  and 
Soviet nuclear parity. The SALT 1 agreement of May 1972 produced a mixed outcome; it 
accepted the ‘mutual assured destruction’ capability by restricting ABM sites to two each, 
but it left the Soviets with a noticeable superiority in numbers of missiles, namely 1,618 
ICBMs against 1,054 and 740 SLBMs against 650. However, America still retained a 
substantial advantage in technological sophistication.
 155 The treaty excluded the SSBNs, 
as well as ignoring the American possession of the MIRV technology, both vital matters 
for the Holy Loch operations. At the highest political level, the US maintained its vital 
strategic needs unilaterally. 
 
SSBN Development 
 
The US submarine fleet was radically redeveloped between 1945 and 1960; it introduced 
submarine-launched nuclear missiles and propulsion by nuclear motors. Two exceptional 
officers,  Admirals  William  Raborn  and  Admiral  Hyman  Rickover  achieved  this 
significantly  ahead  of  the  Soviet  Union,  by  using  the  Fleet  Ballistic  Missile  (FBM) 
programme and the Navy's Nuclear Power Program.
156 In fact, Rickover was so selfishly 
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possessive  of  the  entire  concept  that  he  initially  opposed  allowing  Admiral  Earl 
Mountbatten to board US nuclear submarines. 
 
The limited range of the Polaris A-1 missile meant that forward operating bases would 
reduce travel and lines of communication and thus increase its deterrent capability. In 
December 1959, the CNO and Admiral Lord Mountbatten, Chief of the Defence Staff, 
agreed that Scottish bases would be suitable. This was a continuation of an agreed pattern 
from the 1950s. 
157 Existing bases in West Germany were closer to the USSR, but were 
extremely vulnerable to any Warsaw Pact attack; lessons had been learned from the rapid 
North Korean invasion of South Korea.  There was still strong opposition to the entire 
SSBN concept from senior US naval officers who they feared that ‘it was diverting funds 
away from the large surface ships they preferred.’
 158 
 
Major technological innovations such as deeper diving, underwater sonar navigation aids 
and quieter engines appeared and Rickover ‘created and remained in charge of the most 
significant  naval  programme  of  all  time.’  The  US  Navy  commissioned  one  nuclear-
powered FBM submarine every two months during the period December 1959 to January 
1967.
159  The  acronym  ‘FBM’  slurred  into  ‘Boomer’,  becoming  shorthand  for  a  ship 
submersible ballistic nuclear (SSBN). 
 
The first SSBN was the USS George Washington (SSBN 598), and the Polaris missile 
system  became  operational  on  July  20,  1960.  The  USA  now  possessed  ‘the  most 
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powerful deterrent force imaginable, a stealth platform with enormous firepower.’
160 It 
carried 16 Polaris A-1 missiles, each with a range of 2,200 kilometres, launched when 
submerged.  The  targeting  was  under  control  of  the  SAC  and  the  submarines  were 
commanded  by  CINCUSNAVEUR  and  CINCLANT  (both  appointments  held  by  the 
same US admiral). 
 
The Americans agreed to provide Polaris submarines to the UK for Western European 
defence  as  part  of  the  policy  of  ‘defending  NATO  on  a  global  basis.’  The  UK  was 
permitted to access US nuclear information, thereby overcoming the restrictions imposed 
by  the  McMahon  Act  of  1946.  This  was  one  of  Macmillan’s  coups,  but  there  were 
limitations regarding the amount of information the USA would provide.  
 
Defence Minister Harold Watkinson visited Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates in June 
1960  to  seek  better  terms,  but  the  Americans  pointed  out  Macmillan’s  assurances  at 
Camp David and therefore the US would not consider any political conditions; also the 
US would only agree to supply two Polaris submarines to the UK as part of a NATO 
initiative.
161 Both were examples of American ruthless behaviour in pursuing their own 
requirements, regardless of the Anglo-American relationship or the NATO alliance. This 
was unilateralism in the raw. 
 
Eisenhower and Macmillan agreed at Camp David in February 1960 that the US would 
provide Skybolt missiles to the UK in exchange for the UK ‘making the necessary 
arrangements for US Polaris tenders in Scottish ports’. The USA had based their nuclear 
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bombers in the UK since the 1950s, as well as a generation of MRBMs, and therefore the 
arrival of the Polaris system was regarded as a natural progression of this ‘hospitality’.
162 
 
This quid pro quo was the cornerstone of the US position from which they never 
wavered.
163 Despite the manoeuvring done by Macmillan, the Americans enforced their 
unilateral requirement. Britain attempted to obtain a better deal because of the political 
problems associated with siting a nuclear submarine base in the heavily populated West 
of Scotland. The area housed more than two million people, there was heavy Left Wing 
opposition, and Macmillan wanted to ensure that he secured full support from the 
leadership of the Labour Party. This latter point was particularly important in view of the 
1960 the Labour Party Conference vote to abandon all nuclear-based defence 
measures.
164 
 
The preferred American location was either Holy Loch, a Royal Navy base during the 
war,  or  Rosneath,  which  had  been  a  wartime  US  Naval  Base.  Bremerhaven  was 
suggested as  ‘an acceptable alternative’, to help focus British attention, but the State 
Department did not support it.
 165 On 20 June, Eisenhower stated to Macmillan that the 
submarines needed quick access to open seas and excellent logistical support facilities, 
therefore the Clyde was the only place that could provide these.
166 Macmillan conceded, 
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but mentioned the vagueness surrounding the American offer of Polaris submarines to the 
UK. 
 
The British Embassy in Washington stated that Macmillan supported this ‘worthwhile 
project’; it was a complete surrender to the  US position.
167 To prevent  further delay, 
Eisenhower informed Macmillan that ‘there was no misunderstanding at Camp David on 
the question of location’ and it was now an urgent affair, with the US Navy planning to 
deploy  vessels  by  the  autumn.  The  question  of  operational  control  was  raised  and 
Eisenhower reiterated that the US would require UK consent before firing missiles from 
inside British waters. The issue of assigning British Polaris submarines to the NATO 
project was also mentioned. 
 
Macmillan  vainly  pointed  out  that  Glasgow  ‘contained  unstable  elements…and 
communist  agitators’;  nevertheless,  unrelenting  American  pressure  succeeded  and 
Eisenhower  agreed  to  the  deal  on  27  October  1960.
168  The  media  uncovered  the 
background negotiations and the New York Times broke the news on 18 October 1960.
169 
The process was an indication that the Americans did not regard the Anglo-American 
relationship as a partnership, but had pursued their strategic requirements in a singularly 
unilateral fashion. 
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Naval communications were unreliable and the nuclear launch order needed to reach the 
SSBN during war and  confusion; this task was passed to the Special  Projects  Office 
(SPO).
  170  Communications  networks  had  to  be  resilient  and  secure,  and  primary 
communications were provided by very low frequency (VLF) equipment, as at Thurso. 
The missile launch message from the NCA was also transmitted to relay stations and 
ships for rebroadcast to the SSBNs, thus ensuring that launch commands reached the 
submarine. 
 
Secure extremely low frequency (ELF) communications were developed and submarines 
received VLF communications via a trailing wire antenna that was trailed behind the boat 
just below the surface. 
171 In July 1960, the Pentagon requested a radio communications 
station in northern Scotland, to support anti-submarine warfare (ASW) activities and vital 
ship-to-shore links to the US fleet; this led to the construction of radio bases at Thurso, 
and Londonderry in Northern Ireland. 
172 
 
The two-crew concept meant that one crew manned the submarine for a three-month 
operational period while the off-crew was back in America for training and rest. Prior to 
this  development  each  submarine  would  only  have  had  one  crew  and  a  lengthy 
turnaround in port; however, the nuclear-powered boats could run endlessly and therefore 
the 2-crew concept was devised. In addition, further safeguards were included to protect 
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this strategic advance. The relief crew’s return involved using two separate aircraft; if one 
aircraft developed problems, the other could replicate all the operational functions and 
could therefore take command of the SSBN.
173  
 
During operational build up, an SSBN put to sea and performed a series of live exercises 
including  firing  of  the  Polaris  missile.  Rickover  demanded  that  the  naval  nuclear 
engineers focused their attention solely on the nuclear plant to the exclusion of any other 
operational duties. This was a radical change from the standard naval doctrine of having 
cross-qualified officers aboard submarines to provide resilience within the vessel’s battle 
structure.
174  
 
Polaris  development  continued  and  the  Polaris  A-2,  range  2,700  kilometres,  became 
operational in 1962; the Polaris A-3, range 4,500 kilometres, was fitted to the USS Daniel 
Webster (SSBN 626) in September 1964, the first SubRon 14 boat to be converted.
175 The 
SPO was able to report by May 1964 that it was costing $42 million to refit an SSBN 
with Polaris A-3 missiles. The benefits of Polaris were listed by US Navy Secretary John 
Connally; it could retaliate on order, thus allowing peace negotiations to take place; it 
could be easily retargeted; the Navy operational command system could control it and, 
most importantly, it was not a ‘magnet’ that would draw enemy missiles to the mainland 
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USA.
176    This  was  another  reiteration  of  the  fundamental  advantage  of  basing  it  in 
Scotland,  as  pointed  out  by  Arbatov  and  Oltmans;  America’s  approach  to  national 
security interests always took precedence over multilateral or US/UK relationships.  
 
By the late 1960s, May and Treverton’s point about a ‘superior nuclear arsenal’ for the 
Soviets was becoming true and improvements to Soviet targets and air defence systems 
(ABMs) meant that missile technology needed to be upgraded; therefore the Poseidon 
missile was introduced to succeed Polaris.  
 
Poseidon was developed as a counter to the SS-9 Soviet land-based system; it had a 
bigger warhead than Polaris, and could carry 10 MIRVs over 5,270 kilometres and was 
designed to reassure the USSR that the USA was not building a first-strike capability. 
The  upgrading  of  the  Polaris  system,  and  its  successor  Poseidon,  was  authorised  in 
November 1965 by Secretary McNamara, still a strong FBM supporter.
177 
 
In 1967, he recommended enormously costly improvements to Poseidon and this placed 
significant pressure on the Defense Budget which had to compete for funding against the 
costs of the Vietnam War and the Great Society programme. Nevertheless, McNamara 
specified the initial operational date for Poseidon of November 1970, with a total force of 
384  missiles  on  board  31  SSBNs  by  1975,  with  costs  estimated  at  $4,998  million. 
Flexible response required extra funding for military matters; this was initially the case, 
but Johnson decided to stop the extra spending as it was crippling his Great Society 
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programme.
  178  These  cuts  did  not  impinge  on  the  FBM  fleet,  as  McNamara  was 
‘hardening America’s nuclear arsenal.’ 
 
In January 1967, McNamara reported that SSBN construction was on target; the first 
seven Poseidon re-fitted boats would be deployed in 1971, and the final one by the end of 
1977. 
179 In his opinion, the SSBN was the ideal launching platform - it was mobile, easy 
concealed, thus ensuring a very high probability of surviving any Soviet first strike.
180 
The USS James Madison (SSBN 627) completed the first successful underwater Poseidon 
launch on 3 August 1970. 
181 
 
McNamara’s Force Structure proposals in November 1966 planned for a steady force 
level of 655 SLBMs for the period 1968 to 1972. The Poseidon missiles would replace 
500 of the current nuclear weapons in the strategic bomber force. The SSBN was now a 
major component of the long-rage deterrent force.
182 It utilised enhanced navigational 
equipment using satellite links; this was Programme 435, formerly known as the Transit 
satellite  and  was  first  used  by  USS  Alexander  Hamilton  (SSBN-617),  a  SubRon  14 
submarine, on patrol from Charlestown NC to the Mediterranean. The radio station at 
Thurso was a link in this system. 
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At the end of 1969, the totals of SSBNs stood at 41 for NATO and 8 for the Warsaw 
Pact; however, the Soviet bloc had a significant advantage in conventional submarines, 
with 344 as against NATO’s total of 220.
183 This equation showed that 1969 was indeed 
the ‘major turning point’ as Gaddis claimed, with the USSR achieving numerical nuclear 
parity. SubRon 14 provided one-quarter of America’s SSBN fleet at this time. 
 
American Activities in Scotland 
 
FBM Refit Site One was activated on 3 March 1961 when the depot ship, USS Proteus 
(AS-19) arrived. She was fitted with a huge crane, specialist workshops, missile storage 
and nuclear maintenance capabilities. Some demonstrators in canoes were arrested when 
they tried to board the vessel: a larger protest took place the following Saturday, a polite 
march  by  more  than  a  thousand  members  of  the  Scottish  Campaign  for  Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND).
  184   The  protests  were  peaceable and the  media  were  generally 
positive and welcoming in their reporting.  
 
The first refit was carried out on USS Patrick Henry (SSBN 599), the first submarine to 
reach Holy Loch, on 8 March 1961.
185  SubRon 14, under the command of Captain Ward, 
had now developed operational doctrines and procedures, including the introduction of 
the  two-crew  system  (Blue/Gold).
186  This  allowed  the  SSBN  to  maintain  an  almost 
constant patrol with the only down time being for crews to return to base, change over 
and replenish supplies. The operational patrols lasted 60 to 80 days, limited only by food 
replenishment limits and morale. The potency of deterrence was greatly  enhanced by 
these long patrols. 
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The floating dry dock, USS Los Alamos (AFDB-7), was towed across the Atlantic in four 
sections  and  assembled  in  position  by  Marine  Construction  Battalion  4  (Seabees), 
becoming active in November 1961. Its mission was to ‘provide material and personal 
support for naval units associated with the Polaris/ Poseidon program.’ It guaranteed the 
forward deployment of the SSBNs, and became in effect a ‘force multiplier.’ At full 
capacity, she was able to support one submarine in dry dock and another four berthed 
alongside; the crews, 1,000 in 1961 and 2,750 by 1970, lived ashore.
  187 SubRon 14 
reached its full complement of ten SSBNs at the end of 1963.  
 
Where had the SSBNs been? This remains secret to this day, but examination of US Navy 
records shows that none of them was eligible for the award of the Cuba campaign medals.
 
188 This could only mean that they were on patrol in their northern launch zones. 
 
After the crisis had abated, the Pentagon accentuated the importance of the Holy Loch 
when Navy Secretary Frederick Korth and the Deputy Commander Submarine Forces 
United States Atlantic Fleet, attended the change of command ceremony from Captain 
DuBois to Capt Bell on 21 November 1962.
189 
 
On 15 March 1963, USS Hunley (AS 31) arrived to relieve USS Proteus, which departed 
in marked contrast to the commotion that had greeted her arrival; she left the Holy Loch 
to  a  traditional  nautical  farewell.  There  were  ‘friendly  waves’  from  the  crowded 
waterfront, hoots and whistles from other craft and the strain of the bagpipes playing.
190 
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The Hunley was the first ship designed and built as a nuclear submarine tender and in 
December 1965, when the USS Thomas A. Edison was refitted, it marked 100 refits of 
SSBNs at Holy Loch.
 191 
 
The USS Simon Lake (AS 33) entered the Holy Loch in July 1966 to relieve Hunley and 
operated in this role until May 1970 when she handed over to USS Canopus (AS-34), 
which had been re-configured to refit the Poseidon missile system; Canopus remained on 
duty until November 1975.
 192 
 
After  refit,  SSBNs  had  a  four-day  sea  trial  in  the  Firth  of  Clyde  and  Irish  Sea,  all 
conducted under busy shipping, occasionally brushing with Soviet trawlers. In November 
1964, the Pentagon reported that the Soviet AGI Deflector, was off Guam for the purpose 
of observing the new SSBNs that had now been deployed there.
193 This close surveillance 
was a regular feature, well illustrated when the trawler Zond closely followed the USS 
Lafayette  (SSBN-616),  another  SubRon  14  boat,  for  ten  hours  in  February  1965, 
interrupting  Lafayette’s  torpedo  firing  exercises  and  routine  training  drills.  An 
unconfirmed  report  by  Jack  Anderson  of  the  Washington  Post  claimed  that  the  USS 
James  Madison  (SSBN-627)  from  Holy  Loch  had  collided  with  a  Soviet  trawler  in 
November 1974.
194 
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According  to  Jeffrey  Richelson,  roughly  one  third  of  the  Soviet  Embassy  staff  were 
members of the intelligence service.
195 Their agents came from all walks of local life, 
including the armed services, such as Admiral  Ludke of  West Germany and Colonel 
Wennerstrom of Sweden; others were members of defence establishments, like Vassall in 
the UK. 
 
Information was invaluable to the Soviet Union and in 1967 an East German man was 
sentenced to seven years for espionage at Holy Loch and his accomplice, an American 
sailor, received six months at a court martial. The sailor had passed on an instructional 
handbook dealing with  the  pipe  work system  of a  submarine;  an  operation  had  been 
mounted by counter-espionage officers, posing as fishermen.
 196 
 
Regardless of this Soviet activity, technical problems with nuclear propulsion systems 
were accepted by ‘boomer’ skippers in order to keep their patrol fully operational. If a 
submarine returned to port for repairs, this disrupted the strategic targeting plan.
197 
 
Life  aboard  an  SSBN  was  likened  to  ‘being  on  a  spaceship  -  you're  always  in  a 
completely hostile environment.’ The boat made its own water  and produced oxygen 
from  this.  The  commanding  officer  constantly  had  to  inspect  the  nuclear 
reactor; Rickover’s relentless focus on nuclear engineering eventually became standard 
operating  procedure  throughout  the  US  Navy.  The  nuclear  engineers  had  an  annual 
Operational Reactors Safeguards Exam (ORSE) by his specialist inspection team and if 
the ‘nukes’ did not pass this exam, the crew remained on board until the ORSE had been 
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passed. 
198 He also, contrary to the example of the USAF, set the radiation exposure 
levels for nuclear sailors at lower, civilian levels. 
 
ORSE  failure  meant  the  patrol  was  aborted  and  the  Pentagon  amended  the  Strategic 
Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP); failure was a major operational problem - a ‘most 
unpleasant experience’  for  those  involved. Rickover  tackled  ORSE  failure  in  the  late 
1960s by assigning a permanent training officer to each SubRon - the ‘ORSE Doctor.’
199 
When a submarine went into the dry dock, the propeller was covered so that Soviet spies 
could not photograph the blades, as these could provide a ‘signature’ to the submarine,.
200  
 
All of the SubRon 14 SSBNs were converted to Poseidon, with the Polaris A-3 boats 
limited to SubRon 18 in the Pacific to cover targets that were unlikely to be protected by 
ABMs, such as Chinese locations.
201 The refitting programme took seven years as part of 
the  regular  overhaul  cycle,  thereby  ensuring  that  there  was  no  interruption  to  the 
operational availability of SSBNs. In 1969, the new Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford 
gave full support to the Poseidon programme, which now cost almost $5.3 billion.
202 
 
Servicing and maintenance of SSBNs was a highly technical matter and produced a very 
high standard of technical excellence: Site One pioneered major naval maintenance and 
monitoring programmes. The Holy Loch had changed from the original agreement as an 
anchorage into an intermediate maintenance depot because of its strategic location. This 
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was  due  to  a  well  functioning  US/UK  relationship,  driven  by  a  US-interests  first 
philosophy.
203  
 
There were practical concerns regarding the environmental impact of nuclear-powered 
boats  staying  in  the  Holy  Loch,  but  early  technical  information  reassured  the  UK 
government that any radioactive discharge would be low-level activity.
204 The scientific 
measurements of the loch and surrounding waters in August 1961 reported that there was 
no detectable increase of radioactivity and this was confirmed by later surveys. In March 
1966,  Defence  Secretary  Denis  Healey  stated  that  the  radioactivity  in  the  loch  had 
dropped  to  ‘acceptable’  levels.  These  fears  were  never  fully  allayed  however,  and  a 
spillage in 1967 raised the level of Cobalt-60 in the loch to detectable levels. 
 
SSBNs needed to test launch the gas-operated firing tubes. Secretary Maclay advised that 
these tests should be played down and no publicity given, provided that they ‘could not 
be heard or seen from the shore’; in the event, the tests were innocuous. The first ‘No 
Load  Air  Tests’  in  the  Holy  Loch  were  so  mild  that  the  witnesses,  Dunoon  Police 
Inspector Robertson (whose son George later become Secretary of State for Defence and 
secretary-general of NATO) and the Dunoon Town Clerk, agreed that the tests ‘in no way 
attracts attention or disturbs local people.’
 205  
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Table 2 shows the final range of US units operating at Holy Loch. 
 
Table 2 
 
US Facilities at the Holy Loch 1961-1974 
206 
 
Units  Equipment 
 
USN;USMC 
 
Polaris/Poseidon SSBN base; 
Submarine Squadron 14 (10 boats); 
Ballistic Missile Submarine Refit Site One; 
Submarine tender; 
Auxiliary floating dry dock; 
Nuclear weapons storage facility on board tender;  
Barges and support vessels permanently in Holy Loch. 
 
 
 
UK Government Activity 
 
The operational deployment of Poseidon warheads forced the British government to seek 
an updated MOU. It was recognised that the Americans would be unhelpful and would 
not provide the technical details of the reactors or warheads, unlike the 1964 agreement. 
The  UK  acknowledged  that  the  Americans  would  be  responsible  for  safety  matters 
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aboard these boats.
207 This was again a clear case of the US resolutely adhering to its own 
course regardless of any alliance impact. 
 
The Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, was understandably anxious and raised the MOU 
question  with  the  Prime  Minister  in  March  1971.  A  new  arrangement  was  speedily 
concluded  and  no  public  announcement was  made  as  both  parties agreed  that  it  was 
within  the  scope  of  the  1965  Lyndon  Johnson-Harold  Wilson  agreement.  Heath 
acknowledged that the Poseidon boats would be covered by the same agreement, with a 
‘joint decision’ required between the US and UK governments to permit any operational 
use of US bases in Britain during an emergency, as well as a commitment by the US to 
‘take every possible step’ to consult with Britain if nuclear weapons were going to be 
used.
208 Behind these reassuring words was the reality that the US would always service 
its own interests first and consult if possible. 
 
The Americans remained evasive regarding the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), 
as it could impinge on their freedom of operation. Macmillan rightly felt that a specific 
agreement was important as it ‘might be the only formal exchange of letters to take place 
in connection with Polaris submarines’, but he also realised that publication of any such 
deal  would  be  politically  difficult.  This  was  a  good  example  of  a  ‘gentleman’s 
agreement’
 and showed an unusual piece of mutually beneficent agreement by the US/UK 
relationship. 
209 
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As late as 16 February 1961, Foreign Secretary Home believed ‘it would be damaging to 
Anglo-US  relations’  to  delay  the  first  SSBN  and  tender  ship  without  the  MOU,  an 
opinion shared by Maclay and  Watkinson. Eventually, in September 1962, the White 
House acknowledged there was a requirement for agreement covering SSBNs in the Holy 
Loch,  but  continued  to  avoid  one.  On  8  November  1963,  Macmillan  was  urged  by 
Defence Minister Peter Thorneycroft and Foreign Secretary Home to personally raise the 
matter  with  Kennedy:  the  opportunity  never  arose  as  Kennedy  was  assassinated  two 
weeks later. 
210 
 
Notwithstanding, the British government sent an ‘Immediate’ telegram to the Washington 
Embassy on 25 November, the day of President Kennedy’s funeral.  A laconic reply was 
despatched by the Embassy which was ‘surprised’ to receive such an instruction and 
pointed out that the matter would have to wait until President Johnson was able to address 
it. This was eventually done by the new president.  
 
Finally,  on  26  February  1964,  the  Foreign  Office  was  able  to  notify  the  Ministry  of 
Defence that ‘the Exchange of Letters concerning the Holy Loch memorandum is due to 
be  completed  today.’
211    This  agreement  is  of  such  secrecy  that  it  has  not  yet  been 
released by the national archives of either the US or the UK; however, matters that had 
been considered for inclusion included the point of control of launching missiles, whether 
within British navigational waters, coordinating measures to prevent mutual interference 
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in  movements,  emergency  logistics  facilities  and  naval  technical  contacts.
212  Authors 
such as Campbell are sceptical of this agreement, as the American President would not 
have time for a ‘polite telephone call to the British prime minister’ in time of possible 
nuclear launch. It was really US unilateralism disguised as an agreement without any 
discernible British benefit. 
 
Initially the locals feared that the radiation from the SSBNs would turn the waters into a 
‘killer liquid’; but, as recorded by George Giarchi, by 1975 this fear had vanished and 
most locals had forgotten about the radiation. In 1975 there were more than 600,000 
summer visitors to the area, thus illustrating that this fear was non-existent.
213 The tourist 
trade had revived, assisted by the impact of the large American presence. 
 
Maintenance matters were used by the UK government to attempt to obtain concessions 
from  the  Americans,  as  in  December  1964  when  Defence  Secretary  Denis  Healey 
suggested there could be advantages in the UK agreeing to a request for the SSBNs to use 
a UK facility in the Gareloch, the planned base for the UK FBM fleet.
214 This implies that 
the relationship was unequal, as suggested by Baylis.  
 
Opposition 
 
The Holy Loch base unleashed the anti-American feeling on the British Left and there 
were anti-nuclear demonstrations by CND, and also at the US Embassy in London. Even 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis, US Ambassador David Bruce had concerns about the 
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safety of the premises and staff. 
215 But there was plenty of support for the base and this 
has been consistently overlooked. In November 1960, the Parliamentary Labour Party 
decided ‘not to oppose the establishment of a Polaris facility on the Clyde’; this decision 
weakened  political  opposition  within  Scotland.  On  the  same  day,  the  Convention  of 
Royal Burghs in Scotland ‘refused by 31 votes to 11’ to discuss a motion which opposed 
the base project; only two of the six Firth of Clyde burghs, Greenock and Clydebank, 
both Labour strongholds, opposed the base.
216 
 
Eminent churchmen, including the former war hero, The Very Rev Dr George MacLeod, 
leader of the Iona Community, were outspoken in their opposition and tried to convince 
the government to limit the use of the SSBNs to ‘non-war-like actions.’
 217 The Church of 
Scotland opposed the establishment of the base and conducted a polite campaign with the 
Secretary of State for Scotland, John Maclay, even expressing their admiration for his 
courteous conduct in the matter.
218 
 
The Scottish CND sent a personal invitation to Macmillan to join its demonstration or 
send a message of support for their cause.
219 The commander of the Proteus also became 
involved in the public relations scenario and publicly stated that while he accepted the 
protesters’ sincerity, he disagreed with their analysis.
220 
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Letters were sent to Macmillan, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Nixon, and Dunoon Burgh 
Council remained solidly supportive of the base and the boost that it provided for the 
declining local economy.
  When this opposition is analysed it shows that most opposition 
was  left-wing,  mainly  trades  unions.  Dunoon,  however,  needed  the  additional 
employment, as the local holiday trade collapsed. One protester complained to Scottish 
Secretary Maclay, and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, about ‘trigger-happy madmen’ 
and compared Britain to a ‘tenth-rate banana state under American tutelage.’
 221 
 
The anti-Polaris agitation slowly subsided, although there were two prominent young, 
local protesters, namely George Robertson and Brian Wilson (who later become a Labour 
government minister and a staunch champion of nuclear power).  At the Scottish Trades 
Union  Congress  (STUC)  in  Dunoon  in  April  1963,  the  delegates  were  generally 
uninterested and the vote against the base was passed in a lacklustre fashion.
222 Site One 
was now part of the local landscape and there was no evidence of operational problems 
for SubRon 14. 
 
There has been considerable prominence given to the anti-nuclear protests, but the facts 
show that from 1958 to 1963, there was only 20 to 33 per cent support for unilateral 
disarmament  among  the  British  public;  the  lowest  point  occurred during  the  1960/61 
illegal actions by the Committee of 100, led by Bertrand Russell. From 1960 to 1964, 
public support for the Holy Loch base grew from 44 to 49 per cent, with opposition 
dropping  from  36  to  33  per  cent;  the  Soviet  aggression  during  the  Cuban  crisis 
contributed to this growth of support.
223   
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Giarchi shows that, unlike the protesting thousands in Yokosuka, Japan, the locals ‘had 
not  been  fired  by  the  rhetoric  of  the  CND  politicians’;  only  20  per  cent  found  the 
presence  of  the  SSBNs  to  be  ‘worrying.’
224  In  fact,  ‘there  was  no  indication  of 
widespread fears locally’ and some of the locals counter-protested the CND groups with 
placards proclaiming ‘go home weirdies.’ The CND was infiltrated by communists who 
adopted a pacifist approach, but ‘their interests were not solely pro-peace’; pro-Sovietism 
remained within the Left Wing of the Labour Party, but did not succeed in causing any 
disruption to the Holy Loch site. 
225 
 
Some political opposition to the Holy Loch base continued; the STUC still expressed its 
normal anti-American, pro-Soviet line in 1971 and its General Secretary wrote to Heath 
demanding the removal of the Polaris base, concluding that ‘no alternative was to be 
offered.’
226 Similar opinions were expressed by Glasgow City Council who believed that 
the Holy Loch base was now a ‘prime target’; even Clydebank Town Council felt that 
they  also  had  to  register  their  disapproval  and  did  so  in  1972.  There  was  now  a 
Conservative government in power again, a factor which usually allowed the Labour Left 
more scope for agitation. 
 
Accordingly, the Labour Party conference voted to close the Holy Loch base at meetings 
in October 1972 and April 1973; the Wilson government had previously ignored such 
demands between 1964 and 1970.
227 On Site One’s tenth anniversary, in March 1971, the 
Scottish National Party demanded that the US government pay £500m for their use of the 
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Holy Loch base, as they were already paying Spain £250m for the facilities at Rota: in 
1976 they called for the base to be closed.
228  These requests were ignored. 
There were off-duty discipline problems, normally low level misdemeanours; however, in 
1974, four coloured US sailors were jailed for three years each at Glasgow High Court, 
for mobbing, rioting and police assault; one gave the ‘Black Power’ salute in court.
229 
Nevertheless, the relationship between the US Navy personnel and the local inhabitants 
has  been  identified  as  good  by  Giarchi’s  excellent  research,  and  during  the  period 
from1961  to  1974,  nearly  36  per  cent  of  the  marriages  registered  in  Dunoon  were 
between non-US women and US Navy personnel. 
230  
 
Although Holy  Loch was in Scotland, it was solely a UK  matter; ‘there really is no 
Scottish aspect of the question of the nuclear deterrent’; this caused annoyance to Scottish 
organisations, whose requests for meetings were regularly refused.
231 This undoubtedly 
caused political damage to the Conservative Party in the tightly-fought 1964 UK election 
when they lost power to Labour by a margin of only five seats. They narrowly lost two 
seats in Scotland, which if retained may have kept them in government.
232 American 
unilateralism had become a salient matter in UK domestic politics. 
 
These seats were at Glasgow Kelvingrove and Renfrewshire West, where the previous 
Scottish Secretary John Maclay had stood down; the seat was won by Norman Buchan 
for Labour. During the election campaign, the nuclear and defence issues were accorded a 
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far higher national profile than at the previous election in 1959, with prominent coverage 
in television broadcasts and party manifestoes.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The research would have benefited from a wider range of detailed sources regarding the 
operations of the FBM fleet at Holy Loch. Personal memoir information has been limited 
in its scope and contains no mention of operations orders, launch positions, operational 
problems, etc. Because of its fundamental role in the US strategic plan, it is unlikely that 
this  information  will  be  declassified  soon.  However,  there  has  been  plenty  of  useful 
information available and this has enabled a good picture to be drawn of the Site One’s 
overall role and range of  activities. 
 
The establishment of the Holy Loch submarine base was inevitable once the US adopted 
a forward defence posture for its second-strike capability from SSBNs and was a matter 
in which the UK government really had little choice. The true US/UK relationship was 
obvious,  namely  that  the  UK  was  a  client  of  the  US  in  defence  matters.  American 
unilateralism overrode all other considerations. 
 
Successive American administrations forced the UK government to satisfy the strategic 
needs of the USA. They established a most potent deterrent force at a location as close to 
the enemy as possible and as far away from their own shores as they could contrive. As 
one  American  sailor  said  about  Holy  Loch,  ‘Imagine  handling  nuclear  weapons  in  a 
residential neighborhood (sic)! Some of the Scots' complaints about us were justified. 
Would you allow that in your neighborhood (sic)?’ 
233 
 
The effectiveness of the FBM fleet was proved during the Cuban Missile Crisis when the 
Holy Loch submarines deployed to their battle stations close to the USSR. Fears over the 
operational use of nuclear propulsion and nuclear weapons were thoroughly addressed 
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and the FBM fleet procedures significantly raised the standards of safety and engineering 
for the US Navy. 
 
Holy Loch was the iconic example of the importance of Scotland to the USA for its 
strategic  nuclear  policy;  it  became  the  first  FBM  base  when  the  first  SSBN  became 
available for service. Rota, on the other hand, was not available until January 1964 and 
was closed by 1979, while Holy Loch remained fully operational, thus emphasising its 
importance.
 234 It was only in 1992, when the Trident missile provided the ability to hit 
targets in the USSR from American home waters, that Holy Loch was finally closed. 
 
The  available  evidence  shows  no  damage  to  the  ‘Special  Relationship’  from  US 
operations at the Holy Loch. The UK government recognised reality and agreed to all US 
requests. This pliability meant that the US Navy was able to execute its strategic mission 
from Scotland. The US actions at Holy Loch were not directly connected with any NATO 
requirements, although the assigning of SSBNs to the Mediterranean helped to solve a 
strategic impasse between the alliance and the USA.  
 
Despite media interest and political agitation, there was little significant opposition to the 
establishment of the Holy Loch base. The UK government fully supported it, as did the 
local population, and it became a tourist attraction after a short space of time. Holy Loch 
was a story of US interests from start to finish, but the UK was able to obtain the Polaris 
system for their own use as a consequence. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
ASW – ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 
 
The Soviet Threat 
Submarines had a vital role in the superpower navies during the Cold War. Their crews 
carried  out  intelligence-collection  operations,  sought  out  and  stood  ready  to  destroy 
opposing  submarines,  and,  from  the  early  1960s,  threatened  missile  attacks  on  their 
adversary's homeland: in effect they provided the most survivable nuclear deterrent of the 
Cold War.  
 
During the research period, anti-submarine warfare played a major part in US strategic 
policy. In simple terms, the US Navy had to penetrate the Soviet ASW defences north of 
the GIUK Gap and had also to track and deter Soviet submarines that were trying to reach 
firing positions on the east coast of the United States. 
Both superpowers developed strategic submarine warfare as an essential component of 
their strategic policy and also contested the use and control of the same portion of the 
seas, namely the GIUK Gap and seas beyond. The research will now scrutinise the ASW 
strategic policy and the manner in which the US bases in Scotland were linked to this.  
 
The Soviet Union’s targets were the fighting materiel moving from the USA to Europe.
235 
Loss of this materiel would have caused serious disruption to NATO’s northern flanks 
and would also have had a severe effect on communications. Gorshkov favoured attacks 
on ships in port where they would be ‘more vulnerable than merchant ships at sea.’ The 
Soviet SSKs targeted the NATO reinforcement convoys and trade vessels. 
Soviet submarine tactics had developed to protect the land from seaborne invasion. The 
USSR  built  up  their  submarine  forces  to  attack  NATO  carrier  groups  and  they  built 
nuclear-powered boats in the early 1960s alongside their diesel-powered boats.
236         
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All, however, had short range missiles, but by 1969 they were able to fit longer range 
weapons which were excellent for attacking the surface shipping targets. There was still 
an expectation that the Soviet SSBNs would be used against high value targets, such as 
carrier groups. 
The Soviet SLBM programme was started in 1949, but was not implemented with the 
same vigour and technical excellence as the Americans.
237 Khrushchev wanted 
submarine-based missile systems to exploit  their lead in missile technology, gained from 
the Sputnik success. The Soviets had a lot of ground to make up, as in 1950, their Navy 
numbered less than 50 ships, while the NATO allies could count on almost 1,500. 
 
However, they had a huge SSK construction programme during this time and because of 
this, NATO adopted ASW as a priority task. The Soviet submarine fleet grew rapidly 
from 261 in 1950 to 437 in 1960; these were mainly designed for home defence missions. 
This  forced  the  US  Navy  to  re-examine  the  importance  once  again  of  a  sea  control 
doctrine as it could not get close enough to Soviet targets to launch aircraft. The US Navy 
tackled this problem in  three ways; by compiling hunter-killer  groups of surface and 
submarine boats, by a barrier strategy, and finally by attempting to use carriers to strike at 
the submarine bases.
238 
 
The only visible build up of Soviet surface vessels were the AGIs, but by the 1960s, other 
surface vessels began to arrive. This was a ‘fundamental reorientation of naval strategy’, 
and the central Soviet naval mission became ‘the delivery of nuclear warheads to the 
continental United States.’
239 The Soviets assigned a permanent AGI vessel to Holy Loch 
from 1965 to estimate deployment rates, time at sea on patrol, deployment schedules and 
readiness  states.  This  enabled  the  Soviet  Navy  to  pre-position  submarines  (ship 
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submersible nuclear – SSN) with electronic tracking equipment to await the FBMs: the 
US Navy countered this by deploying other SSNs, ASW aircraft and seabed sensors.  
 
The American SSBNs in the Northern Seas and the Kola waters were always vulnerable 
to Soviet ASW operations and combating this became a major plank of US strategic 
doctrine. From 1964 onwards, Admiral Gorshkov operated a strategic policy of protecting 
the Soviet coast and these waters were heavily patrolled by ASW units; there were a total 
of 146 non-SSBNs in the Soviet Northern Fleet by 1968.
240 These were supported by 
ASW aircraft, surface ships and communications stations. 
 
Khrushchev believed that the Soviet Union did not require large surface vessels, because 
nuclear-powered submarines, with their nuclear weapons would suffice. This was not 
fully supported by Admiral Gorshkov, as implementation would involve the degradation 
of the other services.
241 This contradictory point of view was also upheld by Marshall 
Sokolovskiy, Chief of the General Staff 1952-59, and Leonid Brezhnev, who changed the 
policy on coming to power in 1964; the rapid construction of the Soviet submarine fleet 
then followed. By 1966 Gorshkov was able to claim that ‘nuclear powered submarines 
equipped with ballistic missiles’ were now the navy’s principal weapon.
242 Concurrently, 
the previous doctrine of limiting the navy to combating seaborne invasion forces was 
dropped. 
 
The  Soviet  Navy  could  undertake  all  of  the  tasks  done  by  the  US  Navy.  Gorshkov 
improved it, firstly to counter the US carrier groups, secondly to increase its numbers for 
more influence in any situation and thirdly, to counter the US FBM fleet.
243 
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The early Soviet ballistic missile submarines ( five Project 611AB (Zulu V) boats,  were 
not operationally viable. The first ballistic missile class was Project 629 (Golf); by 1963, 
16 were deployed in the Northern Fleet, carrying the surface-launched R-13 (SS-N-4) 
missile, range = probably only 600 kilometres, thus the submarine had to negotiate the 
US ASW measures to get into a firing position near the eastern seaboard of the USA.
 244 
They were refitted with the underwater-launched R-21 (SS-N-5 Sark), range of 1,400 
kilometres, but the Americans had deployed the Polaris A-3, with its 4,500 kilometres 
range.  The  Soviets  constructed  Project  658  (Hotel)  nuclear-propelled  ballistic  missile 
submarines, with R-21 missiles; there were eight in the Northern Fleet. The Soviet Navy 
only started ‘serial production’ of SSBNs and surface ships armed with nuclear missiles 
after the Cuban crisis.
 245 
 
The Soviet, with a stolen copy of the American ‘Ethan Allen’ class design, built 34 of the 
Project 667A (Yankee) and 22 Project 667B (Delta) class boats between 1964 and 1974; 
the R-29 (SS-N-8 Sawfly), was developed with a range of 7,800 kilometres. The Yankees 
were programmed to attack time-sensitive targets such as carriers or SSBNs in port and 
inland  SAC  bases;  they  also  aimed  to  disrupt  the  US  command  echelons.  These  34 
SSBNs were the first serious Soviet threat and had to be confronted in the sea zone to the 
north of Scotland. 
 
Although the longer range R-29D (SS-N-9 Sawfly) underwater launched missiles became 
available in 1972, only four of these boats were constructed for 41
st Division Strategic 
Submarines, Northern Fleet. The Soviets worked to redress the strategic inequity caused 
by their low-technology assets and new R-29 (SS-N-8) missiles between 1970 and 1974 
aboard  the  new  Delta  Class  boats.  As  Soviet  missiles  and  submarines  improved, 
American ASW tactics needed to improve at the same rate. 
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SSBN ‘bastions’ were then established for these boats in the Barents Sea and the Sea of 
Okhotsk; both the sea and air were heavily protected within these zones.
  At long last the 
Soviets had managed to produce a viable, well protected SSBN capability. Nevertheless, 
regardless of any improvements, Soviet SSBNs had to come through the GIUK Gap to 
approach their firing positions. 
 
Although the Soviet SSBNs could optimise their speed and manoeuvrability to escape 
detection, the US ASW measures were very good and posed a serious problem. It was 
extremely  difficult for  the  Soviet  submarines  to  avoid  detection
  because  of  the  noise 
generated by their diesel-powered  engines, and  even their nuclear power boats had a 
much noisier engine than the American boats.
 246 The Poseidon replacement of Polaris 
stepped up the overall US capability from 656 warheads to 5,120 warheads by the end of 
1974.
247  
 
The Soviets built up their ‘blue water’ capability from the early 1960s and their nuclear 
submarine force was based at Kola; this SSBN/SLBM fleet posed a threat to the east 
coast of the USA and was the number one target for the American ASW mission.
248 US 
strategists believed that the Soviet Navy would only be used for defensive purposes.  
 
It was not until October 1962, when a Soviet naval replenishment ship was spotted in the 
North Atlantic, that the real problems with ASW were fully exposed. This vessel was 
followed and observed refuelling a Project 611 (Zulu) Class submarine near the Azores; 
this suggested that the submarine had probably been on patrol near the east coast of the 
continental  USA.  When  this  sighting  was  followed  by  another  half  a  dozen,  it  was 
obvious  that  Soviet  submarines  were  in  the  western  Atlantic,  close  to  the  USA  on 
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reconnaissance  missions.
  249  This  was  part  of  the  build  up  to  the  Cuban  Crisis  and 
demonstrated that the Soviet threat was serious and active. 
 
The Soviet Union had improved its submarine technology in response to McNamara’s 
belief that the US SSBNs could take out the Soviet land-based missiles. Between 1961 
and 1975, US had a total of 95 submarines (38 nuclear ballistic missile vessels and 57 
attack  boats),  while  the  USSR  had  a  total  of  231  submarines  (54  ballistic  missile 
submarines and 177 attack submarines). This represented 40 per cent of Soviet naval 
construction as the new Soviet sea strategy was to match the American SSBN threat. The 
Northern Fleet at the Kola Peninsula received more than 75 per cent of all new Soviet 
SSBNs.
250 This Soviet build up brought the Scottish bases directly into the front line 
against the Soviet submarine strategy. 
 
In July 1967 the US Navy reported harassment of its helicopters during ASW operations 
in the Mediterranean, by a Kildin Class Soviet destroyer. The helicopters were following 
an unidentified submerged target when the Soviet destroyer intervened and the contact 
was lost.
251 The Red Navy needed to protect its submarines and such behaviour was not 
unusual. 
 
The Soviet Navy became recognised as a global power during Exercise OKEAN-70 in 
1970. It had more vessels than NATO, but observers believed that NATO still had the 
superior battle capability.
252 The Red Navy did not have the superior technology of the 
US ships, but its primary mission was the destruction of NATO SSBNs. 
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In 1967, the DCI, Richard Helms, issued his agency’s estimate of the strength of the 
Soviet submarine force. The CIA assessed that there were probably 37 boats; a fully 
recognisable SSBN class was now under construction and was expected to be in service 
the following year.
  253 This was accurate, as the Yankee class was deployed later that 
same year. He forecast that there would be 38 Soviet ballistic missile submarines in 1967, 
with a possible final total of 55 by 1972. According to Podvig’s later statistics, the USSR 
had 45 in 1969 and 71 in 1972; Soviet expenditure continued under Brezhnev and there 
were 85 by 1977. US intelligence estimates were again awry. This is shown in Table 3 
below. 
Table 3 
 
American Estimates of Soviet SSBNs 1969-1972 
  1969  1972 
 
US Forecast 
 
 
42 
 
55 
 
Actual Soviet Total 
 
 
45 
 
71 
 
US Underestimate 
 
 
+3 
 
+16 
 
Soviet patrols increased against the Holy Loch SSBNs. There was a permanent Soviet 
submarine patrol in the Azores, with the task of intercepting the seaborne traffic from the 
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US to Europe; the number of boats on this patrol was forecast to increase by 1970. Helms 
observed that the Soviet submarines were noisier,  but their logistics and physical support 
systems were greatly improved by mid-1972 and they were able to undertake heavier 
patrol ratios. The need for effective ASW measures was given another timely reminder 
by this report. 
 
In November 1967, the first Yankee class SSBN entered service, seven years behind its 
American counterpart; Soviet naval officers nicknamed it the ‘Vanya Vashington’ class, 
armed with the ‘Red Polaris.’ The US government estimated that there was only one 
Yankee Class submarine on station in the Atlantic; this information had come from the 
various  SIGINT  stations,  including  Edzell  and  Thurso,  that  had  been  monitoring  the 
Soviet  SSBN  test  missile  launches  at  Plesetsk.
254  Notwithstanding  erroneous  US 
intelligence,  the  Soviets  had  definitely  overcome  the  ‘glaring  disparity  of  capability’, 
highlighted by Stephen Zaloga.  
 
Despite  the  usual  intelligence  inaccuracies,  the  1968  Defense  hearings  were  able  to 
establish the growing Soviet submarine threat.
255 The Soviet development programme 
was approximately ten years behind that of the American FBM boats, but the Soviet 
SSBN missiles could now come perilously close to the mainland of the USA from deep 
ocean firing points. This further emphasised the gravity of the ASW problem. 
 
By 1968, McNamara could report that the Soviet Union now carried SLBMs on both their 
nuclear-powered and diesel-powered submarines. Their targets were known to be naval 
and  merchant  vessels,  and  the  number  of  submarines  involved  in  this  mission  was 
estimated  at  368  in  mid-1968  and  360  by  mid-1972.
256  Again  this  was  incorrect 
                                                 
254 SIPRI 1969/70, pp.42, 96; also, Stephen Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of 
Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945-2000, (Washington and London. Smithsonian Institution Press, 
2002), pp.116-7. 
 
255 00474, 1968/01/22, Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S McNamara before House Subcommittee 
on Department of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal year 1969-73 Defense Program and 1969 Defense 
Budget, 22 January 1968,p.58-9. 
 Scotland the Brave? US Strategic Policy in Scotland 1953-1974 
  92   
intelligence and the Soviets had 335 attack submarines in 1968 and 315 in 1975; 255 
were in the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets in 1968.  
 
The Soviet threat against the FBM fleet was enhanced by the introduction of the Yankee 
and  Delta  classes  and  was  further  increased  with  the  arrival  of  the  R-29  (SS-N-8) 
missiles, with a range of 7,800 kilometres; continental USA was now vulnerable. Because 
of the extreme range now available to them, the USSR could keep their SSBNs in home 
waters and operate effectively.
 257 The strategic balance was almost equal, although the 
US held a decided superiority in technology and capability to penetrate ABM defences. 
 
Table 4 shows the respective submarine construction totals of the USA and the USSR 
during the period 1961-1975; the Soviet preponderance is obvious. 
 
Table 4 
Soviet and US Submarine Construction Totals 1961-1975 
258 
 
Type of Submarine  USSR  US 
 
Ballistic missile submarines 
 
54 
 
38 
 
Attack submarines 
 
177 
 
57 
 
Total 
 
231 
 
95 
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The US Response 
 
The Northern Atlantic and Northern Seas was the route from the Holy Loch to the SSBN 
patrol stations; it also had great importance for the Soviet submarines as it was their only 
route to reach the US waters. Scotland therefore had a geographical advantage that could 
be exploited by the Americans in both an offensive and defensive fashion. 
 
The  Soviet  Navy’s  targets would  have been  carriers,  convoys, American  SSBNs  and 
some  shore  locations.
  259  Their  attack  submarines  (SSNs)  would  be  used  for  ‘area 
defence’ tasks, with a mission to destroy NATO SSNs before that could reach the GIUK 
Gap and close  down  the  Soviet  SSBN  route.  The  priority for  the  US  was  to protect 
carriers and other seaborne forces, including convoys, as well as engaging with Soviet 
SSNs, laying mines and attacking coastal targets with missiles. Tactics aside, underwater 
warfare  involves  two  heavily  armed  blind  men,  who  can  only  locate  their  target  by 
sounds. The North Atlantic was an unpleasant theatre of operations.   
 
Classical  submarine  warfare  involves  two  principal  activities,  namely  offensive 
operations against concentrated enemy traffic and defensive operations mounted around a 
barrier concept.
260 The US Navy considered that a forward barrier control strategy was 
the best means of ASW, where they could attack Soviet submarines in the shallower seas 
north of the GIUK Gap before the Soviets could get south to interdict the American 
SLOC. At the same time they also needed to protect the American SSBN fleet. 
 
The American ASW network and fleet communications bases in Scotland played a vital 
role in defending this area. The US Navy had a positive Maritime Strategy of strategically 
limiting its sea control posture to the area south of the GIUK Gap.
261 Its major objective 
was to interdict the Soviet submarines by intense ASW measures; this requirement never 
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altered and ensured that Thurso and Edzell featured prominently in the delivery of the 
strategic plan. 
 
Early US submarines were better able to survive in ASW operations than their Soviet 
counterparts and could operate in wider areas of the ocean. As a result, the American 
SSBN fleet could take to the seas far easier and await their Soviet enemy.
262 In addition, 
the shorter rage of the Soviet missiles, and other technological disadvantages, meant that 
the  Soviet  submarines  needed  to  be  very  close  to  the  continental  USA  to  operate 
effectively.  
 
The ASW doctrine developed by the USA involved the simultaneous use of equipment, 
aircraft, surface vessels and submarines, as part of a combined operation; any contacts, 
whether  surface  or  submarine,  were  passed  to  Commander  ASW  Force  Atlantic 
(COMASWFORLANT), in Norfolk, Virginia.  
 
American  ASW  preparedness  was  described  as  ‘weak  and  ineffective’  by  the  CNO, 
Admiral Burke, in 1958; this was confirmed by General Twining, Chairman JCS, and a 
report was submitted to the Defense Secretary Thomas Gates. The JCS proposed a wide 
area underwater surveillance system to detect deeply submerged submarines.
263 Funding 
was  requested  for  the  research  and  development  of  ASW  installations,  which  were 
mission critical to the developing maritime strategy.
 264 This related to the huge number 
of Soviet SSKs constructed during the 1950s. 
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The JCS reported to the National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, in February 1959, that 
the US ASW capability was superior to the Soviet, but that it lacked sufficient numbers 
for proper effectiveness. At the same time, President Eisenhower had been informed that 
the Soviet Union ‘has in operation 12 atomic submarines’, and that these were fully 
equipped with nuclear torpedoes and missiles. In reality, the Soviet Union was only in the 
early stages of development and construction of the Golf-class boats, with their surface-
launched R-13, 600 kilometres range missiles. This was more poor quality US 
intelligence.
 265 
 
In May 1959, the President’s Science Advisory Committee identified ASW as a major 
matter for improvement.
 266 It was a major strategic issue and Scotland’s ideal location 
meant that it would be heavily involved. There is no evidence that the Americans foresaw 
any problems in obtaining agreement from the British government. 
 
                                                 
265 Oral presentation of study on submarine weapons systems and anti-submarine warfare capabilities to be 
presented at NSC's Comparative Evaluations Group on 3/9/59; NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. TOP 
SECRET. Issue Date: Feb 12, 1959. Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Document 
Number: CK3100286859. [accessed 14 November 2005]: Synopsis of the Comparative Evaluations Group 
Study on submarine weapons systems and anti-submarine warfare capabilities. DEPARTMENT OF 
DEFENSE. TOP SECRET. Issue Date: Mar 27, 1959. Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference 
System. Document Number: CK3100231290. [accessed 21 January 2006]. Also, Declassified Documents 
Reference System. Document Number: CK3100506462. Also, Summary of intelligence and DOS material 
reported to Eisenhower: Soviet submarines; Miscellaneous. TOP SECRET,  WHITE HOUSE. Issue Date: 
Feb 3, 1959. Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Document Number: 
CK3100014582. [accessed 29 January 2006]. 
                             
266 Intelligence. Analysis of the US intelligence system; recommendations Science Advisory Committee, 
November 1957-May 1959 (summaries of work done on … anti-submarine warfare.). Memorandum, David 
Z. Beckler, Exec. Officer, PSAC, to Dr. J.R. Killian, Jr. May 8, 1959. 14 p. SECRET.. Reproduced in 
Declassified Documents Reference System. Document Number: CK3100373543. [accessed 16 March 
2006]: Nuclear Weapons Tests, Phased Approach to Agreement for the Cessation Warfare (ASW) [Latin 
America's most vital contribution in time of war would be protection of strategic sea-lanes; analysis of 
present aid to Latin American nations in ASW, their capabilities, potential, and failure of US to develop a 
LA capability; recommendations]. Brief, OP-001/lr. June 23, 1959. 4 p. Encl: Latin American Military 
Forces with ASW Capability [chart of forces and aircraft]. 1 p. CONFIDENTIAL to SECRET. Reproduced 
in Declassified Documents Reference System. Document Number: CK3100382893. [accessed 29 June 
2006]. 
 Scotland the Brave? US Strategic Policy in Scotland 1953-1974 
  96   
The US laid down large fixed arrays of hydrophones, supported by shore stations, to 
counter Soviet submarine penetration of US waters.
267 This was the Sound Surveillance 
System (SOSUS) and gave them a great advantage as the sounds of underwater activity 
were transmitted to the nearest ASW headquarters. SOSUS became a vital element of the 
GIUK Detection Zone. The US Navy had to defend the North Atlantic at all times and in 
particular  the  GIUK  Gap;  ASW  mines  could  seal  any  gaps  in  this  area  if  required. 
Because of this requirement, the US Navy rapidly developed its ASW techniques.  
 
Both Iceland and Norway were also incorporated in this strategic mission on the vital 
northern flank, as part of the Perimeter Strategy and the SAC bombing route. This was 
noted  by  the  Soviets  and  from  1970  onwards,  the  Soviet  Union  began  to  exercise 
regularly around the northern seas off Iceland.
268 The US military planners recognised 
Iceland’s  ability  to  protect  shipping  in  the  North  Atlantic,  to  conduct  long-range  air 
operations, to handle other air transit and its importance in the early warning system.
269 
 
Iceland was a main replenishment base for the huge American reinforcements to NATO 
in wartime. It had no indigenous security forces, and the US Defense Force in Iceland 
(IDF) was created for this purpose. The 1951 Agreement was deliberately vague, to allow 
the necessary American operational flexibility; the IDF had nine bases, covering such 
facilities  as  communications,  DEW  Line  radar  and  airfields.
270  There  were  two  local 
political attempts to remove this base, in 1956 and 1974, but both failed.
 
 
Norway has common borders with the Soviet Union and was therefore important for the 
American ASW strategy. The Norwegians guarded NATO’s Northern Flank, as well as 
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monitoring all naval movements between the Barents Sea and the Atlantic. There were 
American  stockpiles  on  Norwegian  soil,  but  no  foreign  troops,  although  there  were 
almost  100  US-funded  installations  by  the  1960s,  particularly  LORAN  stations,  to 
‘provide a means of monitoring ship navigation developments being carried out for the 
fleet ballistic missile (Polaris) programme… to enable the Polaris submarines to position 
themselves with absolute precision.’ This was a crucial strategic task. 
271 
 
By 1960, the US naval doctrine required the destruction of Soviet naval assets and air 
bases  in  the  North  Atlantic  area  and  carrier  groups  were  built  with  the  mission  of 
bombing the targets.
272 The US Navy judged its own strategic operational ability on this 
matter alone; however, as the flexible response concept grew, there was a realisation that 
sea  lines  of  communication  (SLOC)  would  also  need  to  be  protected  to  bring 
reinforcements  from  the  USA  to  Europe  in  wartime.  The  Royal  Navy  had  fully 
understood this situation in the 1950s. The US Navy therefore altered its mission and by 
the end of the 1970s, it was able to control its SLOC, destroy Soviet SSBNs, attack 
Soviet  sea  and  air  bases,  make  amphibious  landings  on  Soviet  soil  and  use  its  own 
SSBNs to lethal effect. 
 
The 1962 US Defense Budget stated that non-nuclear ASW weapons were only available 
in small numbers in peacetime, with less than 20 per cent of the wartime stack available; 
also the SSBN engine noise needed to be reduced. It was concluded that the ASW threat 
had  been  underplayed  and  there  was  a  shortfall  in  planning  for  non-nuclear  ASW 
weapons.
273  
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In January 1964, both State and Defense reported that new ASW weapons needed to be 
provided before the outbreak of hostilities, repeating the comments made in 1962.
  274  
SACLANT  also  stressed  the  ASW  threat  and  proposed  that  ASW  aircraft  should  be 
modified to carry them.  
 
The build up of Soviet naval capability forced a rethink of the policy towards NATO’s 
Northern Waters.
275 There were concerns that the USSR could gain a foothold in Norway 
during a period of tension; SACLANT therefore addressed the threat posed by the Kola 
base. In fact, in the early 1950s, the UK still thought of attacking the Soviet Kola bases 
by using naval aviation; this was the role later undertaken by FBM fleet.  
 
State requested allied governments to construct more ASW destroyer escort ships in 1964 
and completed a detailed study of Soviet overseas submarine bases.
276 In July 1964, the 
US Navy carried out close surveillance of three Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean 
as ‘excellent ASW training.’ 
277 
 
The Panel on Anti-submarine Warfare reported to the White House that progress was 
being made on all aspects of ASW and highlighted ocean -wide surveillance systems, 
such  as  LORAN  and  SOSUS.  The  Panel  emphasised  the  advantages  given  by  radar 
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detecting  the  launch  of  a  missile  and  urged  that  this  specific  matter  receive  greater 
development.
278  
 
The USA needed to store ASW nuclear depth charges in the UK, and these were probably 
kept at St Mawgan and at Machrihanish (see Chapter Five). By August 1965, the NSC, 
advised McGeorge Bundy that the American replies to Prime Minister Wilson on the use 
of these British-based US nuclear ASW weapons should keep to the lines of the agreed 
consultation process that had begun in 1952.
  279 However, Bundy was also advised to 
check  the  matter  fully  with  both  Rusk  and  McNamara  to  ensure  that  there  was  no 
‘misunderstanding concerning our NATO war planning arrangements.’ There was still a 
certain amount of ‘vagueness’ about such matters, a strong indication that the Anglo-
American relationship was working well at official level, despite the difficult personal 
relationship between Johnson and Wilson. 
 
In November 1965, ASW was again highlighted by the NSC to McGeorge Bundy; the 
NSC did not like the reductions that were being proposed to the rate of construction of 
both  SSNs  and  DDEs,  and  recommended  strongly  that  full  construction  should 
continue.
280  Weeks  later,  Johnson  was  advised  to  meet  with  the  President’s  Science 
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Advisory Committee to discuss ASW as they had reported to McNamara recommending 
significant changes to the US ASW systems; the matter now needed the highest attention.  
 
In  December,  Donald  Hornig,  the  President’s  Special  Assistant  for  Science  and 
Technology, reported to Johnson; his analysis of the ASW systems was harsh and was 
supported by both Bundy and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. He dismissed the 
future  purchase  of  destroyers  and  pointed  out  the  lack  of  specific  ASW  technical 
managers within the US Navy. The Navy had already started to action this report to 
eradicate the negative effects of previous management.
  281 The report pointed out that 
there were no adequate provisions for force coordination in the barrier system and that 
the torpedoes available all had major shortcomings. There was a serious doubt over the 
US  Navy’s  ability  to  ‘sink  any  detected  submarine’,  and  an  ASW  Laboratory  and 
Technical  Center  was  proposed  for  systems  analysis  and  development  activities.  The 
intensity of ASW development continued at a fast, focused pace.  
 
McNamara’s main point was that the purpose of US nuclear forces was to be able to 
survive  a  Soviet  first  strike  and  then  be  used  as  a  counter  force  weapon.  As  a 
consequence, the importance of submarine-based missiles was universally recognised.
282 
Despite this importance, however, the Secretary of Defense still refused the JCS requests 
for additions to the SOSUS network and other equipment in the 1967 Defense Budget. It 
has to be noted that this expenditure was aimed at protecting the national interests of the 
USA, not in fulfilling some NATO alliance task. 
 
By  the  end  of  1967,  Flexible  Response  was  adopted  as  NATO  official  doctrine;  the 
NATO Defence Planning Committee (DPC) defined it as: ‘a balanced and flexible range 
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of appropriate responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats 
of aggression.’
283 It was also aimed at limiting any ‘hot war’ to the fields of Europe and 
thereby  keeping  it  well  away  from  the  continental  USA,  confirmation  of  Odom  and 
Oltman’s  viewpoint.  A  European  war  could  only  be  sustained  by  American 
reinforcements across the Atlantic, thus emphasising the importance of American ASW 
capabilities.  This  critical  activity  was  never  disregarded  and  the  ASW  measures 
continued to improve. 
 
However, the 1967 consensus agreement satisfied both sides of the alliance.  ASW was 
now one of the main contributory factors in keeping any ‘hot war’ away from the shores 
of the USA and firmly in Western Europe. ASW measures could locate, identify and 
destroy missile submarines that were on their way to attack the US, and US SSNs could 
attack any anti-shipping Soviet SSK attack submarines. As ever, the contributions from 
both Thurso and Edzell were crucial to this activity, as the GIUK Gap would be the 
principal submarine battle zone. 
 
In January 1967, Rusk wrote to McNamara regarding ASW activities, pointing out that 
some NATO allies were spending too heavily on conventional naval vessels instead of 
land forces and that this naval expenditure would be better spent on ASW vessels. There 
was no doubt that ASW had to be a major part of the US strategic naval plan; their 
NATO allies, however, did not share this belief and this remained a cause of friction 
throughout  the  period.  The  NATO  alliance  had  to  cope  constantly  with  national 
characteristics and historic pride, as well as strategic military planning.
 284 Most of this 
arose  from  the  systemic  distrust  between  the  Europeans  and  the  Americans  over  the 
latter’s ultimate intentions. 
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The US Navy developed the Omega hyperbolic radio navigation system by 1968; with a 
station in Norway: the purpose of Omega was to ‘assist the navigational capability of 
Polaris vessels.’
285 It possessed greater accuracy than LORAN, but the LORAN stations 
were not closed and operated alongside the new system. The LORAN station in Shetland 
was unaffected by these changes. 
 
The American efforts prevailed and the JCS SIOP for 1969-71 acknowledged that the 
Soviets regarded the balance of power in mainland Europe as ‘in their favour’. But that 
the USSR capability for intercontinental assault on the USA was inferior, mainly because 
of the good ASW capability of the US-driven NATO system that could stem the Soviet 
SSBNs in the GIUK Gap zone.
286 By 1970, the US had increased its spending on marine 
science and technology more than twenty fold since 1961 with most of this expenditure 
awarded to the US Navy for ASW research.
287  
 
The US had to reinforce Europe during any conflict; by 1970 it was estimated that 11 
divisions would need to cross over and therefore, the importance of protecting the SLOC 
from submarine predation required a  
specific framework, as emphasised by McNamara in December 1964. 
288 
 
In  1971  the  JCS  assessed  that  the  Soviet  maritime  fleet  would  attack  SSBNs  and 
reinforcements  moving  to  Europe.
289  This  strategic  threat  to  the  SLOC  ensured  that 
Thurso would undoubtedly be crucial in the execution of the northern ASW policy.  
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American Activities in Scotland 
 
The earliest Scottish involvement in ASW activities came with US naval hydrographical 
surveys around the Shetlands in 1958, part of the SOSUS project.
290 Geography was 
therefore shown to be vital and this attribute was constantly utilised. 
 
Thurso  had  been  identified  as  a  suitable  location  for  a  ‘US  Naval  communications 
facility’ in 1960 to support the GIUK Gap system.’
291 This was a sensitive matter and the 
decision was taken to agree to the American request, but public notification was to be 
withheld until the Kennedy administration was in place. It would appear that the UK was 
at that time a willing partner in all such requests from the US because of the strategically 
important position of Scotland in the GIUK Gap defences. The Admiralty, as ever, tried 
to camouflage the purpose of these missions; they had been misleadingly briefed by the 
Pentagon that Thurso was not ‘designed to serve Polaris submarines.’  The story  was 
revealed by the Glasgow Herald, which reported that a station in the north of Scotland 
would have the responsibility to ‘keep track of … radar picket escort vehicles.’
292 
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The  US  Navy  considered  Scotland  as  an  alternative  location  to  Iceland,  a  clear 
recognition  of  the  importance  of  geography  in  international  strategy;  Scottish  bases 
would play an essential part in US maritime strategy in the North Atlantic. There was 
perhaps a touch of NATO obtaining cooperation from the USA on this matter, because of 
its strategic implications. 
 
Maritime patrol aircraft often had to use Prestwick because poor weather preventing them 
from landing in Iceland and radio destroyer escorts (DDEs) used the special US Navy 
port facilities at Greenock at the end of their patrol. Scotland was an active American 
ASW centre, with both air patrols and location-finding activities taking place.
 293   
 
Vice President Johnson visited Norway in September 1963, after the submarine scares 
during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
294 Thurso and the other Scottish bases were now drawn 
into deeper involvement in American ASW actions because of the new strategic situation 
which was caused by the successful Soviet penetration of the existing US ASW screen. 
 
The United States strategic policy had changed by this stage and the Scottish bases were 
especially invaluable. This bonus was not fortuitous, as they were part of the original plan 
formulated  before  1960  to  support  the  SSBN  fleet  and  combat  the  Soviet  submarine 
operations in the GIUK Gap zone. The US Navy had improved its ASW capabilities 
which now formed part of all naval training.
 295 Training was held in the North Atlantic 
and ASW was one of the main objectives. The US used the western Scottish facilities for 
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POL and air bases, as well as utilising the Thurso communications capability. Without 
these Scottish facilities, major ASW exercises would have been severely curtailed.
296 
The mechanics of ASW measures were simple; when Soviet submarines left Murmansk 
or Kola, American aircraft from Norwegian bases would track them; this task was then 
passed to British planes in the UK sector. There was a direct link to the aircraft from the 
SOSUS chain and
 in Scotland, Thurso and Edzell were engaged in communications and 
detection; Edzell’s mission ‘to support US Fleet units … in the area; provide navigational 
service  relating  to  air-sea  rescue,  and  conduct  technical  research  in  support  of  Navy 
electronic projects’, while Thurso met the essential LF/VLF requirements in the northern 
North Atlantic.
 297 
 
The principal reason for the establishment of Thurso had been its ability to communicate 
with  submarines,  specifically  the  FBM  boats.  Six  major  VLF  stations  had  been 
established to communicate with the Polaris SSBNs and Thurso became the main base in 
Europe; it was also used as an LF back-up station. Edzell was established to carry out a 
comprehensive  monitoring  of  all  Soviet  electronic  traffic,  and  collected  coverage  of 
SSBN/SLBM testing in the Barents Sea and White Sea.
298 The all-round value of the 
Scottish bases can be seen from these specific contributions. 
The Soviet submarine fleet, however, did not have easy access to the open sea, unlike the 
American SSBNs; this fact could not be changed and ensured that the Scottish locations 
played a permanent role in the submarine theatre. The upgrading of Thurso and Edzell 
continued.  
 
Regardless of any intelligence inaccuracies, there was now a large-scale ASW problem as 
reported  by  McNamara  in  1968.  Thurso  and  Edzell  were  now  providing  shore-to-
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submarine communications and SIGINT data, mission critical activities because of the 
deployment of the SSBN Yankee-class boats.
299 
 
‘There are no areas on the maps of the world’s oceans where the Soviet Navy does not 
sail’,  was  the  proud  boast  of  Admiral  Grishanov,  the  powerful  head  of  the  Navy’s 
political department in 1971.
300 Thurso now had to keep track of the significant increase 
in Soviet sea activity in its zone. 
 
American  submarines  regularly  entered  the  Soviet  waters  close  to  the  Kola  and 
Murmansk  bases  to  collect  intelligence  for  Operation  Johnstone.
301  These  operations 
included  testing  the  Soviet  and  Polish  ASW  measures;  transmitted  data  from  these 
missions was picked up at Thurso and also at Edzell. Without the Scottish locations these 
missions would not have taken place. 
 
ASW operations were always live, and in 1973, during the Arab-Israeli War, the US 
carriers  were threatened  in  the southern  Mediterranean by  Soviet surface  vessels  and 
submarines. The US commander deployed all ASW measures and the situation became 
tense. One of the best ASW measures available at this time was from fixed wing aircraft, 
either shore or carrier-based; these were able to deploy sonobuoys over a wide area and 
listen to the data being emitted.
302 Many of these shore-based ASW aircraft (mainly P3-
Orions) flew regularly from  Prestwick, thus ensuring the  airfield’s constant front-line 
position. 
 
The major ASW innovation for NATO was the introduction of ASW helicopters, such as 
by the Royal Navy at HMS Gannet in Prestwick in 1970. But the most effective ASW 
                                                 
299 00474, 1968/01/22, Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S McNamara before House Subcommittee 
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weapons were now the SSKs, with  their effectiveness in locating and identifying the 
diesel-powered Soviet submarines.
 Both sides used SSKs, although there were only seven 
British submarines of this type in 1974, whereas the USSR was able to call upon 28, 
along with another 48 nuclear boats armed with counter shipping missiles; this armament 
gave them a dual ASW/ counter-shipping capability. 
 
Admiral Stansfield Turner, president of the US Naval War College, described the ASW 
mission of the US Navy in 1974, as to 'ensure safe maritime operations.’ He showed that 
air superiority had been achieved by the Israeli air force in its 1967 war, by deep range 
attacks  on  enemy  air  bases,  as  opposed  to  shooting  aircraft  from  the  air.
  303  This 
suggested that the best place to ‘engage’ submarines was in known bottlenecks, such as 
the GIUK Gap zone. A major element of the observation and communications for this 
zone was provided from Thurso and Edzell, showing again that the US ASW concept 
depended on its Scottish bases. 
 
Thurso  became  even  more  important  by  1976,  when  the  US  Navy  radio  station  at 
Londonderry  was  closed  and  all  its  operations  transferred  to  Thurso,  with  122  extra 
personnel arriving at the base.
304 ASW and Scotland were unmistakeably intertwined. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The available sources have mainly been on the US/NATO side; they have been limited in 
their descriptions, with many important aspects blanked out, but have still enabled a good 
description  to  be  provided  of  the  ASW  operations  of  the  period.  The  Soviet  side, 
however,  has  very little  information  yet  available  on  the  protection  operations  in  the 
Northern  Seas  and  this  situation  has  hampered  a  fuller  examination  of  the  balance 
between both sides over the period. 
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The US and Soviet navies engaged in confrontation beneath the Northern Atlantic and 
Norwegian Sea.
305 It was a serious, and occasionally critical, matter for both navies. By 
the end of the period, it was clear that the Americans’ technical superiority still existed, 
but the Soviets had caught up significantly. As there was little doubt about the mission of 
the  Soviet  Navy,  the  availability  of  Scottish  operational  bases  was  invaluable.  Thus 
Edzell, Thurso and Holy Loch, performed their wartime task every day and proved their 
immense value to the US strategic plan. 
 
Scotland played a vital role through the communications centres at Thurso and Edzell, as 
well  as  supplying  logistics  from  Prestwick  and  Greenock.  All  of  this  support  was 
delivered,  despite  the  pertaining  official  subterfuge  which  claimed  otherwise  and 
regularly issued misleading statements. 
 
The American necessity for extensive ASW, and its requirements for Thurso, Edzell, 
Greenock, Prestwick, Machrihanish and Shetland, did not appear to cause any problems 
for the Anglo-American relationship. In fact, the US was able to make unimpeded use of 
its bases in Scotland in pursuit of its strategic ASW interests during this time. The NATO 
alliance was not damaged by any American ASW requirements in Scotland and there 
were no apparent difficulties for the US forces at local level. There is no doubt that 
Scotland played a central part in the ASW effort. But, as usual, it would appear that the 
Americans  unilaterally,  with  a  few  insignificant  exceptions,  applied  their  own 
requirements single-mindedly. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
SUPPORT ACTIVITIES – NC3, NAVIGATION AND LOGISTICS 
 
American Strategic Requirements 
 
This chapter will examine the US nuclear communications, command and control (NC3) 
systems, plus the navigation requirements for the delivery of strategic policy and the 
logistics involved. According to Duke, these operations ‘comprise a major part of the US 
military presence’ in the UK and were in fact the ‘crux of the military presence.’ These 
systems were absolutely vital to the US strategic operation, being ‘more comprehensive’ 
than any collaborative US/NATO systems, particularly the intelligence systems.
306  These 
support  activities  required  the  development  of  integrated  command,  control  and 
communications links, along with associated facilities in foreign locations. 
 
The USA had many bases in foreign countries after the end of World War 2 and the 
Military Air Transport Service (MATS) was created in 1948 to facilitate US military 
movements worldwide. It included the Air Weather Service (AWS), Air Rescue Service 
(ARS), Special Airlift Mission (SAM), Air Photographic and Charting Service (APCS), 
and  the  Aeromedical  Transport  Wing  (AMTW):  MATS  became  the  Military  Airlift 
Command (MAC) in January 1966.  
 
US  strategic  policy,  whether  based  on  ‘massive  retaliation’  or  ‘mutually  assured 
destruction’,  required  direct  communications  from  the  NCA  to  the  strategic  nuclear 
forces, i.e. the SAC, Minutemen regiments, SACEUR and the FBM fleet. NATO planned 
for a short European ground war, after which it was assumed that overwhelming Warsaw 
Pact  conventional  forces  would  have  made  the  breakthrough  and  therefore  nuclear 
weapons would be used.  
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The US-driven NATO doctrine of a ground war in Europe was integral to US strategy 
and generated a massive requirement for US personnel and equipment to be moved from 
the USA. Therefore, logistics support was essential and had to be constructed:  this would 
enable a conventional European war to provide Daalder’s ‘fire-break’ for the United 
States.
307  To support their strategic aims, the US needed to install the full network of 
support services for their overseas activities. They had originally done this during World 
War 2 and the UK had been the principal overseas location.  
 
Communications systems were vital and operated to the strategic command nuclear link, 
and  also  to  individual  services.  Once  the  strategic  doctrine  had  moved  to  flexible 
response, the requirement for integrated command, control and communications assumed 
greater importance. This eventually became known as Nuclear Command, Control, and 
Communications (NC3) and provided connectivity from the President and Secretary of 
Defense to the nuclear execution forces via the NMCS.
308 Important steps were taken 
during the 1950s to ensure the resilience of the NCA communications network, including 
NATO linkage.  
 
The Cuban Missile Crisis had exposed many poorly functioning command and control 
matters  and  Kennedy’s  greatest  concern  was  the  inadequate level  of  intelligence  that 
reached  the  White  House.  Additionally,  there  was  the  conflict  between  civilian  and 
military control of operations; the military had a historical resistance to this ‘interference’ 
and such friction was exacerbated by the lack of an effective communications system.
 309 
This was a manifestation of the truth about the influence of the US military in strategic 
matters. Previously the armed services had maintained their operational independence, 
but the nuclear era now required operational control from the NCA. 
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By  1960  both  Eisenhower  and  the  UK  government  had  agreed  that  technological 
advances, particularly SLBMs meant that there was a need for a US communications 
network  to  cover  the  world.  US  naval  operations  expanded  and  White  House  staff 
highlighted  three  aspects  of  naval  communications;  first,  the  interoperability  of  air 
defense systems, second, the effects of nuclear detonation on the naval communications 
systems and, third, the reliability of ship-to-shore links.
310 This became an expensive and 
technically complex problem involving the top research and development projects over 
the  next  two  decades. Communications  with  submarines  were tested  by  aircraft  from 
Prestwick, another example of good US/UK relations, but without any specific quid pro 
quo for Britain.
 311 
 
Radio  communications  with  submarines  had  serious  problems.  Short  split-second 
transmission bursts were used, similar to the use of ‘zip’ files; the signal was recorded 
and  would  then  be  played  back  at  slower  speeds.
312  Various  methods  were  used  for 
communication with the FBM fleet, all with serious drawbacks. The US Navy needed a 
system  that  was  survivable,  jam  resistant  and  receivable  during  nuclear  detonations; 
without  these  capabilities,  there  would  be  unacceptable  constraints  on  operational 
deployment. Normal HF military transmissions were unable to penetrate sea water, but 
VLF signals from powerful transmitters could achieve this to depths of 30 metres. ELF 
transmission was the best solution; it was receivable over huge distances, during nuclear 
detonations and at depths of more than 200 metres. Resilience and redundancy could also 
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be achieved by constructing a sufficient number of hardened, dispersed transmitters in 
suitable locations.
 313  
 
However,  a  large  portion  of  the  US  strategic  doctrine  was  predicated  on  NATO 
involvement and therefore needed to achieve the same high standards. By 1967, there was 
no NATO-wide system that could survive a nuclear exchange, cryptographic capability 
was very limited and there was little inter-operability between the many systems. This 
echoed one of the key observations of the report by William H. Orrick, Deputy Under 
Secretary of State for Administration in 1963.
  314 It was suggested that NATO should 
produce a network capable of fully supporting political and military needs. 
 
The inherent vulnerability of the communications network was noted by Kissinger’s NSC 
staff in 1971; they pointed out that the FBM fleet could be neutralised in a conventional 
war  by  ‘attacks  on  supply  ships,  bases,  communications.’
315  The  Pentagon  therefore 
requested  a  ‘last-ditch  reliable’  communications  system  and  the  outcome  was  the 
Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network (MEECN). This guaranteed 
connectivity  between  the  President  and  the  strategic  deterrent  forces  in  stressed 
environments.
316  MEECN  used  ELF/VLF  transmission  and  provided  a  secure,  jam 
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resistant, survivable system.
317 Again, the Scottish communications facilities were part of 
essential US strategic operational communications through their existing, sophisticated 
network. 
 
The MEECN system provided a presidential airborne command post that was able to 
remain airborne for three days; this was based at Andrews AFB, Washington and was 
given  the  codeword  ‘Night  Watch.’
318  The  emergency  procedures  were  constantly 
rehearsed,  and  in  October  1969,  a  simulated  presidential  party,  consisting  of  senior 
military officers, was airborne within 14 minutes.
 319  
 
President Nixon established the Office of Telecommunications Policy in February 1970. 
All presidents since Truman had supported this concept, but communications had been 
regarded as an element of the command function. Nixon now designated it as a separate 
activity and brought to an end the ad hoc management that had surrounded it for more 
than 20 years.
320 As part of this overarching policy, the Worldwide Military Command 
and Control System (WWMCCS) was instituted in 1971. The chain of command of the 
NCA was also officially delineated as running from the President to the Secretary of 
Defense and on to the JCS.  
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Navigation at sea has always been a crucial matter and the US Navy developed a long 
navigation system (LORAN) during World War 2; this used land-based radio transmitters 
to enable ships, or aircraft, to fix their positions when they were within 800 kilometres of 
a LORAN station.
 321 After the war the technology improved to 1,200 kilometres, with 
greater accuracy. The strategic necessity of LORAN was highlighted in July 1958 when 
the possible cancellation of a LORAN station in the Dominican Republic prompted the 
CNO, Admiral Burke, to write to the Under Secretary of State stressing its importance.
322 
This remained a cornerstone of US strategic detail as it ensured that all SLBM targeting 
was accurate. 
 
US Actions 
 
The US support profile therefore required the full spectrum of command centres, ballistic 
missile warning systems and an integrated military and naval command infrastructure. 
This  was  accomplished  with  the  relentless  application  of  the  US’  technological 
advantages. 
 
The importance of the communications framework to the strategic actions of the US had 
to overcome the unsuitability of any joint US/NATO network. Communications networks 
needed to be constructed solely on a US needs basis, thus requiring good management of 
the Anglo-American relationship for all components of the system required to be situated 
in the UK.. 
 
The  USA  constructed  its  own  Alternative  Joint  Command  Centre  (AJCC)  national 
emergency command post and it became operational in 1953 at Fort Ritchie, Maryland. 
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Another  emergency  headquarters  was  constructed  for  the  civilian  agencies,  at  Mount 
Weather, Virginia and this housed the Presidential Emergency Facility (‘Crystal Palace’). 
323 The extension of this essential network to Europe was undertaken during the late 
1950s and 1960s. 
 
Fort  Ritchie  was  America’s  main  strategic  command  centre,  with  6,000  staff  and  an 
underground AJCC, and overseas commands were linked via individual services’ ocean 
cables. The NATO Standing Group communicated with SACLANT and SACEUR from a 
separate command centre in Maryland via commercial telephone lines and had access to 
the DOD worldwide network; all of these links had resilience provided at Fort Bragg, 
North Carolina.
324 The consolidation of all strategic command communications systems 
had begun, but none of it appears to have considered NATO requirements, only American 
needs. 
 
The 1963 Orrick committee investigated the need for a flexible, integrated 
communications system; this restructured the military and civilian communications 
systems to provide a national level command and control framework that would deliver a 
crisis management capability to the NCA. This incorporated the National Military 
Command Center (NMCC), the Alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC), 
North American Air Defence (NORAD) and the national emergency airborne command 
posts (NEACP). Also integrated were BMEWS and other SAC networks. It was the birth 
of the new concept of command and control, McNamara’s great contribution to American 
strategic management. 
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It  received  its  first  live  test  when  a  USAF  reconnaissance  aircraft  strayed  into  East 
German air space and was shot down. The National Military Command System (NMCS) 
provided  President  Johnson  with  accurate  and  timely  information.  The  system  also 
witnessed serious failures, as when the Israelis attacked the USS Liberty SIGINT ship in 
1967, the North Koreans captured the USS Pueblo SIGINT ship in 1968, and a US Navy 
reconnaissance  plane  was  shot  down  over  the  Sea  of  Japan  in  1969.  These  episodes 
resulted in major changes. At no time during any of these incidents was there other than 
perfunctory liaison with NATO allies; US strategic interests were the only consideration. 
 
In January 1965, the JCS submitted their proposals for an  appropriate command  and 
control structure to support the President; they supported the concept of the NEACP and 
specified that direction of the Armed Forces was to be exercised through the NMCS.
325 
The construction of a system of national military emergency warning procedures was 
integrated  into  military  planning  in  March  1964  and  the  JCS  devised  new  alert 
procedures, including the requirement for a joint conference with the President and the 
Secretary of Defense in times of crisis.
326. 
 
The main element for the WWMCCS was the NMCS; this was the hub of the command 
and control network and the Pentagon regularly tested it under realistic conditions. The 
NMCC,  the  ANMCC  and  the  NEACP,  were  re-designed  to  ensure  continuity  of 
command under war conditions. Particular emphasis was given to the links with strategic 
forces, i.e. SSBNs and missile sites, and one NEACP aircraft was always on standby to 
provide  immediate  command  support.
  327    At  long  last  it  appeared  that  McNamara’s 
concept of a unified command and control system had been achieved.   
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This  posed  problems  with  NATO  partners.  The  US  had  assigned  five  SSBNs  for 
integration into the overall NATO targeting plan in 1964; the WWMCCS also included 
these  assets,  plus  other  land-based  systems,  and  this  information  was  available  to 
SACEUR’s headquarters. A separate computer link had to be introduced to filter this 
sensitive information and reserve it for US-eyes only.
328 The Americans looked after their 
own strategic interests first, regardless of NATO commitments. 
 
The first priority was the construction of a system of early warning stations to detect 
incoming Soviet missiles and by October 1960, the BMEWS site at Thule, Greenland, 
opened to give the USA the capability of detecting any ICBMs launched from central 
USSR towards the continental USA. Each BMEWS site had four huge antennae, which 
were highly visible and obvious targets for Soviet interdiction prior to any nuclear launch 
situation.
329 
 
Greenland formed part of the GIUK Gap. It had two main bases; one was a DEW Line 
extension, built on the ice-cap, and the BMEWS base at Thule; it was also part of the US-
Canadian North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) system, directly linked to 
Cheyenne Mountain, Wyoming. Thule was a dispersal base for wartime B-52 nuclear 
bombers, manned by Danish civilians, with another 300 American civilians who covered 
all  the  militarily  sensitive  matters.  Needless  to  say,  these  sites  caused  regular 
disagreement between the USA and the USSR.
330 
 
The DEW Line stations had been activated in 1957 across Canada and Alaska and were 
eventually  upgraded  into  the  North  American  Radar  System  (NARS).  In  1960,  five 
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Troposcatter sites were constructed to form the NARS.
331 There were two sites in Iceland 
(Sites 41 and 42) and NATO Communications Unit in the Faeroe Islands (Site 43) was 
manned by US and Danish technicians; another two sites were in the UK..  
 
Troposcatter technology could transmit over many hundreds of kilometres by ‘bouncing’ 
signals from its AN/FRC-39A(V) antennae; conventional equipment would have required 
several repeater stations to achieve this distance. NARS was thus one of the USAF’s 
primary communications systems, with the role of linking the air defence systems to the 
early  warning  systems.  It  also  transmitted  information  from  the  US  Navy’s  SOSUS 
equipment, which served to provide early warning of Soviet submarines.
332 
 
The requirement for a separate US strategic command system and a combined NATO 
command  structure  caused  difficulties.  Structures  overlapped  because  SACEUR  and 
CINCEUR (Commander-in-Chief Europe) are American-held posts; this was one of the 
constraints imposed by the US Atomic Power Act, which compelled all decisions on the 
use of US nuclear weaponry to be taken by American commanders. All US forces that 
were assigned to NATO similarly came under the control of the President of the United 
States; therefore, the US military network in Europe was primarily intended to support 
SACEUR and by extension the President. No alliance or US/UK requirements appear to 
have interfered.
 333 
 
NATO had different military communications systems; some were based on commercial 
networks and were vulnerable and insecure, such as those in Scotland. The requirement 
for  a  coordinated  air  defence  plan  in  the  1950s  accelerated  the  introduction  of  an 
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integrated command and control system; as a result, the Allied Command Europe (ACE 
High) system was constructed.
334  
 
ACE High’s updated technology enabled voice communication over distances up to 700 
kilometres.    It  was  designed  to  provide  ‘reliable,  secure  and  virtually  instantaneous 
communications’  for  SACEUR,  by  connecting  both  the  military  and  national 
headquarters,  thus  ensuring  that  the  new  concept  of  command  and  control  could  be 
exercised effectively by the NCA.
335 Opening in Norway in 1958, ACE High was still 
operating in 1988; the equipment used huge reflectors and aerials more than 50 metres 
high. It was the biggest communications project of its kind ever undertaken, extending 
from Norway to eastern Turkey and linking 9 of the 15 NATO countries. 
 
The United States also attempted to eliminate the vulnerabilities of the command and 
communications  process  and  provided  an  airborne  control  facility  for  all  bomber, 
Minuteman and Polaris launchings.
336 This deployed a ‘take command and move out’ 
(TACAMO) aircraft that could remain airborne for 72 hours during any time of increased 
tension or nuclear confrontation, and were part of the ‘SILK PURSE’ command network 
system.  
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There was a need for a common user system that could support the entire command and 
control network and remain invulnerable to enemy action. Therefore, in April 1964, the 
US Army and Air Force networks were combined to form the Automatic Voice Network 
(AUTOVON);  this  was  a  wholly  military  system,  with  appropriate  physical  defence 
measures to resist enemy attack.
337  
 
AUTOVON  controlled  operational traffic  by  multi-level, precedence  pre-emption  that 
enabled high level users, such as the President, Secretary of Defense and JCS to override 
other users.
 338 It was the most important telephone communications project undertaken 
by  the  DOD;  its  mission  was  to  provide  ‘rapid,  world-wide  command  and  control 
communications  for  the  NCA  and  other  high  priority  subscribers,’  as  well  as  other 
military and diplomatic users.
339 High-level users could access the world-wide network, 
while others, less important, were limited to their local area. The overseas section of the 
system was eventually completed in 1970 and formed the final segment of the command, 
control and communications framework, C3.
340  This major US strategic communications 
network was routed through Scotland with little information being provided. 
 
With the growing strategic importance of the  FBM fleet, underwater communications 
assumed a higher priority. ELF meant that the submarine would not have to come close to 
the surface  and it  guaranteed a direct, link between the  captain  and the NCA during 
wartime conditions.  This led to Project Sanguine, a ten-year programme to develop the 
operational effectiveness of ELF, starting in 1968 at a cost of £1.5 billion. However, the 
ELF requirement for very large antennae proved to be an intractable difficulty.   
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Sanguine  was  incredibly  ambitious  and  controversial  and  was  a  good  example  of 
Eisenhower’s  prediction  regarding  the  uncontrollable  expenditure  of  the  military-
industrial complex. The original design needed to bury more than 9,500 kilometres of 
wire antenna in Wisconsin State, approximately 41 percent of the state. It also needed 
240 underground transmitters and more than 800 million watts of power, enough power 
for a city the size of Edinburgh (400,000 population). This was reduced to 220 kilometres 
and located in a remote area of the state. However, the huge cost and the environmental 
lobby  limited  the  project  and  by  the  mid-1970s  the  Navy  developed  a  reduced 
specification, non-survivable system called Seafarer.
341  
 
The LORAN naval navigation system allowed the SSBN boats to ‘position themselves 
with  absolute  precision’  and  because  of  the  development  of  submarine  warfare, 
particularly the FBM fleet, the US Navy constructed a chain of LORAN-C stations in the 
north east Atlantic, the Pacific and the Mediterranean during 1957. 
342 Because of the 
Norwegian  veto,  LORAN  was  placed  under  the  command  of  the  US  Coast  Guard 
(USCG), as the USCG was responsible for safety at sea. As part of this subterfuge, both 
LORAN-C  and  Omega,  its  upgraded  successor,  were  later  assigned  for  use  by  both 
military and civilian craft.
343 By 1969 there were 79 LORAN -A stations in operation and 
18 LORAN -C stations. 
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The  LORAN-C  system  was  later  upgraded  for  use  by  SSBNs;  this  was  codenamed 
Clarinet  Pilgrim  and  was  introduced  in  the  1970s.  It  was  a  vital  element  of  the  US 
strategic package; without LORAN-C it would have been impossible for the SSBNs to fix 
their positions accurately.  
 
As shown in Chapter Two, ‘there are no foreign military bases in Norway in peacetime’; 
in reality there were more than 100 such bases, either financed by the USA or NATO.
344 
In  particular  America  funded  intelligence-gathering  activities,  SOSUS  and  LORAN 
stations.  The official policy had consistently been outflanked by placing the equipment 
on Norwegian soil and operating it by Norwegian armed forces during peacetime, with 
the proviso that it would then be operated by US or NATO forces during wartime.  
 
Because of the Norwegian veto, LORAN was placed under the command of the US Coast 
Guard (USCG), as the USCG was responsible for safety at sea. As part of this subterfuge, 
both LORAN-C and Omega, its upgraded successor, were later assigned for use by both 
military and civilian craft.
345 Transit, the world’s first satellite navigation system was 
launched in 1959 and by 1968 a fully operational constellation was in place, providing 
navigation to the US Navy’s FBM fleet.
346 
 
Strategic airlift  capability  was  also  a  major  consideration  and  in  the 1950s,  America 
began to modernise its small fleet of transport aircraft. During congressional hearings, 
Congressman Mendel Rivers, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, pointed out 
that flexible response required greater numbers of conventional aircraft to support any 
action by US conventional forces.
347 By extension, this policy would also require greater 
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numbers of airfields with longer runways; as a consequence, Prestwick and Machrihanish 
were activated for US reinforcement needs. 
 
The US reinforcement plan required an airlift capability to transport a tactical airborne 
assault force of four divisions. General Lemnitzer, Chairman JCS, needed these forces in 
Europe within four weeks. Surprisingly, there were no plans for the air force to have this 
capability  available  and  an  appropriate  rebuke  was  given  to  the  JCS  for  this  major 
oversight. Procedures were then formulated between CINCEUR and the commanders of 
the USAF Europe and US Navy Europe for the deployment of an intra-theatre airlift.
348  
 
This matter arose during the 1960 presidential campaign and Kennedy emphasised the 
point during his first State of the Union speech in January 1961; a modern airlift capacity, 
i.e.  the  concept  of  flexible  response,  was  now  being  backed  at  the  highest  level. 
McNamara accelerated the procurement and 284 of the new C-141 Starlifter aircraft were 
provided by 1968. At the same time there was also greater development in Europe of 
airfields to support America’s changed strategic doctrine. Without the airlift capability, 
the  US  could  not  achieve  the  NATO  requirements;  however,  the  Vietnam  War  also 
created a huge operational demand for this capability. 
 
According to McNamara in 1964, ‘our capability to airlift tonnage to any part of Europe 
has  almost  doubled.’  This  capacity  would  triple  by  1970  and  11  divisions  would  be 
delivered  to  Europe  within  30  days.  Logistical  supplies  were  also  pre-positioned  in 
Europe. Several hundred aircraft would also be delivered from the US to Europe within 
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three  days.
349  Scottish  airfields  were  in  an  ideal  location  for  this  purpose  and  were 
regularly used.
350 
 
The first major reinforcement exercise, REFORGER (Reinforcement of Germany), took 
place  in  1963  and  moved  150,000  personnel  and  associated  stores  from  the  US  to 
Germany in 63 hours. At the same time, as a consequence of the Vietnam War, America 
decided to withdraw almost 30,000 troops from Europe in 1968; however, to reassure 
their nervous allies, an agreement was also made to practice REFORGER annually. 
 
These advances were driven by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) which 
had been established in 1958 as a response to the shock of Sputnik. ARPA was a unique 
organisation and reported directly to the Secretary of Defense; its remit of ensuring that 
the USA led the way with the application of state-of the art technology for military uses, 
was outwith the standard military R&D structure.
351 Its most noteworthy achievement 
was  the  invention  of  the  Internet  in  1969,  when  ARPA  researched  the  problem  of 
command and control after a nuclear attack and developed a communications solution 
named the ARPANET.  
 
Soviet Threat 
 
The development of the BMEWS and DEW systems was a direct US response to the 
missile  systems  being  deployed  by  the  Soviet  Union.  This  was  a  constant  and  ever-
growing threat as the USSR rapidly improved its missile capability from a very poor base 
in the early 1950s to one of almost parity by the mid-1970s. 
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In 1958, the USSR possessed only R-5M (SS-3 Shyster, 1,200 kilometres range) IRBMs; 
48 were deployed after 1957 and there were also long range bombers. The ICBM R-7 
(SS-6 Sapwood, 8,000 kilometres range) arrived in 1960 and remained in operational use 
until 1968, but this was not fully adopted and only 4 were deployed.
352 It was followed in 
1961 by the R-16 (SS-7 Saddler, 11,000 kilometres range); 186 were deployed up to 
1979. Although these missiles were somewhat primitive in their design and guidance 
systems, the US nevertheless implemented significant countermeasures such as BMEWS. 
 
The Soviets produced the R-12 (SS-4 Sandal, 2,000 kilometres range) TBM; this was 
deployed to Cuba, sparking the missile crisis in October 1962; a total of 608 were fully 
deployed  after  1960.  Next  came  the  R-14  (SS-5  Skean,  4,500  kilometres)  which 
‘exhibited the maximum potential of a single-stage ballistic missile’ according to Podvig; 
97 launchers were deployed between 1965 and 1969.  
 
In addition, there were bombers such as the Tupolev Tu-16 (Badger), the mainstay of the 
strategic bomber forces; this was designed as a high-speed jet bomber for tactical use, 
with a range of 5,800 kilometres. Large numbers were produced and it was still being 
flown by the Russian Air Force in 1993.  However, the first ‘intercontinental’ strategic 
bomber was the M-4 3M (Bison), with its range of 8,100 kilometres: this aircraft came 
into service in 1958 and 93 were constructed by the end of 1963. 
 
The Tupolev Tu-95 (Bear) was designed to deliver nuclear weapons into continental USA 
and  was  a  major  Soviet  strategic  advance,  but  there  were  only  one  hundred  ever  in 
operational use. The M-4 Molot (Bison) Strategic Bomber had a combat range of 8,000 
kilometres, but even after upgrading, less than 60 were built as they could not properly 
overcome the US air defences. 
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Other missiles were developed and the R-9A (SS-8 Sasin) was operational from 1963 to 
1976, but only 23 were deployed. The major development was the orbital ICBM R-36 
(SS-9 Scarp, 40,000 kilometres range), with a conventional launch model, range 10,200 
kilometres; a total of 268 launchers were deployed between 1965 and 1973. Soviet land-
based ICBMs improved with the UR-100 (SS-11 Sego, 11,000 kilometres range) in 1966 
and the RT-2 (SS-13 Savage, 9,400 kilometres range) in 1968. The submerged launch 
threat was upgraded by the R-27 (SSN-6 Serb, 2,700 kilometres range) SLBM; the SSN-
8, SLBM, (4,690 kilometres) further increased this threat by 1972.
353 As a result, the 
Soviet Union could almost claim strategic nuclear parity by 1970 with their versatile 
range of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. 
 
A summary of Soviet missile development is shown in Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5 
 
Soviet Missiles 
 
Soviet title  NATO title  Range  Type  Year 
R-5M  SS-3 Shyster  1,200 kms  IRBM  1958 
R-7  SS-6 Sapwood  8,000 kms  ICBM  1960 
R-16  SS-7 Saddler  11,000 kms  ICBM  1961 
R-12  SS-4 Sandal  2,000 kms  IRBM  1960 
R-14  SS-5 Skean  4,500 kms  ICBM  1965 
R-9A  SS-8 Sassin  10,000 kms  ICBM  1963 
R-36  SS-9 Scarp  10,200 kms  ICBM  1965 
UR-100  SS-11 Sego  11,000 kms  ICBM  1966 
RT-2  SS-13 Savage  9,400 kms  ICBM  1968 
R-27  SSN-6 Serb  2,700 kms  SLBM  1970 
R-29  SSN-8 Sawfly  4,690 kms  SLBM  1972 
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US Activities in Scotland 
 
The logistics required for fighting a conventional war could only come from America and 
therefore bases, airfields and ports needed to be available in the UK. Scotland had played 
a peripheral role in the US activities during World War 2, therefore a new structure had to 
be  created.
354  However,  less  than  one  per  cent  of  the  American  forces  had  been  in 
Scotland because of its geographical remoteness to the efforts in Western Europe. The 
post-war  US  requirements,  however,  propelled  Scotland  rapidly  up  the  list  of  most 
desirable locations for the sprawling network of installations and links that made US 
policy  work  on  the  ground.  Soviet  strategic  development  increased  the  threat  and 
therefore the importance of the Scottish bases. 
 
By 1957 the US had a wide spectrum of military establishments in the UK, including 
airfields, personnel accommodation, anchorages, port facilities, logistics bases, hospitals, 
weather observation facilities, military headquarters and navigation stations, as well as 
army, navy and air live firing ranges.
355 They also possessed an IRBM launch complex, 
LORAN stations, a naval aviation site at Machrihanish, as well as a variety of essential 
communications networks.  
 
The original specification for BMEWS included a site in Scotland;  this site was proposed 
for Thurso because of its excellent location and was subsequently fully exploited to serve 
the needs of US strategic policy.
 356 
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Improved communications were requested by senior American officers in March 1959, to 
overcome  the  lack  of  reserve  capacity  in  naval  communications  and  specifically  the 
shortcomings of the Londonderry station in support of operations in the Norwegian Seas 
area.
357  The  US  naval  headquarters  London  had  already  been  integrated  into  the 
UK/USAF Air Operations Net to facilitate air operations in the Iceland to Londonderry 
area. This HQ was also linked to the Admiralty to provide US traffic on the UK net. The 
scene  was  set,  therefore,  for  the  construction  of  the  US  Navy  facility  at  Thurso  to 
improve the communications network. By 1960, communications with submarines were 
tested by aircraft from Prestwick, another example of good US/UK relations, but without 
any specific quid pro quo for Britain.
 358 
 
The US Navy communications stations at Thurso and Edzell were involved in providing 
ground resilience links for the TACAMO and SILK PURSE systems, further evidence of 
the geographical importance of these Scottish bases to US strategic operations.
 359  Little 
evidence has been uncovered of any significant US/UK consultation on this matter.  
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The deployment of the NATO-wide communications network to the UK, as highlighted 
by Orrick, was not problematic because of the good relationship between the UK and US 
governments, and it was duly implemented with the Scottish links being integrated in a 
confidential fashion.
 360 . At this stage, the US involved all NATO partners and achieved 
a swift, operationally-viable outcome, a singular example of unilateral requirement being 
accomplished in a multilateral fashion. The separate computer information link required 
for SACEUR was also transmitted via the Scottish stations.
361 
 
The MEECN system also trained annually in Europe and the Scottish networks were 
used.  Emergency  Action  Messages  (EAMs)  from  the  NAC  were  transmitted  to  the 
SSBNs in the northern waters from Thurso, which was thus accomplishing its primary 
wartime role. There can be no doubt about the essential nature of these Scottish bases to 
the US strategic communications requirements.  
There were two NARS sites in the UK; one at Mormond Hill, Scotland (Site 44) and 
Fylingdales  Moor,  Yorkshire  (Site  45)  to  provide  connectivity  for  the  BMEWS  site 
operated by the RAF. The UK sites had been established with little public announcement, 
yet again demonstrating the ‘gentleman’s agreement’ aspect of the US/UK relationship. 
 
ACE used links in Scotland, including the Shetlands, with a major interconnect site at 
Mormond Hill; as always, the Anglo-American relationship ensured that these Scottish 
facilities  were  quietly  provided  and  rapidly  activated.  The  AUTOVON  project  had  a 
major  presence  in  Scotland  and  a  line  of  unmanned  sites  at  Latheron,  Inverbervie, 
Kinnaber, Craigowl Hill, East Lomond, Kirk o’ Shotts, Browncarrick Hill and Seargeant 
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Law linked this network from the DEW Line to England and Londonderry. The Scottish 
bases were in the essential category for US strategic communications. 
362 
 
By 1969 the UK Wideband Microwave System (UKMS) was completed and Edzell was 
linked to Londonderry; there were also another seven Scottish UKMS sites, including 
Mormond Hill.
363 Edzell’s inclusion was an indication that the CRITICOMM network 
(communications supporting the National SIGINT mission), had been incorporated into 
this protected network.
364 The relevance and importance of Edzell in this context could 
not have been clearer. 
 
AUTOVON and ACE HIGH were upgraded in the 1970s using these microwave links, 
providing  secure  voice  and  data  capability;  Scotland  had  seven  Digital  European 
Backbone  (DEB)  sites,  including  West  Murkle  and  Mormond  Hill.
365    Campbell  has 
claimed that other Scottish sites were also part of the ‘mission-critical’ network, but no 
reliable  sources  have  been  found  to  support  this  assertion.
366  Regardless,  the  sites  in 
Scotland were used to broadcast US military communications, with a notable absence of 
any NATO role; therefore Campbell’s claim may probably be accurate. 
 
                                                 
362 Peter B Mersky, Autovon: The DoD Phone Company, The Department of the Navy Information 
Technology Magazine, [accessed 16 June 2006]: Dr Martin J Fischer et, al. The Circuit Switched Network 
Design and Analysis Model, The Telecommunications Review, p.91. [accessed 20 June 2006].  
 
363 WNY, NRS/2, 5750, Ser.09, OP Nav Report, 5750-1 (Command History) Thurso, 26 January 1970, 
cited in Duke 1987.p.148. 
 
364 Securing Record Communications, The TSEC/KW-26, Center for Cryptologic History, National 
Security Agency, [accessed 19 June 2006] p.8. 
 
365 Duke, United States Military Forces, p.305: Digital European Backbone Complete, ElectronicSystems 
Center Public Affairs, [accessed 3 December 2005]: Source: 5th Signal Command Briefing , 
Communications in the European Theater, US Army, Europe, [accessed 9 May 2006]. NAS, DD12/2518 = 
P/SLR/11/ZT/9, Letter from Mrs HD Harrison, MOD S13 (d) Air), to Miss JF Nicol, Scottish Development 
Department, Subject: Service Land Requirements Ministry of Defence (Air Force Department) 
Safeguarding of Technical Sites, 23 June 1964, Ref: C144250/61/II/S 13d (Air), Unclassified. NAS, 
AF79/70, Letter from Mrs HD Harrison, MOD, to Miss Nicol, Scottish Development Department, 28th 
May 1964, AF/A1629/64/S.13d (Air). 
 
366 Campbell, 1986, p.117. 
 Scotland the Brave? US Strategic Policy in Scotland 1953-1974 
  132   
The microwave system achieved its strategic objective of rendering American military 
communications completely independent of UK and other national systems. The unstated 
purpose of this upgrading was to ensure that emergency contact could be guaranteed with 
the SSBNs in northern waters.
367 This was an excellent example of the USA identifying a 
strategic  requirement,  with  its  Scottish-based  SSBNs,  and  implementing  a  Scottish 
communications solution. The USAF also operated a ground-to-air link at Mormond Hill, 
which  was  deployed  as  part  of  the  Apollo  space  mission  network.
368  Scotland’s 
attractiveness as a communications platform was never more apparent. The 1965 JCS 
report which established the NEACP and NMCS required the technical upgrading of the 
existing Scottish links at Thurso and Mormond Hill. 
369  
 
The Americans constructed a fully operational communications system for their SSBN 
fleet, using VLF and ELF; this was centred at Thurso, the main VLF transmitter for 
Europe.
 In Scotland, the US naval communications network was totally independent of 
any UK systems; this ensured that Thurso and relay stations in the north of the country 
could guarantee links to the SSBNs in the Norwegian Sea patrol areas.
370 The US had 
insisted on full support from the British government.  In addition, there was a group of 
LF  stations  to  provide  resilience  for  the  system,  only  used  for  close-to-surface 
communications,  and  also  the  TACAMO  aircraft  with  their  ten  kilometres  trailing 
antenna. All of these communicated with Thurso. 
 
                                                 
367 Duke, United States Military Forces, p.332. 
 
368 Press and Journal, 14 December 1972. 
 
369 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, from Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Conceptual Approach to 
the National Military Command System (NMCS) (U), 26 February 1965, Top Secret, Reproduced in 
Declassified Documents Reference System. Document Number: CK3100074559  [accessed 15 May 2006]. 
Department of Defense cable regarding a uniform system of progressive alert procedures to assure national 
security, 5 March 1964, Secret, Reproduced in Declassified Documents Reference System. Document 
Number: CK3100138641, [accessed 15 May 2006]. 
 
370 Duke, United States Military Forces, pp.332-4: SIPRI Yearbook 1969/70, p.118: Submarine 
Communications Shore Infrastructure, Federation of American Scientists, [accessed 3 June 2006]: 
Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of Defense, Subject: Defense Department Budget for FY 
69 (U), 1 December 1967, Top Secret, Document Number: CK3100138481, [accessed 16 January 2006]. 
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Eight LORAN stations were established, including Scatsta, in Shetland, and Bo and Jan 
Mayen Island, both in Norway; as with previous base construction, the Shetland base was 
implemented quietly.
371  By 1969 there were 79 LORAN -A stations in operation and 18 
LORAN -C stations, including three stations in Scotland, operated by the USCG. This 
was another example of Scottish strategic achievement for the USA. 
 
The LORAN-C transmission system was upgraded in the 1970s for use by SSBNs and 
codenamed Clarinet Pilgrim. It was a vital element of the US strategic package and the 
Scottish stations at Thurso and Edzell, who had both operated the previous Clarinet Betty 
system for LORAN-A, were crucial participants..
372 Thurso and Edzell also linked the 
Transit satellite navigation data to the SSBNs in the northern waters.  
 
Because of the strategic advances achieved by REFORGER, the Pentagon decided to 
reduce American air presence in the UK (see Chapter 2), and this was announced by 
General Landon, CINCUSAFEUR, in April 1963. Various USAF bases in the UK were 
closed down, but this excluded the Scottish airfields, Prestwick and Machrihanish, which 
had become part of the US logistics chain.
373 
 
Prestwick and Machrihanish had a long history of military aviation. In Prestwick’s case 
this began in 1917 when the Number 1 School for Aerial Fighting was formed at nearby 
Ayr Racecourse, and by 1933 Scotland’s first female captain, Winifred Drinkwater flew 
her first service flight from Campbeltown to Prestwick.
374 In 1935 the Scottish College of 
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Aviation was formed at Prestwick to train RAF pilots; the main personality involved was 
Squadron Leader the Marquis of Clydesdale, who had been the first person to fly over 
Mount Everest in 1933. Number 1 Civil Air Navigation School (CANS) was formed in 
1938.  
 
Once World War 2 began, Prestwick’s location as an all-weather, Atlantic side airfield 
saw the arrival of various units: merchant navy convoy escort aircraft operated out of the 
base, an aviation radio school was established and ferry transport flew aircraft to other 
UK bases. However, the most momentous event happened in 1940, when a ferry flight 
from Gander, Newfoundland, landed at Prestwick after bad weather closed Aldergrove in 
Northern Ireland.
375 During the war, almost 5,000 aircraft were delivered over the North 
Atlantic via Prestwick and more than 37,000 military flights were undertaken through 
Prestwick. This was a portentous activity in view of Prestwick’s later use by the United 
States. 
 
After the war, Prestwick remained the preferred bad-weather diversion airfield for many 
civil and military flights and was a staging and maintenance base for USAF aircraft. It 
was reactivated for USAF use in 1951, when the 1631st Air Base Group (USAF) arrived 
to  support  MATS  and  Prestwick  was  also  given  air-sea  rescue  responsibility  for  the 
eastern Atlantic. The site was rapidly re-developed and in May 1952, the 67th Air Rescue 
Squadron moved in; the following month, Prestwick hosted the completion of the first 
transatlantic  flight  by  helicopter,  when  two  USAF  Sikorsky  H-19s  arrived  from 
Reykjavik. This helped cement its geographic relevance to US aviation. 
 
Jet fighter aircraft in transit to Europe parked at Prestwick and during Exercise Big Lift in 
1961, more than 40 transport aircraft arrived: the US Navy also used Prestwick for early 
warning operations, ASW surveillance and other missions. Scotland was now playing a 
full,  operational  part  in  delivering  American  strategic  policy.  There  were  no  local 
problems to be overcome and no strains on the Anglo-American relationship as a result. 
                                                 
375 Jackson, pp.31-2, 43, 177. 
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Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet deputy premier Mr Mikoyan arrived at 
Prestwick  en  route  for  Havana,  highlighting  the  bizarre  situation  of  a  senior  Soviet 
minister  using  an  American  strategic  overseas  base  during  a  period  of  international 
tension.
376 The change over of FBM crews for the Holy Loch base also took place at 
Prestwick (see Chapter Three), and a Courier Transfer Station was opened in January 
1963 to facilitate the daily movement of SIGINT data from Edzell to Washington DC 
(see  Chapter  Two).
377  International  diplomacy,  nuclear  response  and  intelligence 
activities were now regular US strategic activities at Prestwick. 
 
In 1965, the 1267th Airways and Communications Service (AACS) Squadron MATS 
arrived to handle the transit requirement to move US military personnel to Europe.
378 
The1602nd  Air  Transport  Wing  arrived  to  support  1631st  Air  Base  Group,  and  also 
deployed  were  detachments  of  18th  Weather  Squadron  and  3rd  Postal  Squadron.  In 
addition, Prestwick was regularly used by other units from MATS/MAC, e.g. 420
th Air 
Refuelling  Squadron,  1370th  Photo  Mapping  Wing,  as  well  as  occasionally  hosting 
aircraft involved with Distant Airborne Early Warning and other operations.  
 
Later that year, the 67th Air Rescue Squadron left Prestwick and moved to Moron AFB 
in Spain, as most of the sea traffic from the USA was heading through the sea waters 
controllable from.
 379  Prestwick was then run down by the USAF, and in 1970 became 
HMS Gannet, a Royal Navy ASW base, which had been given responsibility for ASW 
defence of the Clyde area. However, the transit of the Blue/Gold crews was still carried 
out at Prestwick until 1992. 
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378 Berry, p.76: 18th Weather Squadron Unit History, Simmons Weather, Fort Bragg, [accessed 1 June 
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A summary of the US units deployed to Prestwick during the research period is set out in 
Table 6 below. 
 
Table 6 
 
USAF Units Based at Prestwick 1951-1970 
 
Unit  Dates  Activities 
1631
st Air Base 
Group 
1951-1970  Support of MATS; 
Changeover of SSBN crews 1961-1992 
 
67
th Air Rescue 
Squadron 
1952-1965  Responsible for Eastern Atlantic. 
 
Courier Transfer 
Station, 6321
st Air 
Base Group 
 
1963-1970  Under command CO Edzell. 
1267
th Airways & 
Communications 
Service Squadron 
MATS 
 
1965-1970  Terminal  operators  to  move  US 
servicemen to Europe. 
1602
nd Air Transport 
Wing 
 
1965-1970  Support for 1631
st Air Base Group. 
18
th Weather 
Squadron 
 
1966-1970  Weather reconnaissance 
3
rd Postal Squadron 
 
1966-1970  Postal duties. 
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The Clyde area was considered suitable for the construction of additional US airfields at 
Machrihanish  and  Stornoway  in  September  1959;  atomic  weapons  stockpile  facilities 
were also authorised for these sites.
380 All of the facilities in the Clyde area, including 
ammunition and oil storage depots, Machrihanish airfield and associated communications 
sites were assigned to SACEUR for wartime use. This was another sign of the importance 
of Scottish operational facilities as forward bases, especially at a safe distance from the 
USA. 
381 
 
In 1906 Professor Fessenden, inventor of the echo sounder, built a 150-metre tall radio 
mast at Machrihanish and achieved the first radio voice transmission across the Atlantic, 
between Britain and the USA, Campbeltown airfield was expanded during World War 2 
and  became  one  of  the  three  busiest  airfields  in  the  UK  because  of  its  strategically 
important location as the nearest landfall for the Atlantic naval convoys.
382 This strategic 
importance caused the US to request an upgrading of the airfield in the 1960s. This was 
achieved, despite opposition by the Duke of Argyll to the loss of some acres of one of his 
nearby  farms.
383  Once  again,  the  American  strategic  interests  had  been  comfortably 
accommodated without local difficulties or relationship strain. 
 
                                                 
380 Declassified Documents Reference System, Document Number: CK3100343363. Also; Appendix to 
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Subject: Machrihanish-Brief for Lord Forces’ Visit to Campbeltown on 4
th May 1959, dated 30 April 1959. 
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Subject: Notice of Proposed Acquisition of Land by Admiralty, 17 January 1958, 5030/2678/116a, 
Confidential Enclosure. Also: ‘NATO Base for Kintyre, Machrihanish Airfield runway to be extended’, 
Scotsman, 28 April 1959; ‘NATO Air Base in Kintyre’, Glasgow Herald, 28 April 1959: NAS, 
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Machrihanish-Brief for Lord Forces’ Visit to Campbeltown on 4
th May 1959, dated 30 April 1959: NAS, 
DD12/3064=P/SLR/10/AL/18/1, Letter from Lord Selkirk, First Lord of the Admiralty, to Duke of Argyll, 
18 November 1958, Unclassified. 
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When the development project began in January 1959, the Scottish Office indulged in the 
customary subterfuge, claiming that it was not an ‘active airfield’ and would ‘only be put 
to very occasional use for defence exercises for short periods in peace time.’
384 In March 
1962, a huge NATO fuel depot was constructed. The RAF announced that they would be 
deploying nuclear depth charges to a stockpile in Scotland before September 1963; the 
only site that could take these was Machrihanish, as suitable bunkers had recently been 
constructed. This action was definitely a strategic requirement from the USA as the UK 
did not possess its own nuclear depth charges and remained a matter of considerable 
speculation  regarding  the  presence  of  undisclosed  US  nuclear  weapons  in  Scotland. 
However, the research has been able to arrive at a positive conclusion to this mystery.  
 
A storage area was provided at Machrihanish for storing nuclear depth charges for use by 
the US Navy and the RAF in wartime; no documentary evidence has been discovered that 
these weapons were ever stored on the base, although anti-submarine torpedoes were 
stored on site.
385 Serving RAF personnel believe this to have been the case. 
 
In  mid-1967,  US  naval  personnel  for  a  Mobile  Mine  Assembly  Unit  arrived  at 
Machrihanish. They were joined by a detachment from the Explosives Ordnance Disposal 
(EOD) Group, US Atlantic Fleet. The base was commissioned on 7 March 1968 as US 
Naval  Aviation  Weapons  Facility  Machrihanish,  with  a  mission  to  ‘receive,  store, 
maintain, issue and tranship classified weapons in support of the US Navy and NATO 
operations,’ and placed under the command of CINCLANT. 
386  
 
                                                 
384 NAS, DD12/3064=P/SLR/10/AL/18/1, Letter from JM Foster, Department of Health for Scotland, to 
JAM Mitchell and others, including the Scottish Information Office, Subject: NATO Facilities Clyde Area, 
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385 Interview with former RAF armourer inspection officer on 30 June 2006. 
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US Marines were deployed to the base in January 1974, to provide physical security; the 
British government agreed that this activity should be treated in a low-key fashion, with 
little publicity, other than informing the local Member of Parliament. Lord Carrington, 
Defence Secretary, described it as a ‘re-deployment of US forces’ after the end of the 
Vietnam War, who would relieve American sailors who had been ‘misemployed hitherto 
on this work.’
387  
 
This  was  disingenuous  as  the  US  Marine  Corps  had  primary  responsibility  for  the 
security of all US Navy nuclear weapons; it has been stated that the Marine detachment 
here  had  one  primary  function,  namely  ‘nuclear  weapons  security.’  Therefore,  it  is 
probable that they carried out this mission; if this was not so, there seems to be little 
reason for replacing the US naval personnel and keeping quiet about it. Further strength is 
given to this theory by local residents who recall that US servicemen never appeared in 
the local court, but were always moved to the USA from local police custody.
388 Another 
theory  is  that  any  nuclear  munitions  stored  at  Machrihanish  were  for  use  by  RAF 
Nimrods; the US Navy was known to store such items at St Mawgan, Cornwall, for a 
similar task for the RAF.
389  
 
The specific role of USAF Machrihanish is still classified, but it would appear that it had 
a direct task of servicing nuclear armaments, giving credence to the belief that nuclear 
armaments were stored on the base. Otherwise, there would have been no reason for the 
presence of the USMC and EOD nuclear specialist units.
 390 
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The  agreement  for  deployment  of  these  ASW  nuclear  weapons  was  made  between 
President  Johnson  and  Prime  Minister  Wilson  in  1965  and  formed  part  of  the  long-
standing consultation procedures dating from 1952; this situation was reiterated in 1970 
by the Secretary of State Rogers, to Prime Minister Heath.
 391  
 
This US involvement produced the longest runway in Western Europe (3,049 metres) to 
enable Machrihanish to receive large transport aircraft from the USA.
392 The base was 
regularly used by RAF Vulcan bombers (the UK’s airborne nuclear delivery force) and 
also by US Navy P-3 Orion ASW patrol aircraft (which carried nuclear ASW weapons). 
Machrihanish moved into an important position for American strategic reinforcement and 
ASW activities. 
 
In 1971 the JCS assessed that the USSR could plan for a conventional air attack on the 
UK and use chemical weapons. Dual-purpose airfields, e.g. Prestwick and Machrihanish, 
were  vulnerable,  along  with  conventional  naval  locations.  A  NATO  programme  of 
hardening of airfields against missile attacks was also implemented
.393 
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A summary of the US units deployed to Machrihanish is set out in Table 7 below. 
 
Table 7 
 
US Naval Aviation Weapons Facility Campbeltown Units 
 
Unit  Dates  Remarks 
Mobile  Mine 
Assembly Unit 
 
1967-1996  Assembly  team  for  nuclear  depth 
charges. 
Detachment 
Explosives 
Ordnance 
Disposal  Group, 
6
th US Fleet. 
 
1968-1996  Servicing nuclear armaments. 
Detachment 
USMC 
1974-1996  Security  protection  for  US  Navy 
nuclear weapons. 
 
 
 
Amusingly, the development of the US naval munitions depot at Glen Douglas, Loch 
Long, was beset with a non-military problem, when it became embroiled in a parochial 
dispute  with  the  intransigent  Scottish  Office  over  ownership  of  a  flock  of  sheep.
394 
Despite a personal plea from the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, that his mission was to ‘run 
ships, not sheep’, the saga lasted more than 20 months before the construction could 
commence.  As  well  as  Royal  Navy  munitions,  Glen  Douglas  stored  the  munitions 
                                                 
394 NAS, AF79/70, Letter from Graham-Campbell, Forestry Commission Scotland, to J Walker, Department 
of Agriculture for Scotland, Subject: Craggan farm (Part) Glen Douglas, Dunbartonshire, 8 May 1956, 
108680/L/SLR/AD/GD/S, 229/25, Unclassified: Letter from Ian Orr-Ewing MP, Civil Lord of the 
Admiralty, to Gilmour Leburn MP, Department of Agriculture, 2 December 1959; letter from Gilmour 
Leburn MP, Department of Agriculture, to Ian Orr-Ewing MP, Civil Lord of the Admiralty, 15th December 
1959. Also; Interview with former RAF armourer inspection officer on 30 June 2006. 
 Scotland the Brave? US Strategic Policy in Scotland 1953-1974 
  142   
requirement for a Marine Expeditionary Force. This was yet another important front line 
addition in Scotland to US strategic capabilities. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There has been plenty of good source material available for this chapter, although several 
areas are still not yet declassified. It has however been difficult to obtain much detailed 
information of the individual communications sites from UK sources, which is surprising 
as all would have been required to be submitted to local authority planning processes. 
This may be explained by the probability that their requirements were piggybacked on to 
existing run-of-the-mill UK applications. 
 
To support their strategic aims, the US needed to install a full network of support services 
for their overseas activities. They had originally done this during World War 2 and the 
UK had been the principal overseas location. However, less than one per cent of the 
American  forces  had  been in  Scotland because  of its  geographical  remoteness  to  the 
military efforts in Western Europe. The post-war US requirements, however, propelled 
Scotland rapidly up the list of most desirable locations for the network of installations 
and links that made US policy work on the ground.  
 
This was completely due to its geographical significance, i.e. in military parlance it was 
‘vital ground.’ In all military operations, there is some ground which is designated as 
vital ground; it is a formal term and simply means that whichever side is able to dominate 
the  vital  ground  will  have  a  major  strategic/tactical  advantage.  Throughout  military, 
including naval, history, the battle for vital ground had been the aim of every campaign 
and  battle.  Its  possession  is  the  imperative  for  commanders  and  therefore  Scotland’s 
geography placed it in this category during this period. 
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, there was a rapid upgrading of the American presence in 
Europe;  the  command  and  control  infrastructure  was  improved  with  better  links  to 
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NCA would always be able to exercise control over the major US strategic functions in 
any European-based conflict. This was accomplished in a unilateral fashion by the USA, 
without  any  real  close  inspection  as  radio  relay  stations  were  trivial  matters  when 
considered against Polaris-carrying submarines.. 
 
All aspects of the US military infrastructure were enhanced, especially the links to the 
strategic  nuclear  forces.  There  were  better  ship-to-shore  communications  and  greater 
navigational facilities, principally based in the northern Atlantic area. The Scottish bases 
had an important role in this structure, particularly those at Thurso and in the Shetlands. It 
became obvious that Europe’s role in US strategy was to be a ‘fire break’ to detain the 
Warsaw Pact forces and provide time for American reinforcements to be delivered in 
time of need; the upgrading of facilities at Prestwick and Machrihanish bear testimony to 
this strategy. This major refurbishment of the US military profile was accomplished with 
little objection from the UK, as befitting the junior partner in the ‘special relationship.’  
 
The United States amended its strategic policy during this period, in most cases as a 
result of its own requirements; these changes were fully implemented at communications 
and  logistics  bases  in  Scotland,  emphasising  that  Scotland  was  vital  in  the  overall 
American strategic scenario. 
 
The  evidence  in  this  chapter  shows  that  the  Anglo-American  relationship  was  not 
damaged by the American use of Scottish bases for strategic purposes; the bases also 
enabled the US to fully deliver the strategic matters requiring such bases in Scotland. 
There is little evidence that there was any NATO involvement in any of these above 
activities. On the other hand, there were definitely no local problems that affected the US 
strategic purpose of the bases in Scottish locations. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This  research  has  been  possible  because  of  the  wide  range  of  sources  identified  and 
examined for the various topics. Many of these sources provide excellent material from 
extremely reliable sources. However, the sources are not a complete list and have many 
omissions,  particularly  with  regards  to  detailed  operational  orders  and  mission 
statements. All matters regarding national security have long declassification procedures 
and this has been the single fact which has limited the statement of various points. In 
conjunction, the intelligence gathering community holds fast to a lifetime secrecy code 
and this has hampered this particular topic. 
 
Taken  together,  there  is  sufficient  source  material  available  to  clearly  state  some 
conclusions and make supported statements regarding other matters. More research is 
needed in many instances to uncover better material for those weaker areas. 
 
·  Why were the Americans present in Scotland during this period in such strength? 
·  What were they doing there? 
·  How did this change over time? 
·  How does this study of policy implementation help us to understand the American 
motives? 
 
The Americans were present at Kirknewton, Edzell and Thurso as part of their worldwide 
intelligence gathering requirements. Despite the strict secrecy regime surrounding such 
activities,  there  is  sufficient  evidence  from  the research  to  safely  conclude  that these 
bases  were  key  players  in  the  European  zone  of  this  operation.
  395  Although  such 
constraints have necessarily restricted the available information, the US presence and 
activities at these bases has been established. Over time, the only changes at Edzell and 
                                                 
395 SECNAVINST 5212.SD, 22 April 1998, Chapter 2, Telecommunications Records, pp III-2-1 to III-2-
24. Navy Directives ,[accessed 3 March 2006]. 
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Thurso were the upgrading of facilities and greater integration into overall US strategic 
operations. 
 
All of the US actions and decisions were driven by American requirements, which were 
integrated into the overall defence of Western Europe. The Soviet Navy’s biggest fleet, 
with all its SSBNs, was being assembled in northern waters throughout the 1950s and 
1960s and therefore the US needed to upgrade its presence at Edzell and Thurso to assist 
its ASW strategy. 
 
The US Navy was present at Holy Loch as part of the US strategic policy of second-strike 
capability; their sole purpose was to provide the USA with the guarantee of a second-
strike and therefore ensure balance in the Cold War strategic equation. Holy Loch was 
required because of the forward defence implications of both US strategy and the limited 
range of the missiles. It was able to use Holy Loch because of the strength of the US/UK 
special relationship, but also because of the military benefits that the UK was able to 
accomplish by agreement.  
 
However, it was predicated on a completely American unilateral position regarding the 
UK and the USSR; American policy required these facilities and they obtained them. It 
was strategically essential to the USA, having a most potent deterrent force at a location 
as close to the enemy as possible and as far away from their own shores as they could 
contrive.  As  one  American  sailor  said  about  Holy  Loch,  ‘Imagine  handling  nuclear 
weapons in a residential neighborhood (sic)! Some of the Scots' complaints about us were 
justified. Would you allow that in your neighborhood (sic)?’ 
396 
 
The  FBM  fleet  achieved  its  strategic  purpose  during  the  Cuban  Crisis  and  the  only 
changes were in the upgrading of the Polaris missile, the introduction of Poseidon and the 
berthing of more submarines at Holy Loch than previously agreed. Holy Loch was the 
iconic example of the importance of Scotland to the USA for its strategic nuclear policy. 
                                                 
396 Sub Bases: Holy Loch Scotland, Tender Tale, [accessed 19 August 2005]. 
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The available evidence shows no damage to the ‘Special Relationship’ from US 
operations at the Holy Loch. The UK government recognised reality and agreed to all US 
requests. This pliability meant that the US Navy was able to execute its strategic mission 
from Scotland. The US actions at Holy Loch were not  
 
The American use of Scottish facilities in their ASW operations during this period was an 
integral part of their overall strategic activity. However, it needs to be borne in mind that 
these activities were also aimed at the protection of Western Europe and therefore the 
exploitation of Scotland’s strategic geographical location would have been part of any 
NATO operational plan. The Scottish bases at Thurso, Edzell and Holy Loch were fully 
involved in this plan. The accompanying official policy of misinformation was a natural 
consequence of such a high value defence operation. 
 
The upgrading of various pieces of equipment and increases in manning levels at the 
bases were also consistent with the prime task involved. In general terms, it was a repeat 
of Scotland’s one strategic function of World War 2, namely anti-submarine warfare, as 
its geography was still pertinent and military vital ground. The American motives were 
the same as from that period. 
 
The  Americans  had  a  wide  range  of  smaller  facilities  in  Scotland  to  enable  them  to 
provide the full support and logistics network for their strategic plans for the defence of 
Western Europe. However, the principal aim of these facilities was in the defence of 
mainland USA from Soviet missiles crossing the polar zone. The airfields at Prestwick 
and Machrihanish both played a significant role in both reinforcement plans and ASW 
requirements;  Machrihanish  probably  contained  nuclear  ASW  munitions  and  was 
therefore a significant UK location as the only other known ASW storage facility was at 
St Mawgan. 
 
Scotland occupied vital ground both from strategic operational perspective and also from 
a logistical viewpoint. The upgrading of American communications systems throughout 
the  period  meant  that  there  was  constant  activity  on  the  various  Scottish  sites,  both Scotland the Brave? US Strategic Policy in Scotland 1953-1974 
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manned and unmanned. The American motives were simply to ensure that they could 
participate fully in the defence of Western Europe, while at the same time reducing costs 
to the USA, as demanded incessantly by the US Congress. 
 
Machrihanish is the only American base that still operates as a US facility, although this 
is very limited and infrequent. It has been used regularly since its official closure in 1998 
for various specialist aircraft trials, because of its very long runway; these aircraft have 
ranged from top secret spy planes to new heavy lift aircraft. It is also used for annual 
exercises by major USAF logistics units. However, the reason behind these activations is 
the remoteness of the airfield from any main centres of population; on one side is the 
Atlantic Ocean and the nearest large inhabited area is almost 200 kilometres away in 
Glasgow. In this aspect at least it could be claimed that Scotland still has a geographical 
uniqueness for the American forces. 
 
It needs to be remembered that the overall focus of the research is US strategic policy 
during the period and therefore documentation regarding its implementation in Scotland 
is scarce. This identifies an area of research that needs to be undertaken to provide a 
much more definitive appraisal of US activities in Scotland at this time. 
 
Without doubt, Scotland was an important place for US strategic operations during the 
period 1953-1974. Its geographic position meant that it had great saliency. During the 
Second World War, Scotland had only housed about one per cent of the entire American 
forces who passed through Britain; it was not geographically relevant as the war was 
some distance away. The situation changed with the Cold War and Scotland became a 
central piece of the US strategic solution: it was vital ground for the operations required 
in the Northern Seas, reinforcement locations and communications facilities. 
 
These facts rebut Duncan Campbell’s claim that American bases were in the UK mainly 
for political reasons; Scotland was sought out by the US Navy for essential facilities and 
this was the case throughout the research period. However, the facts also show that there 
were political advantages in having Scottish bases, as this enabled the US to keep a tight Scotland the Brave? US Strategic Policy in Scotland 1953-1974 
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rein  on  the  UK’s  strategic,  and  especially  nuclear,  intentions.  The  Scottish  bases 
undoubtedly provided sound military advantages for the USA, and by extension NATO, 
as they were and important part of the vital ground which governs all military actions. 
 
This was the reason for having bases in Scotland; it was because of the geographic 
importance in relation to the military technology currently available. It was a very good 
fit and has been shown by the research sources to have worked well throughout the 
period. Other countries had been chosen for US military bases through occupation after 
World War 2 (Japan and West Germany) and others because of economic and political 
reasons (Cold War politics): this was certainly not the case for Scotland. It was vital 
ground as previously explained and Scotland was geographically vital, but its use was 
eased by political amity between the two governments. Once its usefulness as vital 
ground had diminished in the 1980s onwards, Scotland was gradually abandoned by the 
USA. 
 
In the final analysis, the answers to the research questions have been established. Why 
were the Americans present in Scotland during this period in such strength? The research 
has shown that the United States chose to have bases in Scotland during this period of the 
Cold War because of its excellent geographic location. There was no other reason for the 
choice of Holy  Loch, Edzell, Thurso,  Prestwick and  Machrihanish. The matter needs 
more  detailed  research,  perhaps  along  the  lines  of  eventually  finding  operational 
information regarding submarines, intelligence gathering, communications, and nuclear 
weapons storage. 
 
What were they doing there? The USA introduced the SSBN to the Atlantic in 1961 and 
this strategic tool operated at all times in full accordance with its plan, especially during 
the  Cuban  missile  crisis.  The  build  up  of  intelligence  gathering,  submarine 
communications,  logistics,  navigation  equipment  and  command  and  control 
communications all occurred at the rate of increase that had been planned. The Scottish 
bases were essential to these matters. The USA employed a unilateralist approach, but 
they were acting in defence of Europe as well as themselves. Scotland the Brave? US Strategic Policy in Scotland 1953-1974 
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How  did  this  change  over  time?  Was  American  strategic  policy  a  unilateral  activity 
driven by the centrality of technical military issues? Was it an effort to reach a state of 
balance with the Soviet Union, or was it a unilateral American process that would have 
been enforced in any case? Was the United States able to use its Scottish facilities in line 
with the unilateral changes it had made to its strategic defence policy? The evidence 
examined during the research can only provide a positive reply on this matter.  
 
How  does  this  study  of  policy  implementation  help  us  to  understand  the  American 
motives? America’s main concern was that all nuclear launches would be controlled by 
the  US  president.  They  attempted  some  multilateral  camouflage,  such  as  the  NATO 
multilateral force (MLF), which was unacceptable to Britain and France, but led to the 
creation of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in 1968.
397 The two reasons for US 
overseas bases were ‘to provide support for forward forces engaged in war and to support 
American foreign policy worldwide.’
 398 In 1943 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) stated 
that American overseas bases were ‘essential’, and by 1970 there was ‘little initiative’ by 
the Americans to discard any bases. The American motives remained constant throughout 
the period. 
 
                                                 
397 Miller, pp.116-7: Freedman, Nuclear Strategy, pp.311-3. 
 
398 Coletta and Bauer, p.xvii; and, R Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases, (Oxford; 
Pergammon, 1982), pp.6 & 16. 
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